

# Guide to U.S. Security Assistance to Indonesia and East Timor

East Timor & Indonesia *Action Network*

**R**estrictions on U.S. security assistance to Indonesia have played a crucial role in promoting democratic reform and human rights in Indonesia and self-determination for East Timor. In March 2008, ETAN, along with dozens of other organizations, wrote Secretary of Defense Robert Gates that “we are disturbed that assistance to the TNI is rapidly expanding, absent any significant TNI reform and despite the ongoing failure to hold the TNI accountable for its past and current human rights violations. Any pretense to condition engagement on accountability and human rights has totally disappeared.” In its final report, East Timor’s Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation called on countries to make military assistance to Indonesia “totally conditional on progress towards full democratisation, the subordination of the military to the rule of law and civilian government, and strict adherence with international human rights...”

Congress first voted to restrict Indonesia from receiving International Military Education and Training (IMET), which brings foreign military officers to the U.S. for training, in response to the November 12, 1991 Santa Cruz massacre of more than 270 civilians in East Timor by Indonesian troops wielding U.S.-supplied M-16 rifles. Military relations were increasingly restricted until all military ties with Indonesia were severed in September 1999 as the Indonesian military and its militia proxies razed East Timor after it voted for independence. Soon after, Congress banned foreign military financing and all IMET until a range of conditions were met, including a requirement that the Indonesian government was prosecuting members of the armed forces accused of rights violations or aiding militia groups and punishing those guilty of such acts. Later Congress restricted the export of lethal defense articles for Indonesia. Since taking office, the Bush administration sought to lift all legislated restrictions on assistance to Indonesia. They succeeded in FY 2006, when all remaining restrictions were removed. In late 2007, the administration informed Congress that it planned to train members of Kopassus, the notorious Indonesian Special Forces unit with a long record of human rights violations. Brimob, the brutal para-military mobile police brigade, will be trained as well.

**R**e-engagement has not ended the widespread impunity of Indonesia’s security forces for crimes against humanity and other serious violations committed against the peoples of East Timor and Indonesia, their continued resistance to civilian control and oversight, their lack of budget transparency or their persistent emphasis on internal security. The Indonesian military continues to resist attempts to dismantle its “territorial command” system, which allows the military to exert influence over civil administration and politics, commerce, and justice down to the village level. The required end to its business empire has turned into a farce and the military remains involved in many illegal enterprises. “[M]ilitary involvement in both legal and illegal business activities” is linked to alleged human rights violations, according to leading human rights activists in Jakarta.

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In West Papua, where outside access is restricted, human rights violations include the targeting of civilians during military and police operations and the imprisoning peaceful activists for their political views.

Upon independence in May 2002, East Timor became eligible for security assistance from the United States. La'o Hamutuk, an East Timorese NGO, wrote that the country's recent political and security crisis "raise[s] questions about the military training done by the USA, Australia, South Korea, Portugal, Malaysia and other countries, as well as the international advisers in every state institution, including in the military (F-FDTL) and police."

*Below are descriptions of the main U.S. programs providing aid to the military and police of both countries.*

### **FMF: Foreign Military Financing**

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides grants and loans to foreign governments for the purchase of military supplies and services. While regulated by the State Department, the Defense Department oversees its daily functioning. FMF to Indonesia was suspended following the Indonesian military's campaign of terror against the East Timorese in 1999, but was reinstated for Fiscal Year (FY) 2006. In November 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice waived a congressionally-mandated restriction on FMF within 48 hours of the restriction's becoming law. While in FY2005 Indonesia received no FMF, FY2006 finished with \$990,000 in assistance through the program; it received \$6,175,000 in FY2007. FMF for FY2008 allocation is estimated at \$15,572,000 (more than doubling 2007s allocation), but Congress withheld \$2,700,000 until the Secretary of State reports "on steps taken by Government of Indonesia" regarding actions and progress concerning human rights accountability, military reform and access to the West Papua region. The FMF request for FY2009 is \$15,700,000

East Timor has also begun receiving FMF to help build and instruct the Timor-Leste Defense Force: \$2,420,000 in 2004; \$1,023,000 in 2005, \$990,000 in 2006, and \$475,000 for FY2007. The administration requested no for FMF for FY2008 or FY2009.

