CONTENTS:
Summer 2000
Estafeta
John Sayles
on East & West Timor
Keeping up the Pressure
La’o Hamutuk
Election 2000
Constancio Pinto
Helping East Timor's Grassroots
West Papua
Short Takes
Estafeta
back issues
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East Timor Enters Reconstruction Era:
A Work in Progress
by John Sayles
“Welcome,” reads the banner hung in the sauna-like airport lobby in
Dili, East Timor, “to the World’s Most Recent Nation” (see photo).
This newly
independent half-island has suffered invasions by the Portuguese, the
Japanese, the Indonesians, and most recently by a well-meaning horde of
international relief agencies. I passed through Dili at the end of April
after visiting refugee camps scattered within neighboring West Timor and
talking with concerned parties of various backgrounds in Jakarta as part
of a delegation examining the plight of refugees generated by September’s
murder and scorched-earth campaign. With me were a trio of congressional
staffers, a graduate student expert in Indonesian affairs and a
representative from the East Timor Action Network (ETAN). We spoke with
relief workers, rights activists, bishops, colonels, governors,
ambassadors, and mass murderers in an attempt to learn if the bleeding had
ended and the healing begun.
We roll through the dust-choked streets of Dili. Large, bristly hogs
strut through the endless reconstruction sites — survivors. Water
buffalo, still used to work the rice fields here, were gunned down
systematically in the militias’ retreat.
“The World Bank sent a representative down,” grumbles an American
volunteer we meet with. “Listens to the long list of immediate crises we’re
facing here — no medicine, no doctors, no anything — then launches
into this speech about how important it is to make sure health care is
privatized. Before it can be privatized it has to exist.”
Into the West
The camps in West Timor are unusual in that a large percentage of the
original refugees did not flee there willingly but were kidnapped —
forced at gunpoint onto ships, planes, and trucks, and dumped in
Indonesian territory as the TNI and their militias destroyed East Timor.
And once UN peacekeeping forces were allowed into East Timor, these
unfortunate people were joined by the very people who’d sent them
packing in the first place, the militias and demobilized East Timorese who’d
served in TNI battalions. The first months were punctuated by militias
murdering political enemies and openly training. Decapitated bodies were
found miles away. UN and other aid workers were threatened upon entering
the camps, delivery of health services was difficult, and any sort of
reliable census or rapid repatriation impossible. The bulk of refugees
became hostages to the pro-integration militias. People have managed to
return home though, some on their own, most through the efforts of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Nearly 150,000 had
gone back by the time our delegation arrived (more than 100,000 still
remain). What became clear from source after source, however, was that
tens of thousands more would return if militia ringleaders were taken out
of the camps, and that the current military leadership in the area was not
willing to do this.
“[The TNI is] still recruiting new militia and training them,” one
West Timorese activist tells us. “Only now they put them in TNI uniforms
and drill them with the regulars. Never more than 15 at a time. Five leave
and another five go in, so you never see a big concentration of people.”
“What a fiasco,” says the nervous UN official who whisks us through
one of the largest camps in West Timor, near Kupang. He isn’t referring
to the operation of the camp, but to the sudden escort of police following
us through the rows of tents and metal-roofed huts. “Usually they’re
afraid to come in here. It’s the TNI [Indonesia regular army] who
control security here.”
The TNI colonel in charge of all camps in West Timor had assured us the
day before that his soldiers were only used in emergencies and that it was
the local police actually keeping order.
The camp is like a poor village grown huge — no fences marking its
boundaries, just mud and barefoot kids, a tentative stringing of
electrical wire, and every so often the large round water tanks that are
refilled from trucks every day. Slight variations on the basic
short-haired, famine-ribbed, rat-tailed Third World Dog root for scraps
all around us. The feeling is not desperate, only tense and a bit aimless
— too many people crowded together with nothing to do and no clear end
in sight.
