LH Bulletin | Reports & Announcements | Mission Statement | How to Join the LH Listserv | Home
La'o Hamutuk, The East Timor Institute for Reconstruction Monitoring and Analysis P.O. Box 340, Dili, East Timor (via Darwin, Australia) Mobile: +61(408)811373; Land phone: +670(390)325-013; Email: laohamutuk@easttimor.minihub.org.
The World Bank is a major player in East Timor’s
reconstruction. The principal donors to East Timor have given the Bank
approximately US$166 million for a two and one-half year period to manage on
their behalf. The Bank is charged with allocating these funds to help in the
reconstruction of East Timor. The World Bank oversees the funding and design of
nine projects for rebuilding the devastated country, and monitors their
implementation.
In some ways, the Bank’s activities in the territory are unique. Because East
Timor is not yet an independent country and therefore is not a member of the
World Bank, it is not eligible to receive Bank funding directly. The Bank’s
charter, however, permits it to loan or provide grants to public international
institutions. In this case, the formal recipient of the funds is the United
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) as the legal,
governing authority of the territory.
While the World Bank is known as a loan-providing institution, all funds
provided by the Bank to East Timor are in the form of grants, not loans. In
part, this is because the Bank serves as a conduit for funds first pledged at
the International Donors Conference for East Timor in Tokyo in December 1999.
These pledges were confirmed and increased somewhat at the donor conference in
Lisbon in June. Although international donors have given the funds to the Bank
to administer in trust for the people of East Timor, the Bank plays a major role
in designing and carrying out the projects financed by these funds.
Like any institution, the Bank is inherently conservative. In this regard, the
Bank’s beliefs and practices have been generally consistent during its more
than 50-year existence. At the same time, however, like all institutions, the
Bank is not monolithic, nor unchanging. Its activities vary in different times
and places depending on the players involved. By drawing on experiences in other
parts of the world, combined with the Bank’s current activities in East Timor,
we can assess some of the implications of World Bank projects.
In many ways, it is too early to assess the various World Bank initiatives in
East Timor. Indeed, some of the projects have barely begun. That said, by
evaluating two of the projects already under way, while considering World Bank
practices elsewhere, we can begin to understand the potential impact of the Bank’s
presence in what will soon be the world’s newest independent country.
The “World Bank” is actually two closely linked institutions: the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the
International Development Association (IDA). Given that their staffs are one and
the same, what are officially two different organizations are more like two
different programs within the same institution. The IBRD generally serves as the
lender of last resort to developing countries, providing loans slightly below
commercial rates. Approximately 75% of the US$29 billion in new loans issued by
the Bank in 1999 went through the IBRD, which raises its funds by selling bonds
and securities.
The IDA, on the other hand, gives out interest-free loans (but with a 0.75%
annual “service charge”) that recipients pay back over a long period of
time. Because of inflation, the real value of a fixed sum of money declines over
time. In the case of IDA loans, recipients typically pay back the loan over a
35-40 year period. Thus, a majority portion of the loan is effectively a grant
as the recipient is paying back a sum of money the value of which is much less
than it was when originally granted. Unlike the IBRD, the IDA receives its
resources from donations from the world’s relatively wealthy countries. The
IDA is the wing of the World Bank that is present in East Timor.
Along with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank was founded in 1944
at a conference at Bretton Woods, USA. The IMF and the World Bank are key
components of the post-World War II international economic order and the most
significant public institutions affecting economic development in the world.
The original focus of the Bank was to aid in the reconstruction of Europe and
Japan in the aftermath of the Second World War. As it became clear, however,
that the Bank could not compete with the massive resources of the United States
as manifested by the U.S. government’s “Marshall Plan” for Europe, the
Bank became involved in funding and guiding development projects in so-called
third world countries.
The Bank’s stated purpose is to help “the poorest people and the poorest
countries.” In addition, the Bank sees the expansion of the private sector,
what it calls “the engine of long-term growth,” as a major goal.
Traditionally, the Bank has focused on funding specific projects in developing
countries such as the building of a hydroelectric dam or an irrigation system.
Over time, however, the Bank’s emphasis on big infrastructure projects has
declined. At the same time, the World Bank has come to focus much more on
broader issues such as human and social development, good governance, and
institution-building. The Bank’s projects in East Timor reflect this diversity
of activities.
The World Bank has come under frequent criticism over the years for insufficient
transparency, for its funding of environmentally- and socially-destructive
projects, and for its providing loans to repressive governments. At the same
time, many human rights and environmental activists have accused the Bank of
serving the interests of Western capital by encouraging a model of development
that facilitates growing liberalization of economies and, thus, increasing
reliance on export production and foreign investment in the domestic economy.
The World Bank’s relationship with Suharto’s Indonesia would seem to be an
example. Over a 30-year period, the Bank provided about US$25 billion to Suharto’s
government. Indeed, Indonesia was one of the Bank’s largest recipients of
funding, despite the Suharto regime’s horrific human rights record and its
endemic corruption. The Bank admitted as much in 1999 in a critical, internal
self-assessment undertaken in the aftermath of the “Asian crisis” that led
to Suharto’s downfall. The report noted that Indonesia had been “widely
perceived within the bank to be a miracle and a symbol of the bank’s success”
despite the fact that Suharto’s “New Order” had severe problems of
corruption and governance. The 1999 internal report called the Bank’s
performance in Indonesia over the previous 30 years only “marginally
satisfactory.”
Indonesian authorities took advantage of the Bank’s generosity to further
their illegal occupation of East Timor. Last year, for example, local Indonesian
government authorities diverted poverty alleviation project funds from the Bank
for use in their “socialization” campaign in the U.N.-run referendum of 30
August 1999. In this manner, the Indonesian military used World Bank funds to
finance its terror campaign to deter people from voting for independence.
