The U.S. Congress blocked moves to restore military aid to Indonesia following reports of its military’s involvement in the 2002 murder of American school teachers in Timika. The blockade was released after the indictment of Antonius Wamang by the Department of Justice. In May 2006 the Bush Administration announced a new Pentagon program that will provide up to $19 million to supplement existing programs for building Indonesian military capacity. Questions remain about whether Wamang acted alone. Where did Wamang obtain bullets? Did Indonesian military agents have prior knowledge of the attack? Why did the Indonesian military sue reporters, doctor the crime scene, intimidate witnesses, and conduct a sham reconstruction?

This report—prepared for the Joyo Indonesian Newswire and Pantau Foundation—is based on internal police documents, court records, eyewitness accounts, and exclusive interviews with Wamang. A verdict in the trial of Wamang and six alleged co-conspirators is expected today. The key points of evidence presented in the trial are equivocal. The Indonesian government has rejected an international role in helping bring the murderers of human rights campaigner Munir Thalib to justice. But Indonesia has partnered with the Bush Administration to prosecute some of the alleged murderers at Mile 63. The rigorous standards of evidence that would have been applied in a US court room have not been upheld.

“Murder at Mile 63” will be released as a three part series: 1) A Trip to the Big City, 2) The Ambush, and 3) The Cover-Up.

A TRIP TO THE BIG CITY

When Antonius Wamang boarded a Garuda jet in September 2001 at Timika’s Moses Kilangin airport in Papua, his heart was pounding—he was on a mission to get weapons and ammunition in Jakarta. Born in the remote highland village of Beoga in 1972, Anton was a young boy when Indonesian Brigadier-General Imam Munandar launched Operation Eliminate (Operasi Kikis) in the highlands of Papua. Anti-personnel Daisy Cluster bombs, mortars and machine-guns were used against Papuan villagers who were armed with bows and arrows. Nearly 30 years later, Anton found what he thought was an opportunity to buy arms in hopes of fighting back against the Indonesian military.

Anton flew to Jakarta alone and was met at Cengkareng airport by Agus Anggaibak, a sandalwood (kayu gaharu) dealer with close ties to the Indonesian military. According to Janes Naktime, a Beoga native who has known Anton since elementary school and currently heads the Warsi Foundation in Timika, “Agus Anggaibak set up everything, he lobbied the officers and arranged the money” Anggaibak, Naktime and Anton Wamang are members of the Amungme tribe, a relatively small group where almost everyone knows everyone else. Anggaibak had earlier visited Wamang’s group in their jungle hideout, encouraging them to raise money to buy guns. He brought a rifle with him. Anggaibak showed off this weapon in Wamang’s camp: “MODEL P88-9, Col 9 mmp AK, Made in Germany.” On 11 January 2006 FBI agents detained “Agus Anggaibak”—a 15-year-old teenager whose real name is Johni Kacamol—and handed him over to Indonesian authorities. The real Agus Anggaibak remains free. In fact, after the 2002
ambush, he became a member of the Timika district parliament as a representative of the Golkar party. Johni Kacamol is in prison in Jakarta.

Anggaibak promised to help Anton obtain weapons like the one he was carrying, as well as other guns, from arms dealers in Jakarta. Like all groups in West Papua’s TPN (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional, National Liberation Army)—a group without a clear hierarchical command structure founded in 1971—Anton’s group was poorly armed. Janes Natkime, Wamang’s long-time acquaintance, commented, “Papua also wants to be independent. But we have no weapons. We have no (arms) industry. We are not skilled at making arms. All weapons belong to the NKRI.”

NKRI stands for Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia or the Unitary State of the Indonesian Republic. It is a name frequently used by Indonesia’s nationalists, including politicians and military officers, to emphasize Indonesia’s territorial sovereignty.

Anton’s group, according to the prosecutor’s indictment and several witnesses, only had three aging weapons: an SS1, an M16, and a bolt-action Mauser. Following several weeks of intensive gold panning, and kayu gaharu collecting, Anton’s group raised money to purchase guns. Anggaibak departed for Jakarta, with an advance payment from Anton, where he began working on securing a deal. Anton later flew to meet Anggaibak. He brought sacks of kayu gaharu worth more than 500 million Rupiah. On the international market kayu gaharu fetches even higher prices. This rare wood is used to make incense and perfume.

