| Subject: ‘Operasi
Sapu Jagad’ – Indonesian military’s plan to disrupt independence Ref.: FA10-1999/10/21eng Subject: ‘Operasi Sapu Jagad’
– Indonesian military’s plan to disrupt independence
Summary: In the wake of the UN organised popular
consultation on 30 August came the slaughter, mass deportations and wholesale devastation.
The sheer speed with which this was carried out corroborates earlier reports, according to
which the Indonesian military, together with the militias formed by them, planned to make
independence - the choice of the majority - unviable, and to reduce East Timor to a
"desert". Implementation of the plan started immediately after President
Habibie’s "broad autonomy" offer in August 1998, and it came into being
formally in March 1999 under the code name ‘Operasi Sapu Jagad’ (Operation Total
Cleansing). The facts refute both Indonesia’s statements about uncontrollable
militias and claims by Indonesia’s allies that it was the work of "rogue"
elements in the Indonesian armed forces.
Shortly after the fall of President Suharto, his successor,
President Habibie, tried to resolve the problem that had done most damage to
Indonesia’s image abroad: the East Timor issue. After initially offering "broad
autonomy" (that in reality would have changed little) in August 1998, Habibie
followed up in January 1999 by promising that East Timor could separate from Indonesia if
the Timorese rejected the autonomy package. The UN managed to get the Indonesian
Government’s agreement on the popular consultation being organised by the UN itself.
However, Indonesia refused to allow armed international forces to be sent to the
territory. The UN, Portugal (as de jure administering power) and Timorese leadership tried
to offset this by making the Indonesian police responsible for maintaining security, and
by sending unarmed international police and military officers to serve as
observers/advisers.
The facts:
1. In October 1998, General Adam Damiri, military commander
of the Udayana (Bali) Region that includes East Timor, called on leading Timorese figures
who were known supporters of Indonesia to attend a meeting. Among the participants was
54-year-old Tomas Gonçalves, the son of Guilherme Gonçalves who was appointed by
Indonesia in 1976 to be East Timor’s first Governor. Tomas Gonçalves was
Administrator (Bupati) of the Ermera District and leader of a paramilitary group (of 400
men) known as Railakan, which had been collaborating with Indonesian forces in their fight
against the Timorese armed resistance (Falintil). General Damiri ordered participants to
quickly set up new militias. (Expresso, Lisbon, 11.9.99).
2. In November, 400 Kopassus Group 4 agents arrived in East
Timor from Jakarta (via Kupang). Kopassus are Indonesia’s elite troops, withdrawn
from Aceh because of the brutality they used to suppress the local population. The murder
and "disappearance" of students by Kopassus troops during the May 1998
demonstrations in Jakarta led to the removal of General Prabowo Subianto, son-in-law of
dictator Suharto and commander of the Strategic Reserve (Kostrad). Group 4 are specialists
in military intelligence and elimination of opposition. Indonesian intelligence agencies
and/or secret services were already present in East Timor at that time: Intel, SGI,
Tribuana V (see East Timor Observatory FA07, 5.4.99 and FA09, 6.7.99).
3. In December 1998, Lt.Colonel Hartono Suratman, military
commander of East Timor, announced that, "in order to protect the villages against
the rebels", there were now plans to arm civilians in East Timor’s 440
localities (AP, Dili, 5.12.98), "5 to 10 people in small rural villages … to
fight against the pro-independence forces" (Sidney Morning Herald, 8.12.98). In
February 1999, the chief of employment services (BAKN) estimated that there were 76,000
Timorese working for the Indonesian Government, of which "20,000 civilians recruited
by the police and military to help guard people’s security and safety" (Suara
Pembaruan, 5.2.99). Finally, after so many years of playing down Indonesia’s military
presence in East Timor, Australia’s Foreign Minister estimated the number of
Indonesian soldiers and police in the territory to be 26,000 – for a population of
about 800,000 (ABC, Australia, 8.9.99).