### **FMS: Foreign Military Sales**

There are two major channels through which foreign governments purchase U.S. military supplies: Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS). DCS are transactions between a foreign government and a corporation. FMS transactions are government to government. (Purchases through either can be funded through FMF, which provides grants and, to a lesser extent loans, for the purchase of military equipment). This is different from DCS and Foreign Military Financing (which provides grants or loans for the purchase of weapons and other material, through either FMS or DCS). FMS to Indonesia were particularly high in 1976 (during the early stages of Indonesia's

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illegal occupation of East Timor) and 1986 (during the Reagan administration).

Sales were halted due to Indonesia's atrocious human rights violations in the 1990s. However, in May 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced that "non-lethal" FMS sales would resume. The following November she waived all remaining congressional human rights conditions on "national security" grounds, resulting in \$15,000,000 in FMS agreements in FY2006. In 2007 there were \$22,343,000 in FMS agreements with Indonesia. For 2008 the FMS agreements projection is \$38,000,000, and \$562,840,000 for FY2009. There are currently no legislated restrictions on military purchases by the Indonesian military.

Independent East Timor first received FMS in FY2003 in the amount of one million dollars. This amount increased in FY2004 to \$1,990,000 and to \$2,051,000 in FY2005. In FY2006, FMS agreements totaled \$613,000. As is typical, actual deliveries in those years were less: \$958,000 in FY2003 and \$24,000 in each of the following two years. FMS agreements in FY2006 totaled \$19,000, rising to \$527,000 in 2007.

## **DCS: Direct Commercial Sales**

The State Department oversees the DCS program, which is regulated by the Arms Export Control Act. This act provides the legal framework (along with the Foreign Assistance Act) for corporate sales of weapons and military-related services to foreign nations by obtaining an export license. Indonesia has purchased hundreds of millions of dollars in weapons through DCS since the 1970s. Notably, in fiscal year 1978, when conditions in East Timor were among the worst, due to Indonesia's invasion and occupation, Indonesia received authorization for \$112 million in commercial sales from the United States -- a 2,000 percent increase from the previous year's authorization of \$5.8 million. Following the bloody aftermath of East Timor's referendum in 1999, DCS were temporarily halted by presidential order. In January 2005, commercial sales of non-lethal weapons and supplies resumed, and for the same fiscal year, a reported \$51,626,913 in licenses were authorized for Indonesia. In March 2006 the ban on lethal weapons sales to Indonesia was lifted. In FY2006, approximately \$115,000,000 in DCS licenses were authorized. Since there are currently no legislated restrictions on military aid to Indonesia, DCS will continue to be a major source of military supplies, depending on Indonesia's budget priorities, the level of FMF, and congressional oversight.

## **EDA: Excess Defense Articles**

The U.S. military can transfer Excess Defense Articles (EDA) through section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act. EDA consist of various surplus military supplies ranging from aircraft to uniforms. These articles can be given or sold at reduced prices to foreign countries. EDA transactions are coordinated by various parts of the military: security assistance organizations, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and individual armed forces. Between 1998 and 2005 Indonesia received no EDA, and no publicly known EDA transfers occurred in 2006. However, in 2005 "non-lethal" EDA were again allowed as a part of the Bush administration's resumption of military relations with Indonesia. The State Department describes EDA "as potentially fill[ing] Indonesian equipment shortfalls.

In FY2005 East Timor became eligible for EDA, but as of yet there have been no known transfers.

## **Section 1206**

Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act was initially created for the Pentagon to fund training and equipment for the militaries and police of Iraq and Afghanistan without State Department involvement. The program has been expanded to allow the Pentagon to spend several hundred million dollars each year, with State Department agreement, to support militaries in a wide range of countries including Indonesia. A March 2007 General Accountability Office (GAO) report found that in FY2006, only five of 14 proposals under the program were coordinated with the relevant embassies before being reviewed in Washington. And in another five countries, the Pentagon did not inform the embassies of its plans to provide military assistance until it had already notified Congress of the projects. Indonesia received \$18.4 million in Section 1206 funding in 2006 and \$28.7 million in 2007. At the end of May 2007, a coalition wrote the Senate to oppose the "Building Global Partnerships Act of 2007," which grows out of Section 1206. The Act would grant permanent authority to the Department of Defense to spend up to \$750 million annually to help foreign governments build up their military forces, police and other internal security forces, with limited

congressional oversight. The groups said the Act “represents a continuation of the dangerous trend to remove State Department control over U.S. military assistance programs.”