At the same time, however, the Bank has certainly become more transparent and
more responsive to the concerns of grassroots constituencies—in large part due
to the criticisms by activists and social movements. These changes are reflected
in the Bank’s rhetoric which is full of seemingly progressive terms such as
“sustainable” and “people-centered” development. The question is how
much these changes are reflected in its practices.
The Bank’s agriculture project is an emergency recovery project that aims to improve food security of selected poor households; to improve agricultural production in selected project areas, and to promote rural growth.
The three-year, US$20.7 million project has four major components:
The first, or emergency phase of the project is worth US$6.8 million. The
design of the second phase of the project is scheduled to begin in early 2001.
Accomplishments include a vaccination campaign begun on October 23 in the
districts of Aileu, Ainaro, Baucau, Bobonaro, Ermera, Mahufahi, Lautem, and
Viqueque which had vaccinated over 85,500 cattle and buffalo as of December 12.
Rehabilitation of the Comoro irrigation scheme is also more than half-completed,
and 45.5 kilometers of rural roads have undergone rehabilitation. And
reportedly, the Project Management Unit is in the process of contracting three
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to begin to distribute hand tools (up to
6,000 sets of five tools) in rural areas.
Inadequate consultation
While such accomplishments are certainly noteworthy, the Bank’s
agriculture rehabilitation project has been criticized from many quarters.
In terms of the design of the project, for example, the Bank’s “Project
Appraisal Document” states that it reflects the “broad participation of
donors, NGOs and civil society, as well as beneficiaries [such as farmers] in
the design of the project.” But the rapidity of the project’s design
suggests otherwise. Major international NGOs active in agriculture, for example,
have said they had no contact from the Bank.
A World Bank team of three persons arrived in East Timor in April to begin
planning the project. The team spent two to three weeks in the territory,
engaging in “rapid rural appraisals” to evaluate local needs and wants, and
meeting with NGO representatives at the beginning of their trip and at the end.
As a result of the mission, the Bank wrote a first draft of the project
assessment document that laid out the principal components of the project.
In mid-May, a World Bank team returned to East Timor for a little over a week to
assess the proposed project. Out of this visit emerged the short-, medium-, and
long-term priorities of the project.
On 21 June in Lisbon, UNTAET and World Bank officials signed the agreement for
the initial grant of US$6.8 million for the Agriculture Rehabilitation and
Development Project. Jemad-ud-din Kassum, the Bank’s Vice-President for the
East Asia and Pacific Region, expressed his happiness on the day of the signing,
noting that the agriculture project (along with the one for education) had been
“successfully negotiated and signed within a record time.”
The “record time” reflected the pressures on the Bank to complete the design
of the project and to get the project agreement signed (by UNTAET) by the time
of the June 21-23 donors meeting in Lisbon as such an agreement was deemed an
important demonstration of progress. World Bank officials contend, however, that
the pressures did not result in any sort of shortcutting of the consultative
process, only a speeding up of the Bank’s own internal mechanisms.
At the same time, Bank personnel state that the emergency nature of East Timor
agricultural situation simply did not allow for as far-reaching a consultation
process as they would have liked. Irrigation systems, for example, were in
danger of collapsing after having remained in disrepair for 1.5 years. And many
livestock had died because of the lack of vaccination services. (One Bank
official said that a full consultation process would have taken one year or
more. It is for this reason, the official explained, that the project allows for
significant revisions in its design during implementation.)
Nevertheless, district-level UNTAET officials and international NGO
representatives interviewed by La’o Hamutuk state that the consultation
process that informed the design of the agriculture rehabilitation project was
totally inadequate even given these limitations. When the World Bank team and
the UNTAET agriculture division first presented the proposed project to a
gathering of District Administrators (DAs) and district-level agricultural
officers (DAOs), for example, the plan met strong opposition. At least one DA
publicly announced that s/he would not allow the project to be implemented in
his/her district. Opposition to the plan was especially strong among the DAOs
(at least two of whom stated privately that they were threatened with firing by
the Division of Agricultural Affairs if they expressed any criticism of the
project.)
Similarly, many international NGOs were highly critical of the project’s
design, arguing that the Bank’s plan was not sustainable.
District-level critics within UNTAET demanded that the Bank and UNTAET’s
Division of Agricultural Affairs incorporate into the project a safety net for
those hurt by the commercialization embodied by the Pilot Agricultural Service
Centers (PASCs). They also called for provisions to guarantee secure land
tenure, subsidies for agricultural inputs, and for capacity building to enable
the East Timorese to devise their own country-wide standards and practices.
Finally, a number of DAs and DAOs argued that the project needs to make a clear
distinction between domestic and foreign investors and ensure favoritism for
domestic investors.
The World Bank promised to rewrite the strategy and submit a second draft to
the DAs for consideration, but this never happened. Instead, the Bank and the
Division of Agricultural Affairs had no further contact with district officials
regarding the design of the project.
Project aspects problematic
Many local UNTAET officials, as well as international and local NGOs, have
criticized not only the process, but also specific aspects of the project. Many
fear, for example, that the planned importation of buffalo and chicks is
potentially dangerous due to the threat of disease. While the project provides
for quarantine facilities to prevent such a problem, critics contend that the
resources provided are insufficient. (The Bank points out that the allocation of
monies for the different components of the project is flexible, allowing for
increases for specific areas when needed.) Many have also suggested to the Bank
and UNTAET that they help establish chick hatcheries—something far more
sustainable—rather than import chicks from abroad.
These criticisms have given the World Bank and the UNTAET Division of
Agricultural Affairs pause. They are now exploring the purchase of animals from
local sources in addition to sources outside of East Timor. In some districts
where there is a relative surplus of livestock—in Bobonaro, for example, and
possibly in Oecussi—the purchase will be local. In areas where there is an
overall shortage, it is likely that they will import the animals—possibly from
Indonesia.