4. Questioned about whether the strategy of creating armed
groups could lead to civil war in East Timor, Subagyo replied that the armed forces were
"monitoring the situation and would later decide whether to continue distributing
weapons or to disarm the militias" (Lusa, Sidney, 1.2.99). "Those militia have
been legally funded by the government … but merely to help ABRI in facing security
disturbance groups security disturbance groups (GPK)" said General Wiranto (Antara,
2.2.99). "We are only lending them weapons … they have to return them when they
are finished", said the spokesman for the armed forces, General Sudraiat (BBC,
5.2.99).
5. On 27 January 1999, President Habibie announced that
East Timor could separate from Indonesia if the Timorese rejected autonomy. Presidential
foreign affairs adviser Dewi Fortuna Anwar revealed that Foreign Affairs Minister Ali
Alatas had not attended the restricted ministerial Council at which the President’s
proposal had been put forward. All ministers present, including General Wiranto, had
agreed with the President’s decision, although General Wiranto had been emphatic that
the armed forced had not made any mistake when they invaded East Timor in 1975. General
Sintong Panjaitan, Habibie’s military adviser, refused to comment on the matter,
apart from pointing out that it had been "the President’s personal
decision". Habibie, undoubtedly well aware of the opposition, told his restricted
circle of aides that "It will roll like a snowball and no one can stop it"
(Jakarta Post, 16.2.99)
6. In February, General Damiri and his adjutant for
military operations, General Mahidin Simbolon, held a further meeting with militia
leaders. One of the first militias to carry out indiscriminate killing (young and old
murdered, and a pregnant woman disembowelled) that caused 6,132 people to flee and seek
the safety of the church in Suai in January, was called MAHIDI. "Mahidi" can be
both an acronym for "Mati Hidup Demi Integrasi", meaning Dead or alive with
Indonesia, as well as a tribute (sic!) to Major Mahidin Simbolon.
7. A document dated 11 March, addressed to the "highly
respected pro-integration war general" Joao da Silva Tavares, also known as the
"commander-in-chief of all militias", informed him that "Operasi Sapu
Jagad" (Operation Total Cleansing) was about to commence. The message, signed by a
Lafaek Saburai, was sent on behalf of the "Red Blood command group" which,
curiously, had authority enough to be able to give orders to the "war general",
to all other militia chiefs to which copies of the document were sent, and even to the
ABRI, informing them that they should remain in their barracks (nº 024/OPS/R/III/1999,
see integral text attached – original in Bahasa Indonesia). ‘Lafaek’ is the
nom de guerre of Afonso Pinto, a Timorese collaborator and member of the BIA (Indonesian
military intelligence services), so conclusions may be drawn as to where the orders were
originating. The document refers to the fact that "the methods used until now [by the
militias] are too slow, ineffective, too persuasive and permissive", and to further
actions that should be undertaken, the first being "to take pro-integrationists (and
only these) out of Dili"; those remaining in Dili "whether they be men, women,
children or old people, are anti-integration and must be eliminated". The time set
for this to commence was 1 May, at 00.00 hrs.
8. On 26 March a further meeting was held, this time in
Dili, between military and militias. Lt. Col. Hartono Suratman was present, as well as the
civil Governor of the ‘Province’, Abilio Osorio Soares. The 1 May attack on Dili
was discussed. The Governor suggested that Catholic priests and clergy could also be
killed. The Indonesian commander welcomed that idea, according to Tomas Gonçalves who was
present. But for Gonçalves, this was the last straw. Now in exile, Tomas Goncalves says:
"I did not agree to the plan, but could not say so. I kept quiet (…) otherwise I
would be killed. Commander Suratman threatened me in October 1998 (…) that’s why
I had to escape" (Expresso, Lisbon, 11.9.99).