## **CTFP: Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program/ Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Program**

Funds for the Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) were first appropriated in early 2002, after the September 11 attacks on the U.S., and made permanent in the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act (the annual law which sets policy and spending limits for the Pentagon). The program was initially created to circumvent the IMET ban on Indonesia, and it has increasingly become a major source of military training worldwide. In 2004, the CTFP was authorized to fund lethal training. In FY2006 2,845 security and military personnel received training through the program. For FY2007, Congress appropriated a total of \$20 million for the program. The Defense Authorization Act for FY2007 authorized an increase in funding of up to \$25 million and officially changed its name to the Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Program.

Because the CTFP is funded through the military budget (as opposed to the foreign assistance budget), the program does not have to follow the more stringent Congressionally-mandated human rights standards required of State Department-administered international assistance programs. (A July 2006 GAO report found that some recipients of CTFP training in Morocco and Tunisia had not been vetted for human rights violations, even though the State Department reported that both nations had highly problematic human rights records). From FY2002 through FY2004, Indonesia received more CTFP funding than any other nation and twice that of the second highest recipient (the Philippines). In FY2005, Indonesia received \$878,661 in CTFP funding, \$715,844 in FY2006 and \$525,000 was planned for FY2007.

## **IMET: International Military and Education Training**

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program was created in 1976 and serves as a major channel through which the United States trains foreign military personnel. IMET is overseen by the State Department and implemented by the Defense Department. The Indonesian military has been a major recipient of IMET funds. During the period following the invasion of East Timor through 1991, more than 2,600 Indonesian soldiers received IMET. In October 1992, following the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre and statements by Indonesian military authorities justifying their policy of violent repression toward the East Timorese, Congress banned IMET funding for fiscal years 1993-1996. However, beginning in 1995 some IMET funds were allotted through the Expanded-IMET program, a subprogram (see section on E-IMET). All U.S. military assistance was temporarily cut off following the campaign of terror implemented by the Indonesian military against East Timor surrounding the 1999 independence referendum. In FY2000, because of the “Leahy amendment” to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, most military assistance for Indonesia was conditioned on the return of the many tens of thousands of East Timorese refugees, accountability for human rights crimes and other requirements. In 2003 and 2004, resumption of full IMET was conditioned on Indonesia’s cooperation with the FBI investigation of the murder of two U.S. citizens and one Indonesian citizen in Timika, West Papua in August 2002. However, in 2005, the Bush administration resumed full IMET funding for Indonesia despite the State Department’s continued documentation of human rights violations by the Indonesian military and the unfinished state of the Timika investigation. In FY2002-2005, Indonesia received nearly \$2 million in IMET funds. FY2006 IMET funding for Indonesia totaled \$938,000 and \$1,398,000 in FY2007 (with a total of 69 students receiving training through the program) The administration estimates spending \$927,000 in FY2008 (for a total of 46 students) and plans to increase IMET to \$1,500,000 for FY2009 (with a corresponding increase in students to 74).

East Timor also receives IMET with the stated purpose of supporting “U.S. objectives of East Timor’s self-sufficiency, disaster management and humanitarian assistance relief, as well as of developing a professional, effective defense force.” In 2005, East Timorese attended IMET training in courses such as “Electronic Principles” and “American Language.” For FY2002-2005, East Timor received \$648,000 in IMET for 216 students. IMET for FY2006 totaled \$587,798 and \$254,000 for FY2007 (with 27 students trained through the program). Estimated spending for FY2008 is \$381,000 with 40 students trained). The request for FY2009 is \$300,000 to train 32 students.

## **E-IMET: Expanded International Military Education and Training**

Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET), a subprogram of the International Military Education and Training program (IMET), is a State Department program implemented through the Department of Defense. All IMET funding to Indonesia was cut off following the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, but the ban was amended in 1995 to allow E-IMET for FY1996. E-IMET was created in 1991 to train recipient militaries and later civilians in areas such as management, civilian-military relations and peacekeeping. In June 1997 Indonesia's president Suharto briefly refused to accept E-IMET, complaining about U.S. criticism of human rights violations and restrictions on other forms of military assistance. Regular participation in E-IMET in the years prior to East Timor's independence referendum did nothing to restrain the Indonesian military's campaign of violence and destruction in 1999. After the 1999 violence, all U.S. military support for Indonesia was cut off. However, E-IMET for Indonesia resumed in 2002, even as regular IMET remained banned.