Local CNRT officials have expressed concern that giving out animals could lead
to social conflict. They reason that the process could increase rural inequality
as the animals might only go to those farmers with experience in animal
husbandry and who have the ability to maintain them.
In response, the Bank and UNTAET are now reportedly allowing collectivities—such
as local cooperatives or farmers groups—to be eligible to receive the free
animals.
Pilot Agricultural Service Centers
The most controversial component of the project is the plan to establish the
commercially-run Pilot Agricultural Service Centers. Local “stockholders”
will own the PASCs (UNTAET will give “shares” to the poorest members of the
community), and the centers will work along commercial principles. Thus, rather
than receiving agricultural services and inputs at (lower) prices subsidized by
the state, farmers will pay “free market” prices. This reflects the Bank’s
view that government should be a “facilitator,” rather than a “provider”
of agricultural services.
According to the Bank, the role of the government should be “to create and
implement a policy framework that rewards hard work and innovation, and that
offers employment opportunities for rural people through market-driven growth.”
While the Bank defends this approach by saying that, given the priorities of the
East Timorese leadership, the country cannot afford to subsidize agriculture,
others point out that it is standard World Bank practice to promote
privatization and market mechanisms. The destruction of September 1999, the
resulting intensification of rural socio-economic insecurity, and the very
serious land tenure disputes as a result of the Indonesian occupation (see page
9), mean that it will be too expensive and risky for many East Timorese farmers
to do business with the PASCs.
In this regard, the establishment of the PASCs could actually help to worsen the
state of many East Timorese farmers. Furthermore, the privatization of the PASCs
will mean that the government will be insufficiently involved in the livelihood
activities of the majority of East Timorese, resulting in a fragmented
agricultural sector and potentially undermining national-level interests and
development planning.
|
World Bank Projects (as percent of US$166 million) |
|
| Health Sector Rehab. & Dev. | 23% |
| Emergency Infrastructure Rehab. | 18% |
| Community Empowerment & Local Governance | 14% |
| Agriculture Rehab. & Dev. | 12% |
| Emergency School Readiness | 8% |
| Small Enterprise | 6% |
| Microfinance Dev. | 5% |
| Capacity-Building for Econ. Inst. & Budget Prep. | 2% |
| Dili Community Employ. Generation | >1% |
| Uncommitted | 12% |
The Bank and UNTAET’s agriculture department present the PASCs as an example
of participatory democracy. Rather than the state or a single business-person
owning the agricultural centers, they argue, the community will control them.
But at least one evaluation of the project has called this into question,
contending that the proposed centers are too few in number and thus cover
regions that are too big. It would be far better to have smaller, more numerous
ones as a way of ensuring democratic ownership and participation.
The Bank claims that the PASCs “will provide urgently needed inputs and
services to the rural communities.” To ensure proper management of the PASCs,
the project will provide technical assistance and training. Nevertheless, the
Bank expects that “some of these PASCs will fail” but contends that this
will not represent a failure of the PASCs as a whole as the PASC-component of
the project will have “provided priority inputs to jump-start rural growth and
entrepreneurship.”
On a more general level, some have called into question the spending of so much
money for so little. On average, for example, each district will receive only
154 water buffalo and/or cattle. Administration costs (which include high
salaries for foreign consultants) will eat up a significant portion of the
project budget—a common problem with World Bank projects. If local communities
were to have direct control over the funds, the benefits could be much greater
(and realized far more quickly).
The ultimate goal of the Agriculture Rehabilitation and Development Project is
to improve food security of the most vulnerable. In a public meeting at La’o
Hamutuk, a World Bank official made a distinction between food security and food
self-sufficiency, stating that the former is far more important and practical
than the latter. He used the example of rice to argue his position, stating that
it would be extremely difficult for East Timor to be self-sufficient in rice
given the limitations of the land. In any case, he contended, places like
Thailand can produce rice that is cheaper and better than that of East Timor.
For this reason, he explained, East Timor should concentrate its resources on
producing what its does best relative to other countries. Thus, it makes more
sense for East Timor to expand its production and export of its high-quality,
organic coffee. With the monies earned from this trade, East Timor could then
afford to import its food needs. (Nevertheless, the Bank is supporting domestic
rice production to a certain extent as demonstrated by the funding for
irrigation rehabilitation.)
An obvious problem with emphasizing “competitive” crops for export is that
it potentially detracts from production of food crops for domestic consumption.
If, for example, East Timor is overly dependent on other countries for food, low
coffee prices—a current problem (see “In Brief” on page 11)—will
undermine its ability to import needed foodstuffs. Given that you cannot eat
coffee, such a problem throws into question the wisdom of promoting an increase
in coffee production for export at the expense of food production for local
needs. (La’o Hamutuk will examine coffee production in a future issue of the
Bulletin.)
The Bank responds
The World Bank is quick to point out that there is a lot of flexibility built
into the project. Already, the Bank and UNTAET’s Division of Agricultural
Affairs have adjusted the program on the basis of public input. For example,
they sped up vaccination and community irrigation in response to community
demand, while they slowed down the creation of the PASCs and the selection of
beneficiaries (for livestock and tools) to allow for more time and greater
community input.
Bank personnel will come to East Timor four times a year to supervise and
evaluate the progress of the project and the assumptions behind it, and to
consult with “stakeholders,” and to reshape the project accordingly. In this
regard, there is considerable potential for East Timorese civil society to
influence the Agriculture Rehabilitation and Development project, and—to a
significant degree—East Timor’s agricultural sector, as it evolves.