Initially Anggaibak and Anton stayed in Mess Perwira Polri—a police guest house in Jakarta. A kayu gaharu middleman from Makassar named Mochtar introduced Anggaibak and Anton to some Indonesian army and police officers. Well aware of how to exploit internal conflicts within the Indonesian security forces—conflicts that had resulted in a April 1996 shooting match between different branches of the military in the Timika airport—Wamang hoped to secure weapons from one faction in hopes of attacking another faction.

Sergeant Puji, a police officer, befriended Anton while he was staying at the guest house. Sergeant Puji took Anton and Anggaibak on trips around Jakarta. They toured around while Puji asked them about the activities of Papuan guerillas in the Timika area. Puji said that he wanted to help the movement: he presented Anton with a gift of six magazines of bullets (a total of 180 bullets) that could be used in Anton’s M16 or SS1 rifles. Sergeant Puji also gave Anton bullets for his Mauser. One night in the Mess Perwira Polri, Sergeant Puji showed Anton fifteen M-16 rifles. Anton says he paid 250 million Rupiah for these guns and Sergeant Puji held on to them for safe keeping.

Later Anton moved to Hotel Djody at Jalan Jaksa 35, a backpacker hostel in downtown Jakarta. He probably checked in using a false name. “Mochtar was a regular guest here. Maybe, yes, Wamang also stayed here but he used another name,” said Herry Blaponte, the hotel’s front office staff. Blaponte said Mochtar had regularly made sandalwood business deals with his Papuan guests. Hotel staff remember Mochtar as having a stocky build and being a “dandy”—their memories of him are not fond, however, since he left without paying his bill. Blaponte and hotel security staff Mahmud Trikasno told Indonesian chief detective Dzainal Syarief that they did not remember Anton’s stay at their hotel. “I don’t remember his face,” said Trikasno. Four cleaning service staff also did not recognize Anton’s picture.

One afternoon at Hotel Djody, according to Wamang, a stranger approached him and Anggaibak. “I hear you are looking to buy guns”, Wamang quoted the stranger as saying. Eventually Anggaibak admitted that they were. The stranger—Captain Hardi Heidi—said that he was an Indonesia soldier from Surabaya, Indonesia’s second largest city in eastern Java. Eventually Anton paid for four additional guns from Hardi Heidi: two AKs and two M-16s. As with Sergeant Puji, Anton arranged for Hardi Heidi to keep the weapons for safe keeping until he was ready to depart for Timika.
Hardi Heidi introduced Anggaibak and Anton to Sugiono, an active duty Kopassus officer who pledged to help transport the weapons to Timika. They all traveled to different cities in Java together—to Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya. Sugiono and Hardi Heidi had interests similar to Sergeant Puji’s—they wanted to hear about TPN activities around Timika.

On September 21, Anton visited 40 Amungme and Kamoro tribal leaders, who had just returned from negotiations with Freeport McMoran at its New Orleans head office. They were making a stop in Jakarta and stayed at Hotel Mega Matra. Excited to see many fellow Amungme, Anton visited the hotel a number of times. The leaders were negotiating a profit sharing deal with Freeport’s management. “We left America one day before 9/11. We heard about 9/11 when we were checking in into our Hong Kong transit hotel,” said delegate Eltinus Omaleng.

Anton asked many of the delegates for money. He bragged about how he had secured weapons that were ready to be shipped to Papua. Janes Natkime gave Anton 1.5 million Rupiah, “Five days later he came back to the hotel, saying that the ship had been rerouted to Aceh.”

Anton said that he had paid Sugiono nearly 50 million Rupiah to ship the guns to Timika. After a chartered boat was loaded with the weapons, Anton claims that Sugiono and Hardi Heidi gave him the slip. The ship motored away with Anton standing alone on the dock. Just prior to the boat’s departure, Anton says that he overheard a conversation between Hardi Heidi and his wife. Anton quotes the wife as saying: “We should sell these in Aceh.”