Some of the IMET that East Timor receives takes place under E-IMET.

## **JCET: Joint Combined Exchange Training**

The Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program authorizes training of foreign military personnel through the Special Operation Forces budget of the Defense Department. The stated intent of the program is to train U.S. Special Operations Forces, with any training of foreign military personnel seen as a secondary benefit. The Pentagon trained Indonesian military personnel through JCET from 1992 through 1997, despite clear congressional intent to bar such military training for Indonesia. During this period, the Indonesian military, including its notorious special forces, Kopasus, participated in 36 JCET trainings on topics such as "Advanced Sniper Techniques" and "Psychological Operations." In 1998 the Pentagon suspended JCET aid to Indonesia, but aid through this program was allowed to resume in FY2005.

## **Joint Military Exercises and Other Activities**

Indonesia participates in various joint military exercises with the U.S. The United States Pacific Command Theater Security Cooperation Program hosted 85 events in 2004, and in 2005 the U.S. embassy in Jakarta anticipated that Indonesian military personnel would take part in 132 joint activities. These activities have focused on "counterterrorism seminars promoting cooperation on security as well as subject matter expert exchanges."

Indonesian military personnel have also participated in the Cooperation Afloat and Readiness Training program (CARAT), a series of bi-lateral military exercise in Southeast Asia. The 1998 CARAT was cancelled after the Congressional uproar over JCET. Indonesia's Lt. Col. Willem first helped coordinate the Indonesian naval forces in the August 1999 CARAT and then traveled to Dili where he served as a senior official in KOREM military headquarters from which Dili's notorious militia operated. In the 2005 CARAT exercise, Indonesian personnel learned "skills directly applicable to the combat of seaborne terrorism threats and transnational crimes at sea." According to the U.S. Navy in 2006 over 2,000 personnel from the United States and Indonesia participated in CARAT training in scenarios "including visit, board, search and seizure...demonstrations, amphibious operations, diving and salvage, and small craft force protection tactics." Major General Syaiful Rizal, the commander of Kopassus, who have a notoriously poor human rights record – participated in the 2006 Pacific Area Special Operations conference.

In April 2007, Indonesian Major General Noer Muis participated in Garuda Shield 2007, in Bogor, West Java. Garuda Shield was the first joint brigade-size since 1997. Muis was tried and convicted in 2003 for crimes against humanity by Indonesia's Ad Hoc Human Rights Court for his role in brutal attacks on East Timor's Dili Diocese, East Timorese Bishop Belo's house and the Suai Church massacre in September 1999. His conviction and sentence of five years were overturned on appeal in that widely discredited process. On February 24, 2003, Muis was indicted with other senior officers by the UN-backed serious crimes process in East Timor.

Indonesia has also observed the Cobra Gold program since 2000 and participated for the first time in 2006. Cobra Gold takes place annually, primarily with Thailand and participated in the Khaan Quest peacekeeping exercise hosted by Mongolia in 2006 and 2007.

In late March 2007, the marines in both countries signed an agreement on joint military training.



More than 700 Indonesian and US marine troops participated in the first Naval Engagement Activity (NEA), an in-port exercise that covers amphibious raids, riverine operations, laws of armed conflict, rules of engagement, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and piracy. In March 2008, the U.S. Marines 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit participated in a bilateral field training exercise in Indonesia. The exercise included live fire sniper and other training “to help the Indonesian Marines understand how to successfully battle an insurgency.”

## **Global Peace Operations Initiative**

The Global Peace Operations Initiative is a multilateral five-year program to train and equip a total of 75,000 military troops for peacekeeping missions by 2010. The program was initiated for Africa in 2004 and extended to the Asia Pacific region starting 2005. Indonesia was eligible for direct training starting with four Indonesian personnel trained in 2006. The number of Indonesian trainees expanded to more than 160 in 2006 and 2007. In 2006, the Initiative also funded the transportation and logistics requirements of Indonesian troops who deployed to Lebanon.