Administered jointly with the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the East Timor
Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project (CEP) is a 30-month, US$22.5
million project. Newly-created elected village and sub-district councils (with
each village being represented by one woman and one man) receive block grants to
fund community development and reconstruction projects of their choice. A small
part of the funding supports cultural heritage projects (9%) and local
non-governmental organizations (5%). The second phase of the CEP is scheduled to
begin in late February, involving another round of grants, some of which will be
awarded to widows, orphans, and other “vulnerable groups.” It will also
include a component focusing on the development of community radio.
The CEP’s objective is to establish transparent, democratic, and accountable
local structures in rural areas to make decisions about development projects in
a decentralized fashion. The local CEP councils will allow communities to
rehabilitate basic infrastructure and revive local economies. On a longer-term
basis, the Bank presents the councils as a vehicle for expressing their
development needs and desires, and for implementing projects. In this regard,
they are a form of local governance and structures for a “bottom-up”
approach to development.
The CEP would thus seem to be a good example of the Bank’s new face. Jarat
Chopra, the former UNTAET head of the Office of District Administration
describes the CEP as “an introduction to local democracy, as well as a
functioning form of self-determination in the reconstruction process.”
According to the World Bank, the CEP has led to the formation of 417
village-level development councils, and 60 sub-district-level councils. The
project has funded over 600 local projects.
The Bank reports that 43% of projects are for the construction of community
meeting halls, 25% for small roads linking up to larger ones and for the repair
of agricultural infrastructure, 15% for the restoration of household assets
(such as pots, pans, plates, cups, and/or spoons shared by villagers) and
productive equipment (such as communally-owned low-tech farm equipment, lathes,
or saws) destroyed in the post-referendum violence, 10% for repair of water
supply infrastructure, and 7% for schools or clinics.
Influential individuals within UNTAET strenuously opposed the project at the
beginning, fearing that UNTAET would not have control over the significant
amount of funds, and that CEP would set up decision-making bodies circumventing
UNTAET’s governance structures. While UNTAET did finally agree to allow the
CEP to go forward—in part due to pressure from the CNRT—its original
opposition helped to give the CEP the look of a democratizing project. And, in
this regard, it appears that the CEP has been rather successful. The program,
for example, has helped to increase the number of women in leadership positions
and women’s participation in governance and community development planning on
the local level, as well as their participation in public life more generally.
There have also been tensions between CEP structures and traditional
decision-making mechanisms, however. It also appears that the CEP has
unintentionally served to reinforce power relations in some areas as the
relatively powerful have been best positioned to take advantage of the
opportunities offered by the project. Because of insufficient communication
within localities and between villages and the district levels, there is also a
problem of CEP projects duplicating projects by NGOs, UNTAET, or UN agencies.
Fortunately, UNTAET, in consultation with the Bank, is now setting up District
Advisory Boards which will help link sub-district CEP councils with district
administrations. Finally, members of local councils have complained about the
lack of monetary compensation for their time working on CEP-related activities.
The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, USAID, and AusAID released a report
in November 2000 called the “Joint Donor Supervision of Community Development
Sector” that acknowledged many of these concerns. The report found, for
instance, that local communities and leaders generally accept the CEP councils
as legitimate, but that there is often a weak understanding of what the councils
actually do, including among council members, especially women “who still
largely continue to operate within a culture of silence.”
The report also stated that women are under-represented in terms of their
participation and that CEP council elections have not always been democratic:
over 30% of the elections took place through “acclamation” of candidates
chosen by local leaders. In terms of payment, the project does not allow for
council members to be paid. That said, the two village facilitators receive very
modest compensation even though the facilitators “have not yet been trained
and are barely active in most places.” The report seems to oppose paying
council members or increasing the compensation to facilitators for fear that it
would encourage opportunism and engender jealousy given the poverty in most
villages and the fact that many—such as clandestine front leaders—have
labored for the community without compensation for long periods of time.
In addition to suggesting greater support to women council members, the report
expresses hope that the next annual round of CEP elections will be more
democratic. It also calls for enhancing the capacity of local councils
(something that is reportedly already underway) and to improve communication
regarding development planning between district and sub-district levels so that
the local CEP councils can make better-informed decisions.
That the World Bank has publicly acknowledged the shortcomings of the CEP bodes
well for the future of a program that has already achieved a good deal of
success. On 23 November, control of the project passed from Community Aid Abroad
(Oxfam/Australia) to an East Timorese management team. It still remains to be
seen, however, if the CEP structures are sustainable. As of now, the CEP is an
economically-supported form of democracy. What will happen to the CEP structures
if and when there is no more external funding? Would they become
self-sustaining?
In many ways, the CEP councils are creations of the “international community”—albeit
with the expressed support of the CNRT. In this regard, they are not as
legitimate and vibrant as socio-political structures that have emerged out of
local, long-term processes. As the “Joint Donor” report noted, “[A]t
present the talent and energy at village level is more likely to be found around
the chefe and the old clandestine structures than within the council.” It is
such structures that the report contends “must be built upon if the country’s
urgent rural development problems are to be solved.” What the report calls
their “control mentality and gender bias,” however, run counter to
international notions of democracy, as well as to the official positions of the
CNRT. How the CEP will reconcile its praiseworthy principles with the need to
respect indigenous beliefs, practices, and structures is an ongoing challenge.
In this regard, working more closely with local and national organizations—such
as East Timorese women’s groups, for example—might go a long way toward
realizing many of the CEP’s goals.
Health Sector Rehabilitation and Development. The biggest of the World
Bank’s projects in East Timor, it is a three-year, US$38 million project to
create a national health system, complementing the work of UNTAET and the
Division of Health Services. The project seeks to improve access to basic health
services by accelerating immunization programs, strategies to combat
tuberculosis, and efforts to promote health and nutrition. A major goal is also
to strengthen East Timor’s health system in the medium and long terms by
helping to develop health policies and systems. Finally, the project seeks to
strengthen “local capacity” by training people to run the country’s health
system, and by helping to establish management and administrative structures.