9. On 5 April, the inhabitants of villages near Liquiça
who had fled into the town’s church for safety were surrounded by Besi Merah Putih
militiamen and by soldiers from Battalion 143. These refugees were slaughtered: 62 were
killed, and a further 14 "disappeared". (The "disappeared" have been
named by the HAK Foundation). This massacre was perpetrated ahead of the scheduled 1 May
start to Operasi Sapu Jagad, but it would seem to have been part of the ‘Total
Cleansing’ phase.
10. In a dramatic appeal, Xanana Gusmao, who had already
been calling for intervention by an international peace force, insisted breaking point had
almost been reached: "the international community’s passiveness is forcing me to
take the decision to authorize the Falintil to take all necessary steps to defend the
population against the murderous attacks by the armed civilian groups and ABRI [Indonesian
armed forces] and authorize the population itself to proceed to generalized popular
uprising against the armed militia groups" (message of 5.4.99). While remaining
silent about the crimes being committed, international diplomacy strongly criticized these
words by Xanana Gusmao.
11. On 13 April, a message signed by ‘Lafaek
Saburai’ (see point 7 above) stated that the "Red Blood command":
"informs the whole population of East Timor that, following CNRT President Xanana
Gusmao’s declaration of war against ABRI and the pro-integration community, we have
decided to bring forward Operasi Sapu Jagad (…) all Timorese who are in favour of
integration must immediately hoist the red and white flag from 17 April to 15 May.
(…) We shall consider all those who do not hoist the flag to be our enemies".
Another message, signed by Eurico Guterres, the "commander of Sector B of Aitarak
militia", demanded that all anti-integration civil servants should resign
immediately.
12. On 14 April, General Zacky Anwar Makarim, formerly a
close collaborator of General Prabowo Subianto, the dictator Suharto’s son-in-law who
was sacked by General Wiranto in the wake of the May 98 riots in Jakarta, arrived in Dili.
According to a non-identified Dili source quoted by the Sidney Morning Herald (26.8.99),
General Zacky Anwar "is a dirty tricks specialist. That’s his job. He’s
been here before doing this." He was in Aceh in the early 1990s, in Dili as chief of
Intelligence Services of East Timor at the time of the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991 and,
until recently, was chief of the BIA. General Zacky Anwar is currently military Assistant
for Security, and still an influential figure among the most conservative sector of the
military. He was accompanied on his visit to Dili by another hard-liner, former military
commander in Timor, General Kiki Syahnakri (Media Indonesia, 19.4.99), who was sacked in
1995 following the killing of 6 civilians near Liquiça that earned international
condemnation.
13. On 16 April, Timorese students who had traveled by boat
from Dili to Bali and Suabaya reported that over 150 militiamen had also been on the boat
on their way to Jakarta, where they were to carry out the "cleansing" of
pro-independence Timorese. They were operating under the command of Captain Eusebio Belo,
one of the few officers of Timorese origin, who works in the BIA, and by a Jakarta
shantytown gang leader called Hercules, a lackey and protégé of General Prabowo. They
stayed in Ragunan, a hotel frequently used by athletes, and in Kepala Dua, Cimangris,
Bogor, where the Brimob riot police barracks is situated (Fortilos, Indonesia, 18.4.99).
14. On 17 April in Dili, Joao da Silva Tavares and Eurico
Guterres, 1st and 2nd "commanders of all the militias", inspected hundreds of
men and dozens of trucks that filed past the Governor’s palace in an organised
military style parade. After the speeches, the "clean-up" of the city began.
Pro-independence leaders and supporters were targeted, but the operation was not as
extensive as had been announced: dozens were killed, including 12 in the house of Manuel
Carrascalão, the former local Deputy and leader of the GRPTT, group working for
reconciliation among Timorese.
15. On 21 April, a Peace Agreement was signed in Dili.
Colonels Suratman and Timbul Silaen, military and police commanders respectively, signed
the agreement along with militias and CNRT (National Council of Timorese Resistance).