After calling associates back in Timika for more money, Anton traveled alone back to Timika on the Kelimutu passenger ship. Anton arrived in Timika with only the bullets that Sergeant Puji had given him. His extensive contacts with Sergeant Puji, with Sugiono, with Hardi Heidi, and with Mochtar had given him moments of hope. But ultimately his mission to obtain guns had failed. Instead, Anton gave agents of the Indonesian security forces almost 12 months advance notice that a TPN attack was being planned in Timika.

The Washington Post reported that senior Indonesian military officers, including then commander-in-chief Endriartono Sutarto, “discussed an operation against Freeport before an ambush near its mine in Papua”. Did Indonesian military agents use their advanced knowledge of Anton Wamang’s plans to guide his attack? Citing a United States government official, and other sources who had knowledge of U.S. intelligence reports, the The Washington Post reported that the Indonesian military may have staged the attack with the aim of “discrediting a Papuan separatist group”.

The Indonesian military subsequently sued The Washington Post for libel. Jakarta newspapers reporting on Indonesian military involvement in the attack were also sued: Koran Tempo and Suara Karya. The Washington Post settled out of court in February 2003. Leaked reports on the FBI investigation’s findings later confirmed intelligence reports. “It’s no longer a question of who did it,” a senior U.S. official familiar with the investigation, told AP in March 2004. “It’s only a question of how high up this went within the chain of command,” said the official. The U.S. Embassy later issued a formal denial that the FBI found evidence of Indonesian military involvement.

In the time leading up to the ambush in August 2002, there were regular contacts between Wamang’s group and local Indonesian military agents. Are all the weapons used in the attack accounted for? Were there other shooters at the scene of the crime? Part Two of “Murder at Mile 63: The Ambush” will address these questions.

S. Eben Kirksey (ebenkirksey@cruzio.com) has conducted over 17 months of anthropological research in Papua during six separate trips (1998-2005). He earned a M.Phil. from the
University of Oxford and is completing his Ph.D. at UC Santa Cruz. Currently he is a Visiting Professor at Deep Springs College, California.

Andreas Harsono (aharsono@cbn.net.id) is a journalist working for the Pantau Foundation in Jakarta. He currently writes a political travelogue, “From Sabang to Merauke: Debunking the Myth of Indonesian Nationalism.” He received the Nieman Fellowship on Journalism from Harvard University in 1999.

Footnotes

1 Antonius Wamang, tape-recorded interview with SEK on 25 March 2005 in Kwamki Lama, Timika; interview with AH on 8-9 October 2006 in Jakarta.
2 S. Sularto, 'Mereka yang Terpaksa Mengungsi', Kompas (Jakarta), 28 November 1977, pp. 7-8; Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soe Liong, West Papua, pp. 119-20; Robin Osborne, Indonesia's Secret War, p. 145.
3 Budiardjo and Liem, West Papua, pp. 119-24.
6 An activist at the camp copied the specifications of the gun down in his notebook. SEK saw this notebook, 24 March 2005 in Timika.
10 R. Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia (St. Leonards, N.S.W., 1997), Ch. 5
14 Herry Blaponte and Mahmud Trikasno, AH interview, 6 November 2006. Police chief commissioner Dzialal Syarief, who headed the Indonesian police investigation on the Mile 63 case, declined to comment for this story. AH showed Wamang’s photo to five other hotel employees. None remembered his face. They said they have many guests. The guest book does not show either Wamang’s name nor his alias P. Amug.
15 Wamang, 25 March 2005, Timika
18 Eltius Omaleng, AH interview in Jakarta, 6 November 2006.
19 Like Papua, Aceh is an Indonesian province seeking independence from Indonesia. It declared independence in December 1976. Aceh guerilla fighters regularly attacked Indonesian military positions. In 2001, some of the worst attacks happened in Aceh. Arms circulated easily in Aceh. Only in August 2005, the Free Aceh guerillas agreed to sign a peace agreement with Jakarta.