## **Regional Centers for Security Studies**

The Department of Defense runs five Regional Centers for Security Studies. The major goal of the Regional Centers is to build relations between officials from the U.S. and those from other nations. Indonesian students regularly attend courses and seminars at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Hawaii. APSCC began in 1995 and directs its courses primarily toward military executives, bringing them together with policymakers and others to discuss regional issues and security strategies. Courses include “Comprehensive Security Responses to Terrorism”, which seeks to “counter ideological support for and combat terrorism cooperatively for the long term.” Other courses have focused on topics such as emergencies and regional stability.

Funding for the Regional Centers comes overwhelmingly from the Defense Department, but smaller amounts come from other sources that vary by Regional Center and program. In 2004, 24 students from Indonesia trained through Regional Centers, while 16 trained there in FY2005. For FY2008 the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (which has administered the Centers since FY2006) is pushing a “Transformation,” shifting the Centers’ from an “academic” orientation toward one of “outreach,” and realigning older programs with the Global War on Terror agenda. This “outreach” oriented position seeks to “promote a real physical presence” in each region in which a Center is directed. In 2006 the Defense Department spent \$68,097,000 on the centers and will spend an estimated \$79,625,000 in FY2008.

## **Section 1004 Counter Drug Assistance**

Section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act allocates funds for anti-narcotics efforts, including training, non-lethal arms transfers, construction and other forms of aid. The program has been noted for its use as a major source of military support in Latin America, but it is also used to fund military and security forces in other regions. Section 1004 is funded through the Defense Department. Accordingly, it lacks the restrictions of State funded programs like IMET. Congress did not require Section 1004 funds to be accounted for until 2001, and did not require this reporting in FY2003-FY2005. The FY2006 Defense Authorization Act again reinstated the reporting requirement, but the report that has been made available only includes information on funds allotted for construction efforts. The June 2006 report listed \$1.06 million spent on two projects in Indonesia.

Some argue that Section 1004 has been used to evade restrictions on military aid for governments with troubling human rights records. In 1999 Human Rights Watch reported that some of the Mexican recipients of Section 1004 training funds had engaged in acts of torture. While in 2005 there were no Section 1004 funds allotted to Indonesia for training, in 2006 it was estimated that 120 students would be trained through its budget. In 2005 \$1,016,000 Section 1004 funds were provided to Indonesia to help construct training centers, including \$354,000 for the construction for the Marine Police Training Center in Jakarta. In October 2007 the program was renewed through 2011.

### **ESF: Economic Support Fund/Development Assistance**

According to the State Department, the Economic Support Fund (ESF) program provides grants to nations for purposes of stability, development, and security. ESF grants are provided in the context of larger U.S. foreign policy objectives and only a portion is earmarked for security forces, usually the police. Between 2001 and 2004, the U.S. provided \$23.2 million in ESF to support police forces in Indonesia. In FY2005 Indonesia received \$68,480,000 in total ESF, and \$69,300,000 for each of the following two years. For FY2008 the estimated allotment is \$64,474,000.

East Timor also receives ESF, but according to the State Department, ESF funds have not yet been used for police training. However, USAID provides “support to government and parliament bodies responsible for monitoring and oversight, and insuring civilian knowledge of police and military responsibilities and applicable laws.”

Between 1999 and 2004, East Timor received \$165 million of ESF, including \$23,036,000 in 2004. The stated purpose of this aid has been to “support development of East Timor’s civil society and democratic and economic institutions...” USAID’s goal for East Timor between 2005-2009 is to help the country grow as “a model for the developing world, a mature democracy with a thriving free-enterprise economy.” In 2005 East Timor received a total of \$21,824,000 in ESF and \$18,810,000 in each of the following two years. Funding for FY2008 is \$16,862,000.