General Wiranto signed as a witness and stated: "I gave instructions to change the
fight from a physical to a moral [psychological] fight" (AFP, Dili, 23.4.99). The
Minister of Defence stated some days later: "I reject any suggestions that [the
military] was siding with a particular group in the conflict" (AP, Jakarta, 3.5.99).
The following day, however, he was welcoming the fact that the CNRT had "lost their
roots in 10 of the province’s 13 regencies" (AFP, Jakarta, 4.5.99), which meant
that CNRT members had either been forced underground, killed, or had to publicly repudiate
their support for independence in order to survive.
16. Following the signing of the 5 May Agreement in New
York, the presence of UN electoral officials, and police and military advisers brought
some measure of improvement to security in the territory, although the situation was still
far from satisfactory. Approximately one in ten Timorese had now been
"displaced" by the violence. Civilians (particularly men) were either fleeing
from the pro-Indonesia militias, or had been rounded up (mainly women and children) and
were being held in camps guarded by militiamen. Even the UN Mission (UNAMET) itself came
under attack from militias, while Indonesian police and armed forces looked on passively.
17. In May, UNAMET spokesman David Wimhurst witnessed
first-hand the training of civilians by uniformed soldiers inside Indonesian military
installations. In spite of the fact that, under the New York agreement, responsibility for
security lay exclusively with the police, Indonesian authorities claimed that the training
was legal under Indonesian law as it was a training course for ‘civil guards’
(AFP, Jakarta, 20.5.99).
18. Militiamen and even militia leaders were integrated in
the "civil defence" forces. The most significant case was that of militia 2nd in
command Eurico Guterres, who was appointed head of the "swakarsa" of Dili.
Militia leadership positions had, overnight, turned into "pos pamswakarsa"
positions: from illegality to guardians of security. As David Wimhurst commented, it was
like "getting a fox to guard the chickens" (AFP, Dili, 9.6.99).
19. In early June, the Indonesian Government sent a
"Task Force for the implementation of the popular consultation in East Timor" to
liaise with UNAMET. To UNAMET’s dismay, the "Task Force" member in charge
of security matters was General Zacky Anwar, the very man considered to be the brain
behind the entire Sapu Jagad operation.
20. Two months before the referendum, Col. Hartono Suratman
was replaced at the head of military forces in East Timor by Col. Muhamad Nur Muis, an
officer with experience in UN peace-keeping operations in Iraq (Far Eastern Economic
Review, Hong Kong, 2.9.99). Until then, Muhamad Nur had been military commander of the
Ermera District, southwest of Dili, one of the districts in which militias and military
caused the worst violence in recent months (Tapol, London, 16.6.99).
21. On 3 July, H.R. Garnadi, Assistant at the Interior
Ministry and member of the Indonesian "Task Force", wrote to the Minister for
Political and Security Affairs: "our initial optimism, which seemed to be convincing,
has become less firm (..) the people’s choice might be for option 2 (independence)
the pro-integration group wants to continue its resistance (…) ought to be assured
that the Indonesian Government does not wish to wash its hands (…) the attitude of
the Timorese soldiers recruited to support integration cannot be ignored. They are the
heroes of integration". The document proposes contingency plans in the case of
victory for independence: "expedite evacuation of Indonesian civil servants and
outsiders before the announcement of the result of the ballot (…) prepare elements of
the TNI (Army, Navy and Air Force), both personnel and equipment, near the evacuation
areas; prepare the NTT territory to receive massive numbers of refugees, including their
security, planning and securing the withdrawal route, if possible, destroying vital
facilities or objects" (Memo number M.53/Tim P4-OKTT/7/1999).
22. On 21 July, Indonesian "Task Force"
spokesman, Dino Patti Djalal, issued a document describing the H.R. Garnadi document to be
a "100% forgery" that lacked the "formatting, logo, style, language, and
signature … normally used by the Task Force", concluding that "the
Indonesian Government will act according to what the East Timorese people decide in the
August popular consultation, but not before that happens" (Mission to Indonesia, UN,
no.29/VII/99, 21.7.99).