Small Enterprise. While the Bank’s Community Empowerment Project
concentrates on rural areas, the primary beneficiaries of this US$10 million
program are in relatively urbanized areas. The implementing agent of this loan
is a commercial bank, the Portuguese Banco Nacional Ultramarino (BNU). Through
this project, East Timorese business-people or groups “with viable business
plans” can receive loans worth US$500 to US$50,000, repayable in equal monthly
install-ments for up to 36 months. Repaid loans will provide the funds for
additional loans, and will eventually go into a trust fund for a future
Government of East Timor. The project is an attempt by the World Bank to
energize the private sector. Thus, the Bank sees the possibility of people
becoming accustomed to borrowing at commercial rates as a positive outcome. In
this regard, the Bank states that “BNU has the potential of acquiring a
customer base through the project.”
Microfinance Development is a US$7.7 million project, which UNTAET and
the World Bank signed on December 2. The project will facilitate community-based
opportunities for income generation and creating sustainable employment with the
overall goal of poverty reduction. The activities will include training in
income-generating activities, rehabilitating and strengthening credit unions,
and establishing a micro-finance bank to provide loans to the rural poor.
Capacity-Building for Economic Institutions and Support for Budget
Preparation. Worth US$2-3 million, this project aims to strengthen the
capacity of the East Timorese for Ministry of Finance-type activities. The
project funds the hiring of senior economic and procurement advisors for the
evolving East Timor Administration for technical assistance and the training of
East Timorese counterparts. The ADB co-manages the project.
Emergency School Readiness. The total dollar amount of this two-year
project is not yet known, but it includes US$13.9 million for the first year.
Signed in June 2000, the project aims, in the short-term, to reconstruct East
Timor’s destroyed school buildings, providing resources for teaching and
learning materials, as well as for training principals and school councils, and
supporting the development of education policy and curriculum. This project
became controversial when procurement procedures made it virtually impossible
for East Timorese manufacturers to supply school furniture.
Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation. The Asian Development Bank,
which co-manages the Trust Fund, oversees this two-year, US$29.8 million
project. The project seeks to rehabilitate East Timor’s road network, as well
as its ports and electricity supply, while developing a plan for long-term
investment in infrastructure.
Dili Community Employment Generation. This is a 5-month project worth
US$0.5 million to provide income-generating employment for poor, “unskilled”
East Timorese. The project is scheduled to cease operations in December
2000.
On December 4, just before the Brussels Donor Conference, the Centre on
Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) released a comprehensive housing
report that sharply criticizes the response by political institutions to
East Timor’s housing crisis. Tellingly, the joint World Bank-UNTAET “Background
Paper” for the Brussels meeting did not mention the word “housing.”
COHRE is “an independent international human rights organization committed to
ensuring the full enjoyment of the human right to adequate housing.” Its
report, Housing Rights in East Timor: Better Late Than Never, warns that
continued neglect of this issue threatens East Timor’s future stability and
long-term development. At the very least, the report should stimulate
substantive discussions on East Timor’s housing situation, and, ideally, help
inform the creation of a robust housing policy. For this reason, the COHRE
report is worthy of further review.
The report found the East Timorese people eager to rebuild. Many individuals
and, in some cases, small groups are reconstructing houses. Yet communities and
local NGOs remain frustrated by the lack of consultation on this issue by the
UN.
Indonesia-backed militia forces destroyed over 70% of East Timor’s housing
stock in September 1999. More than one year later, COHRE housing experts
maintain that the majority of East Timorese continue to live in housing that
falls far short of internationally recognized standards of adequacy, calling the
territory’s overall housing conditions “nothing short of deplorable.”
In rural areas, where houses are generally made from traditional building
materials such as bamboo, wood, and thatch, the felling and use of trees for
fuel and livelihood purposes have led to serious depletion of East Timor’s
primary forests. For this reason, the report argues that “reforestation
projects are clearly required in the country.”
A very serious and widespread challenge faced by East Timor’s authorities is
the spontaneous occupation of “abandoned” homes (see sidebar, page 10).
While it is understandable that people are squatting in these homes so they can
have a place to live, serious tensions between returning owners and occupants
will become increasingly common, the report cautions, unless mechanisms are
established that help resolve conflicts through creative approaches such as
through the provision of alternative housing, land, credit, and/or technical
assistance. The report argues that in rural areas “the policy may require
agricultural and livestock support as part of the alternative package for both
parties.” In the case of houses that go unclaimed or that were built and
occupied by the Indonesian military, the report suggests one policy option of
transferring ownership to the current occupants.
The COHRE report credits UNTAET for many accomplishments and recognizes the
plethora of challenges facing East Timor. Yet, on the issue of housing, COHRE
contends that UNTAET’s response has been totally inadequate. The report
reveals that UNTAET officials treated housing as an ‘unbudgeted priority’—that
is, significant, but not sufficiently important to justify the allocation of
enough funds.
Certain branches of UNTAET and some United Nations agencies have given attention
to housing issues. The United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), for
example, has overseen the distribution of about 25,000 shelter kits (the
original estimated need was 85,000, but subsequent planning only included
35,000); there are also significant delivery and disbursement delays.
The report warns that unless current approaches to housing by those governing
East Timor change, we will see a repeat of mistakes committed in Cambodia and
Kosovo, resulting in long-term instability. As COHRE contends, “The lack of
attention given by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
to land and housing issues, for instance, is widely viewed as the key reason why
these issues are the most contentious today, a full ten years after the
transitional period.”