“The rains have lasted longer this year,” a doctor treating
refugees in West Timor tells us. “This makes the respiratory problems
even worse. We can’t really treat TB in this situation. But when the
rains stop and the puddles have a chance to settle, the malaria will start
up again. Last season we lost at least 600, most of them children.”
We are surrounded by silent, sullen militia members in a camp near the
border. “No meetings are allowed,” our colonel reassured us, but the
summit we walked in on had been going on for two days. Hard rain drums on
the metal roof overhead as lower-ranking men take over food distribution
in the background. The leader of the local militias is passionate as he
speaks in the carefully wrought phrases of a political information
officer. “This is a time for reconciliation,” he begins, “not for
justice. My troops want a peaceful transition, but of course they are
willing to fight for their rights.” He indicates that any negotiations
with his group should be preceded by granting them a secure area of land
in East Timor. This is a refrain we hear a few times — because 20% voted
against independence, they should get 20% of the country. “We have no
weapons,” he continues. “Of course I can’t speak for everybody.”
The most common attitude toward East Timor’s referendum I encountered
among Indonesians was suspicion that it had been rigged by sinister
international powers — something akin to what you heard in 1960s
Mississippi about “our colored” being stirred up by “outside
agitators.” The people who seemed to accept, if not celebrate, the new
nation most pragmatically were in West Timor. Rather than fearing a
foreign power next door, they worried about the possible permanent dumping
of pro-integration militias and refugees in their territory. This is not
paranoia. Whether the change is viewed as positive or negative, Miami has
clearly never been the same after the Cuban revolution and the subsequent
arrival of exiles. The West Timorese don’t want to become a staging area
for raids into the east.
East Timor remains a work in progress. Hopes to extradite and try
militia leaders for human-rights violations are made speculative at best
by the lack of a judicial system. Justices, prosecutors, and defense
lawyers will have to be trained. The older, exiled professional class has
begun to return, but their long absence and advocacy of Portuguese as the
official language alienates them from the masses. Resentment over the slow
pace of recovery, inequity between salaries for international aid workers
and those few East Timorese who have found jobs, ethnic and class
differences continue to cause tension. The UN transitional authority will
be in place for a long time.
It is vital for both East Timor and Indonesia that some sort of trials
take place, and inevitable that some high-ranking TNI officers are
implicated in the post-referendum murders. But it is equally important
that these trials proceed with regard to rule of law. We should not be
surprised if some of the worst perpetrators walk in this highly charged
political situation. But better an honest process that leaves a couple of
fish unfried than an autocratic sacrifice of a few colonels to protect
business as usual.
[Editor’s note: in ETAN staffer Karen Orenstein’s report
on the delegation, she recommended support for an international
tribunal on East Timor, pointing out that many Indonesian NGO leaders have
lost faith in the Indonesian process and now see such a tribunal as the
only alternative.]
Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world. Governing
it democratically is a near-impossible challenge that calls for
international support. It is important that the U.S. continue to suspend
military sales and training (and by extension, approval) from the TNI.
Military reform will be slow in Indonesia; resumption of arms sales should
wait until lasting reform is apparent. East Timor’s development as a
viable nation will be equally slow. They need everything but spirit.
During our late adventure in the Gulf, restoring royalty to Kuwait, George
Bush talked a lot about doing “the hard work of democracy,” which
added in no small way to the cynicism of the young people I know. What has
to happen next in Timor, East and West, is the actual hard work of
democracy. If we in the West are to sell that concept without cynicism, we
had better care about what happens to people in places like East Timor.
In April, writer/director John Sayles
participated in an ETAN-organized delegation to East Timor, West Timor,
and Jakarta.
ETAN Washington Organizer Karen Orenstein’s report on the group’s
findings, and related news articles, are available on the web at www.etan.org/news/2000a/deleg3.htm
or on paper from ETAN’s Washington DC or White Plains offices. A longer
version of this article appeared in the Austin Chronicle.
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