### **ICITAP: International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program**

The International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP) is administered by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to train foreign police forces and judiciaries. Its main stated purposes are “the development of police forces in the context of international peacekeeping operations” and “the enhancement of capabilities of existing police forces in emerging democracies.” Indonesia first received ICITAP funding in 1999. This assistance increased following the official separation of the Indonesian police (INP) from the military in July 2000. In April 2007 the DOJ stated that “On average the Indonesia ICITAP program receives \$8 million per year.” The DOJ describes the primary objective of ICITAP in Indonesia as assisting “the INP transition from a military to a civilian agency that is committed to democratic policing practices and international standards for the protection of human rights.” However, doubt has been cast on the centrality of “the protection of human rights” in ICITAP trainings. A July 2005 GAO report “found no evidence that an estimated 4,000 Indonesian law enforcement officials who received training under Justice’s ICITAP were vetted for possible human rights violations prior to October of 2004.”

Indeed, the report found that trainees “included 32 Indonesian police from a notorious special-forces police unit [BRIMOB] that was prohibited from receiving U.S. training funds under State [Department] policy because of the unit’s prior human rights abuses.”

East Timor also receives aid through ICITAP. ICITAP’s work in East Timor has primarily focused on three stated areas: “basic supervision and management skills training”, “developing policies and procedures” and “the establishment of a field training officer program.”

### **INL/INCLE: International Narcotics and Law Enforcement**

The International Narcotics and Law Enforcement program (INCLE) is administered through the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the top agency dealing with drug policy within the State Department. The stated purpose of the program is narcotics control, though more recently INCLE has worked for a “broader and more integrated law enforcement effort to combat the full range of criminal, drug, and terrorist threats”, according to the FY2006 budget justification. Following the official separation of the Indonesian police and military in July 2000, the U.S. began training Indonesian police. In FY2005 there was no INCLE support to Indonesia; in FY2006 there was \$4,950,000 in aid and \$4,700,000 in FY2007. The estimate for FY2008 is \$6,150,000, and the request for 2009 is \$9,450,000.

East Timor receives support through INCLE for police training. While no INCLE funding was received in FY2005, East Timor received a total of \$1,485,000 worth of aid in FY2006. There were no funds allotted through INCLE during FY2007. The estimated expenditure for FY2008 is for \$20,000 and the request for FY2009 is \$1,010,000.

## **NADR: Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs**

The Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) budget is controlled by the Department of State. NADR consists of multiple programs covering three major categories: nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, and regional stability and humanitarian assistance. NADR funding for Indonesia is primarily for Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA), with more than \$30 million allotted since FY2002. The Detachment 88 Indonesian police unit—a special police unit largely created under U.S. government auspices and trained using ATA funds—has been accused of serious human rights violations. To a much lesser extent, funding for Indonesia for Export Control and Border Security Assistance (EXBS), the Counterterrorism Financing budget (which targets the funding of terrorism), and the Terrorist Interdiction Program (which supports a traveler analysis program) come through NADR. During FY2007 there was a total of \$8,881,000 in NADR funding. For FY2008 there will be an estimated \$5,861,000. The NADR request for FY2009 totals \$6,750,000.

NADR-ATA funds for FY2005 totaled \$5,987,000, \$6,237,000 in FY2006, and \$7,626,000 in NADR-ATA funds during FY2007. In FY2008 there will be an estimated \$4,166,000 in NADR-ATA funding, and with an increase to \$5,800,000 requested for FY2009. A major priority for FY2009 NADR-ATA funding is to support “enhanced training for a premier Indonesian anti-terrorism unit which regularly performs major operations against terrorists in the region.” In FY2005 Indonesia received \$275,000 in NADR-EXBS funding; \$450,000 was spent for EXBS funding for FY2006 and FY2007, with an estimated \$490,000 spent during FY2008. There is a requested increase to \$600,000 for FY2009. In FY2005 Indonesia received no CTF funding, but \$201,000 was spent in FY2006. There was a total of \$805,000 in CTF funding for FY2007. An estimated \$461,000 will be spent in FY2008. For FY2009 there is a requested decrease in CTF funding to \$50,000. NADR-TID funding for FY2008 is estimated at \$744,000 and \$300,000 has been requested for FY2009.

### **DEA Training**

Training by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) consist of basic and advanced drug enforcement seminars to improve the capabilities of foreign law enforcement agencies to implement self-sufficient counter narcotics programs. Indonesian police participated in one training between 2000 and 2004, and again in 2006 and 2007.

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*A Bahasa Indonesia translation, updates and sources available at  
<http://www.etan.org/news/2007/milglossary.htm>*

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