The report credits Xanana Gusmão and other CNRT leaders with giving vocal
support to housing rights. At the same time, COHRE is very concerned about some
of their proposed plans. One plan, for example, foresees a coordinated policy
encouraging people to live together in hamlets, with their farmlands around the
village, as opposed to the present practice of each family living on their own
land. While such a policy might make the provision of services more effective
and affordable, it would fundamentally restructure rural society. Moreover, it
would likely remind some of the resettlement villages the Indonesians imposed on
a large percentage of East Timor’s population. Finally, the report suggests,
the implementation of such a plan could involve coercion and many forced
evictions.
According to the report, the CNRT leadership may be contemplating the
development of a “Master Plan” for Dili, ostensibly to ensure that slums do
not surface and that everyone will eventually have access to decent housing.
Yet, in cities outside East Timor with master plans, city inhabitants have not
been active participants in their design and implementation, and indeed, many
have been forcibly evicted from their housing.
The report also found the CNRT is waiting to rebuild permanent houses in Dili
until after the elections, reasoning that if people are not provided with new
houses, they might then go back to their villages. However, many people have
migrated to Dili for economic reasons. They told COHRE investigators that if
they were able to find an adequate job in their village, they would return.
Perhaps, they might also be inclined to return if the CNRT were to undertake
housing projects in their villages. In this regard, the report suggests that the
authorities should study the lessons of failed housing policies elsewhere so
that they are not repeated in East Timor.
|
The COHRE report makes seven recommendations to UNTAET:
|
The COHRE report urges the East Timorese political leadership to rethink the
Hamlet Development Plan and the proposed Master Plan, deal creatively with urban
growth (consult all of constituents, note how economics effect housing choices
and promote jobs and services throughout East Timor), ensure that communities
can participate in the reconstruction of their housing and infrastructure, and
develop a housing policy responsive to peoples’ needs and wishes. Perhaps
through mechanisms such as CEP, people could engage in developing an
understanding of the housing situation, processes and options, then discuss and
evaluate plans that meet the communities’ needs.
John Mills, UNTAET Public Works Director, is responsible for reconstructing
government buildings, developing building and housing standards, and exploring
the dimensions of “public” housing. He responded to the report, saying that
“we haven’t done anything, but clearly something needs to be done” about
the general condition of housing.
The East Timor Technical Assistance for Housing Assessment (ETTAHA), a project
managed by the World Bank and funded by the Australian Consultants Technical
Fund (ACTF), was supposed to begin an evaluation of the housing situation in
late September. But it has not yet begun. (The donor countries to the World
Bank-administered Trust Fund for East Timor are sending experts in various
fields to East Timor; ACTF is Australia’s contribution.) Mills relayed that he
has already secured funding for consultants to review the ETTAHA findings and
make policy recommendations. He also said that there are funds for a long-term
housing expert to work in East Timor for some part of next year. On 19 December,
Mills learned that one such expert would be available to begin in April 2001.
Meanwhile, East Timor’s housing crisis continues.
Land and property ownership is one of the most controversial and difficult issues facing East Timor. UNTAET’s Land and Property Unit has allocated and administered several hundred abandoned public properties, re-created the property registration system and proposed mechanisms (such as a national land and property commission) for the equitable resolution of land and property disputes. However, ETTA has not yet adopted these mechanisms, insisting that fundamental questions relating to the resolution of land claims be deferred to a future elected government. Should titles from before the 1975 invasion be valid if the former owner sold (perhaps under coercion) land during the Indonesian occupation? Should foreign nationals be allowed to own land (as they were during the Portuguese, but not the Indonesian period)? Many records were destroyed or lost, the Indonesian government trampled on people’s property as well as human rights, basic questions of class interest and agricultural tenancy are at stake, and decisions will affect families’ assets going back centuries.
On 14 November, in a letter addressed to the East Timor National NGO Forum,
UNTAET’s Cabinet Member for Political Affairs, Peter Galbraith, announced the
withdrawal of the Civic Education for Democracy in East Timor Project document.
UNTAET was responding to concerns expressed by the national (East Timorese) NGO
community. UNTAET drafted the Project Document on Civic Education in September,
and its release sparked two letters from the East Timor National NGO Forum to
Galbraith’s office calling for suspension of the project. The first letter of
9 October stated that there was inadequate consultation of East Timorese in the
development of the project document, and that the process was neither
transparent nor democratic. The letter also called into question the fact that
the proposed project would cost over US$8 million—more than 10% of the entire
annual ETTA budget for East Timor—of which over 75% would go to international
staff or UN Volunteers and only 2.2% to East Timorese staff. UNTAET’s
Political Affairs Unit is now establishing a steering committee on civic
education that seeks to include all sectors of East Timorese society in drawing
up a new project proposal.
The Japan Times (15
November) reported that Tokyo is lobbying heavily for a high-level position
in UNTAET for a Japanese government official. As a senior Japanese Foreign
Ministry official said, “We expect the U.N. to agree to grant Japan an
influential post in charge of economic assistance projects. . . . We need to
maintain a voice in the decision-making process at UNTAET, at least concerning
actual implementation of economic assistance projects.” According to the
report, Tokyo believes that such a position will strengthen its efforts to win a
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. UNTAET is expected to
agree to the Japanese government’s wishes to ensure that Tokyo does not reduce
its contribution to East Timor. (Japan is East Timor’s largest bilateral
donor.)