23. On 23 August, General Zacky Anwar left Dili. According
to western diplomatic sources, his departure was the result of intense international
pressure. General Zacky Anwar was replaced in the "Task Force" by General Tyasno
Sudarso, his successor in the BIA (ABRI’s Intelligence Services) that was later
re-named ‘BAIS’ – Strategic Intelligence Services. General Sudarso is
though to be close to General Wiranto (Tapol, London, 28.8.99), but Tomas Gonçalves, the
Ermera Bupati who refused to take part in operation Sapu Jagad and went into exile after
the Liquiça massacre in April, claims that Tyasno Sudarso was involved in the elaboration
of the plan, along with General Glenn Kahupiran (Radio Netherlands, 6.10.99).
24. In the month before the vote, at least six generals
– Zacky Anwar, Kiki Syahnakri, Glenn Kahupiran, Tyasno Sudarso, Syafrie Syamsuddin
(deputy commander of Aceh Province), and Mahruf – were in East Timor. For a territory
normally commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel, their presence illustrates the important role
of military intervention in the run-up to the consultation. The first three generals and
General Syamsuddin are known to be close allies of General Prabowo and representatives of
the armed forces’ hard-line.
25. On 27 August, 3 days before the vote, a high-level
military delegation led by Admiral Joost, an officer close to Wiranto, arrived in Dili to
take control of security before the ballot. A western military analyst quoted by the
Sidney Morning Post (30.8.99) questioned the effectiveness of the delegation: "the
Navy is superior to the police in terms of prestige … but there’s still a long
way to go before an Admiral can assert his authority over Kopassus or the intelligence
agencies".
26. There were clear warnings from leading Indonesian
figures that the military would not accept independence: "The TNI are fighting for
political survival in this country [Indonesia]", "If East Timor was let go, it
would discredit the whole armed forces completely", said Marzuki Darusman,
vice-president of the Governmental party (Golkar) and of the official Human Rights
Commission (Mandiri, Jakarta, 3.5.99). "The military are not going to accept it. They
will subvert it", said the Director of Jakarta’s Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (Sidney Morning Herald, 26.8.99) and, according to the same
newspaper, many Indonesian army officers were saying: "If we cannot keep East Timor,
then we shall turn it into a desert" (idem).
27. Shortly after the ballot, in view of the generalized
violence, the Indonesian Government announced it could not control the situation, decreed
martial law, and turned over all authority to General Kiki Syahnakri, the toughest of the
tough.
Conclusions:
1. No one is in any doubt about the involvement, passive and active, of Indonesian
military forces in the repression and destruction of East Timor. The militias were just a
mask, that was unable to bear up to the cameras and eyewitness reports of the many
journalists, observers and international officials on the ground to cover the consultation
process.
2. The objective was to prevent East Timor from becoming
independent, but it was only part of a broader political and economic struggle for power
by the military in Indonesia. The same struggle and the destabilization are, consciously
or unconsciously, being spread to neighbouring islands with the outflow of deportees.
3. While the overall objective was clear from the outset,
strategies to attain it developed as the situation changed: preventing UNAMET’s
arrival, disrupting its operational capacity especially outside Dili, terrorising the
population into not registering, and then into not voting. After all strategies failed,
the next step was to kill, empty, devastate, .. and prepare for the reconquest, albeit
partial, from over the border in West Timor, using militias and mercenaries.
4. The threat of instability in Indonesia was the main
brake on international intervention, ever since the negotiations stage in New York. The
Indonesian Government or, more precisely, President Habibie, appeared to want to resolve
the East Timor issue that had been pending since 1975, but in the past international
diplomacy had given preference to the military interlocutor, and continued to do so.
Indonesia’s traditional allies, particularly the US and Australia, ought to question
military support – including training programmes – provided by their own armed
forces to Indonesian military. This support and training had particularly benefited
Kopassus and the intelligence agencies, which were the very services and troops that were
appearing at the forefront of the events described above.