On 18 November, the United Nation’s Security
Council Mission to East Timor and Indonesia issued the report from its trip
to East Timor and West Timor (12-13 Nov.), and to Jakarta (14-17 Nov.). While
the mission “was impressed by the progress made in implementing the mandate
given to UNTAET in little over one year,” it wrote that “this progress has
not always been smooth.” The Mission noted, for example, that the UNTAET
judicial sector is under-resourced. As a result, “the current system cannot
process those suspects already in detention, some of whom have been held for
almost a year.” While much rehabilitation of major public buildings and
utilities has taken place, “the overall state of East Timor’s infrastructure
remains devastated.” And of “particular concern” to the mission was how
little UNTAET has expended on reconstruction, “and the uneven rate of progress
of the rest of the country compared with Dili, particularly with regard to road
reconstruction, power supply and the reconstruction of buildings.”
A report in The
Lancet, a British medical journal, on 18 November summarized the results of
a study carried out in all 13 districts of East Timor by the International
Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (IRCT) in June and July 2000.
Ninety-seven percent of respondents stated that they had experienced at least
one traumatic event during the Indonesian occupation. The IRCT classified 34% of
the respondents as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, 57% as having
experienced torture, and 33% having suffered from physical beating or mauling
and 5% from rape or sexual abuse. Twenty percent of the respondents felt that
they would never recover from their experiences. Given the nature of East
Timorese society, the IRCT argues that psychosocial and rehabilitation programs
are likely to be most effective if they are family- and community-oriented. This
study highlights the acute need for the international community to provide the
necessary resources to build a national mental health system, something now
lacking. (See The La’o Hamutuk Bulletin, Vol. 1, No.
3.)
The Third
Donors Meeting on East Timor took place in Brussels, Belgium on 5-6
December. Among ten “high priority, unfunded projects” identified by UNTAET
and the World Bank were the capital funding and five-year operational budget to
procure and subsidize ferry service between the Oecussi enclave and Atauro
island and Dili to reduce their isolation. Although a couple of donors
reportedly expressed interest in funding a link between Atauro and Dili, no
money has come forth. And there were no promising signs of interest in funding
for transportation for Oecussi. Reportedly, UNTAET will follow up with donors in
the months to come to try to secure funding for Oecussi’s and Atauro’s
transportation needs and other “unfunded priorities”—especially the
writing of a national constitution and the holding of elections, and the
development of an East Timorese civil service.
The Sydney Morning Herald (19
December) reported that coffee prices on the world market have plummeted by
about 35% over the last several years. This is due to an oversupply of coffee
internationally. These low prices will have a profoundly negative effect on East
Timor as approximately 25% of the population, about 40,000 families, depend on
coffee as their main source of income. LH has received reports that prices paid
to coffee growers in East Timor have dropped more than 65% over the last three
years.
The Sydney Morning Herald (20
December) reported that the Australian government has withheld from United
Nations investigators Indonesian communications intercepted before and following
the 1999 referendum. The hundreds of hours of intercepted messages implicate
dozens of people, including General Wiranto, in gross human rights atrocities.
According to Professor Desmond Ball, Australia is withholding documentation that
would confirm rumored mass killings and dumping at sea of East Timorese students
following the 30 August 1999 ballot. “The Australian intelligence agencies
were able to provide the [Australian] Government with a ringside seat at the
mass killings and forced deportations that began when the result of the ballot
was announced on September 4,” Ball stated. Professor Ball obtained a
copy of a 9 Sept. 1999 report by Australia’s Defence Intelligence Organisation
that documented that Wiranto’s chain of command was very much intact during
the post-ballot terror, thus exposing the false nature of official Australian
statements claiming that “rogue elements” of the Indonesian military were
responsible for the violence. Australia’s Defence Signal Directorate near
Darwin intercepted many of the communications. Reportedly, the United States
government, which operates an intelligence center near Alice Springs, Australia,
provided Canberra with additional information.
LH comment: The U.S. government also knew exactly what was happening in East
Timor and who was behind the crimes, despite similar statements ascribing
responsibility to “rogue elements.”
In a memo
issued on 29 December, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East
Timor “reminded” “all UNTAET personnel” that they “should not
communicate to any person outside the Mission any information known to them by
reason of their service with the Mission … or other matters affecting the host
country or opinions they have formed about the political life of local
inhabitants.” These obligations continue after one leaves UNTAET, and can only
be waived by written authorization from top UNTAET officials.
La’o Hamutuk wonders why such secrecy is required, and hopes that the
future East Timorese government will give more attention to freedom of
information, transparency in decision-making, and the right to know.
The World Bank is a very powerful institution with a lot of resources. Here
in East Timor, it
oversees a trust fund worth US$166 million for a two and one-half year period on
behalf of international donors. In this regard, the Bank is in a strong position
to influence the way donors perceive and act toward East Timor. Combined with
its experience and expertise, the Bank is also in a position to shape debate and
social structures within the soon-to-be independent country.
In a number of ways, the World Bank has been a responsible steward of the funds.
Often the Bank has proven open to dialogue with various sectors of East Timorese
society as well as, at times, with international NGOs. And the Bank is generally
forthcoming with information about its projects. It now publishes brief project
summaries in Indonesian and Tetum. More specifically, the World Bank’s East
Timor Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project (CEP)—while having
its problems—appears to be a generally successful endeavor in promoting
grassroots democracy and local control over some small development initiatives.
(See article on CEP).
Even in these areas of strength, however, there are significant limitations.
Most major Bank documents concerning East Timor—including project information
documents and project appraisal documents—are available only in English, thus
making it difficult for the vast majority of East Timorese people to participate
effectively in policy discussions. At the same time, Bank-commissioned external
evaluations of its projects are not available to the public. Moreover, dialogues
and consultations involving the Bank tend to be more form than substance. In the
worst instances, they are highly-orchestrated events run by Bank personnel with
the narrow goal of gaining support for proposals created by small groups of
people. Finally, the very culture of the Bank—with its reliance on highly-paid
“experts” and its corporate-style offices—are hardly inviting to outsiders
and grassroots participation.
The Bank’s Agriculture Rehabilitation and Development Project (see
article) exemplifies many of these problems. The consultation process prior
to its design was totally inadequate. Of course, there has been considerable
pressure from sectors of East Timorese society and various NGOs on Bank
officials to accelerate the design and implementation of projects. Many have
complained that the Bank has been too slow—a result of both the pace of donor
disbursements into the Trust Fund and the procedures of the World Bank. It also
appears, however, that pressures internal to the Bank, given the institution’s
preoccupation with public relations, have led it to rush project design, and
thus undermine the opportunity for greater public participation.
At the same time, the Bank defends the limited consultation for the agriculture
project by arguing that emergency needs did not allow the luxury of extensive
participation in the project design.
While this argument is valid for vaccinating livestock and repairing irrigation
systems, it does not justify haste in non-emergency components of the project,
such as the Pilot Agricultural Service Centers (PASCs). Even if these components
can still be revised, they become the starting point for subsequent discussions
and thus bias the dialogue, potentially undermining consideration of real
alternatives. For such reasons, the non-emergency aspects of the agricultural
project should not have been part of the original project agreement.
The people of East Timor need time and resources to learn from the experiences
of other post-conflict and developing societies. Past development disasters—a
number involving the World Bank—show the danger of allowing outside “experts”
to have too much influence over East Timor’s reconstruction. Therefore,
exchanges with grassroots activists from other countries who have dealt with
Bank projects would be very worthwhile. (The funding needed for such exchanges
could come from the Trust Fund, while local NGOs would be in charge of
organizing them.)
Typically, the Bank works to establish institutions within developing countries
that are autonomous from the government, while cultivating people who favor
technocratic and “free market” approaches to development. In this regard, it
undermines indigenous development strategies.
All too often, the Bank sees countries as empty laboratories in which it can
apply its standardized policies. As the Project Appraisal Document for the
agricultural project states, “[East Timor] is starting life with a clean
slate.” Of course, East Timor is not a “clean slate,” but a society with a
unique history, as well as its own traditions, sets of social relations,
conditions, and needs. Given these factors, and the horrific trauma experienced
by its people over the last 25 years, East Timor needs the space to devise its
own development paths. Concerned parties must ensure that the Bank allows the
various sectors of East Timorese society to play a far more significant role in
the design, implementation, and oversight of projects than they have so far.
The Bank oversees a considerable amount of money in trust for the people of East
Timor. It is highly unlikely that East Timor will receive so much “free”
money in the foreseeable future. The Bank thus has a responsibility to ensure
that discussions that lead to the design of projects (excepting perhaps
non-controversial, emergency rehabilitation activities) are as extensive and
inclusive as possible. This is inherently a time- and labor-intensive process,
one made all the more necessary because East Timor does not have a
democratically elected and controlled government.
Experience shows that concerted public pressure can influence how the Bank
works. East Timor has a vibrant NGO sector, a political elite that is relatively
responsive to grassroots constituencies, and a strong international solidarity
movement. Working together, they can help ensure that the World Bank serves the
East Timorese people’s needs, rather than vice-versa.
In addition to producing this Bulletin in English and Tetum, La’o Hamutuk undertakes many other activities. Here are a few from the last two months:
Ö
Produced the first two issues of Surat Popular (Popular Page), a Tetum-language pamphlet with graphics, drawing on information from the Bulletin, which grassroots groups use as a popular education tool..Ö
Started a program on Radio UNTAET to further disseminate our findings.Ö
Organized bi-weekly meetings with resource people on topics including Oecussi’s isolation, the Brussels donors’ meeting, East Timor’s education system, and the structure of the United Nations.Ö
Set up internet email service lists to facilitate communication among international and East Timorese NGOs operating in East Timor.Ö
Gave a presentation on monitoring the U.N. at the Fourth Asia-Pacific Coalition on East Timor (APCET) conference in Baucau.
Ö
Continued to develop relationships with other NGOs, East Timorese organizations, U.N. personnel and others involved in East Timor’s emerging nation.
ClarificationOur previous Bulletin (Vol. 1, No. 3), which focused on East Timor’s health system, said that Division of Health Services Head Dr. Sergio Lobo contends that most diseases in East Timor do not need the care of a doctor, but can be treated with already existing trained nurses and local health workers. Dr. Lobo wrote to La’o Hamutuk to clarify his view: "What I was trying to say is that diseases that affect the majority of the population are not cases that need the specific attention of a doctor. Of course, there are many other diseases that affect part or particular members of the population that need exclusive attention by doctors." |
International staff:
Pamela Sexton, Mark Salzer
Executive board:
Sr. Maria Dias, Joseph Nevins, Fr. Jovito Rego de Jesus Araùjo, Aderito Soares
La’o Hamutuk (Walking Together in English) is a joint East Timorese-international organization that monitors, analyzes, and reports on the principal international institutions present in Timor Lorosa’e as they relate to the physical and social reconstruction of the country. La’o Hamutuk believes that the people of East Timor must be the ultimate decision-makers in the reconstruction process and that the process should be as democratic and transparent as possible. La’o Hamutuk is an independent organization, encouraging effective East Timorese participation in the reconstruction and development of the country. In addition, La’o Hamutuk works to improve communication between international institutions and sectors of East Timorese society. Finally, La’o Hamutuk is a resource center, providing literature on development models, experiences, and practices, as well as facilitating contacts between East Timorese groups and development specialists from various parts of the world.
In the spirit of encouraging greater transparency, La’o Hamutuk would like you to contact us if you have documents and/or information that should be brought to the attention of the East Timorese people and the international community.
La'o Hamutuk, The East Timor Institute for Reconstruction Monitoring and Analysis
International contact: +1-510-643-4507, lh@etan.org
Website: www.etan.org/lh