5. Thus, democratic states contributed to reinforcing the
military’s power, just as happens in numerous countries, in detriment to their
development and democracy. This military might prevails over civil authority in
decision-making, and in this case there were even rumours (threats) of an impending
military coup.
6. Informed circles knew all about ‘Operation Total
Cleansing’. However, the apparent exaggerations and camouflaged authorship of the
revelations about the Operation caused the true dangers to be underestimated, especially
by those who were far away - but there were 280 UNAMET police advisers and 50 liaison
officers: it is impossible to believe that intelligence agencies, particularly the US and
Australian services, were not party to additional information that provided a more
accurate reading. In light of what actually happened later, the reports of the Operation
were not so exaggerated after all.
7. The East Timor issue is intimately linked to the
development of the situation in Indonesia and its transition to democracy. At least the
catastrophe that enveloped East Timor has shed light on some of forces and perils opposing
that transition. Major international support should be clearly directed towards the
democratic sectors in both society and the armed forces. Otherwise, not only will the East
Timor issue remain unresolved but fresh catastrophes will arise all over Indonesia.
Annex.
EAST TIMOR SWEEPING FRONT (FRONT PEMBERSIHAN TIMOR TIMUR)
RIGHT WING MILITIA (MILISI SAYAP KANAN) "RED BLOOD" (DARAH MERAH) East Timor For
Red and White Forever = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = == =
Number : 024/Ops/R/III/1999 Lampiran: Re : Operation Clean
up Status : Top Secret
To the most respected War General pro-integration JOAO DA
SILVA TAVARES In Bobonaro
Greetings Red and White!!! We are hereby informing you, War
General, that the 'RED BLOOD' commando group will start the OPERASI SAPU JAGAD which have
already started in steps. This group was formed with the following objectives (at the same
time to let you, the War General, know that this group is commanded by):
1. Red Blood Commando believes that the current [sic]
solutions to East Timor question are very weak and will not resolve it fully.
2. Red Blood Commando believes that the solution to the
above problem can only work if the anti-integration elements that form organisations such
as CNRT, GRPRTT, Falintil, Ojetil and others are captured and eliminated.
3. The method of solution currently employed by our friends
in arms that form under the command of the War General, such as Halilintar, Mahidi,
Aitarak, Besi merah putih, Sakunar, Alfa, Sera, Saka, Makikit, and others are too slow,
ineffective and too "persuasif and permisif" [sic]
We have, therefore, undertaken positions and actions to
start a clean up operation with the objective of eliminating the leaders and followers,
and at the same time the anti-integration population in the Loro Sae territory [East
Timor]. We have already started this step by step plan with the support of the forces of
Red Blood commando armed with weapons possessed by this unit, which is powerful enough to
destroy a number of cities at once and the first actions we agreed to be taken in Dili.
In relation to the above points, we inform you that
excercises undertaken friends in arms be finished at the 30 April 1999 deadline, because
the operation will commence on 1 May 1999 at 00.00 hours exact in the whole of Dili.
1. Start evacuation of all pro-integration people in Dili
area to region no. 7 Bobonaro 2. Mantain a state of alert for each region. 3. Screen the
evacuees, only accept those who are pro-integration/autonomy 4. We expect good logistical
support in all regions.
After the dead line we will assume that everyone left
behind in Dili, be it men or women, children or elderly are anti-integration people, whom
we must eliminate. We are informing all elements of ABRI to cease all actions on this day
and to be in their posts and their headquarters. End of message and enjoy the RAINING FIRE
ON DILI show that is on its way to you.
Commando Red Blood the Commander, Lafaek Saburai
Forward to : 1. Mahidi Commander, 2. Aitara Commander, 3.
Alfa Commander, 4. Sera Commander 5. Saka Commander, 6. Makikit Commander, 7. Sakunar
Commander, 8. Besi Merah Putih Commander... Each one to its region.
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