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Leahy Conditions on Restrictions of Military Assistance for Indonesia
Have Not Been Met
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Indonesian Military |
The Bush Administration argues that now is the proper time to lift
legislative restrictions on U.S. military assistance for Indonesia. Seven
conditions, known as the "Leahy Conditions," must be met before
restrictions can be withdrawn. Below is the text of the legislation.
Beneath each condition is an examination of Indonesia's shortcomings in
compliance.
H.R. 2506, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2002, Section 572: (a) Funds appropriated by this
Act under the headings "International Military Education and
Training" and "Foreign Military Financing Program" may be
made available for assistance for Indonesian military personnel only if
the President determines and submits a report to the appropriate
congressional committees that the Government of Indonesia and the
Indonesian Armed Forces are -
(1) taking effective measures to bring to justice members of the
armed forces and militia groups against whom there is credible evidence of
human rights violations in East Timor and Indonesia
Reality:
The government of Indonesia and Indonesian armed forces have not made
progress in this area. Rather, their actions make clear their intent to
maintain the culture of impunity that has for decades enabled and
encouraged Indonesian security forces to systematically commit widespread
violations of human rights.
- Judicial proceedings underway in Jakarta to address crimes against
humanity committed by the Indonesian military (TNI) and by militia
organized, supported, and directed by the TNI in East Timor operate
under constraints so limiting as to render the process a travesty. The
court's mandate is limited to events occurring in only three of East
Timor's thirteen districts during April and September 1999, excluding
crimes that transpired in all districts during the period extending
from the December 1975 invasion to the organized atrocities of
September 1999. Moreover, most senior TNI officials identified by an
Indonesian government commission as involved in the 1999 atrocities
were dropped as official suspects, and some have since been
promoted.
- As reported in May
2002 by the International Crisis Group (ICG), indictments and
presentations by the prosecution at the trials in Jakarta are very
weak, portraying the scorched-earth campaign in East Timor as a civil
war-like conflict between equal adversaries in which the TNI's
shortcoming was to not do enough to prevent violence, despite
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. According to the ICG,
"There is a failure to address the way in which the military's
creation and use of militia forces contributed to human rights
violations: the military role is presented as failing to prevent
violence rather than actively orchestrating it; and…though
purporting to identify crimes against humanity, the indictments as
drafted suggest little more than criminal negligence on the part of
the accused."
- Despite its wide regard as the best documented case, with
independent Dutch and UN investigations producing hard evidence
related to specific perpetrators, the case of the murder of Dutch
journalist Sander Thoenes in East Timor in September 1999 was recently
closed by the Indonesian government.
- Despite substantial evidence of Kopassus involvement in the brutal
November 2001 assassination of the leading political independence
figure in West Papua Theys Eluay and the likely political nature of
the killing, military authorities and an investigation by a special
commission appointed by President Megawati have classified the
assassination as an ordinary crime, enabling the military to pursue
the case in a military court. By evading a civilian trial or a human
rights tribunal under Indonesian Law No. 26/2000, the armed forces
have succeeded in precluding any revelation of involvement of more
senior officers, which is widely suspected by independent
observers.
- No senior and very few mid-ranking military officers have ever been
held accountable for widespread rights violations in Aceh or West
Papua. Last year alone, the death toll in Aceh reached 1700, most of
the victims being civilian. § The TNI ignored and/or rejected summons
by Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission in investigations into
the killing of students in 1998 and 1999, some of which entailed
sniper fire shooting of unarmed students on campus grounds.
- There has been no accounting for the mass rape of Chinese women that
occurred in May 1998.
(2) taking effective measures to bring to justice members of the
armed forces against whom there is credible evidence of aiding and
abetting illegal militia groups in East Timor and Indonesia.
Reality:
Rather than bringing to justice military officers who aided and abetted
militia groups, the TNI has formed East Timor-style militia in several
regions of Indonesia. It is also widely believed that the General Wiranto
faction within the army, as well as factions in the police and navy,
provide the Islamic fundamentalist militia Laskar Jihad with critical
support. Recruitment and training of these fighters has been
well-publicized. A June 29 New York Times article noted that TNI officers
have assisted in their training.
- Mahidin Simbolon, who as a military colonel played a key role in
organizing, training, arming, and directing East Timor militia, was
promoted to General after the East Timor mayhem and assigned to head
the command of military forces in West Papua. His reputation is such
that one of the most notorious militia in East Timor named themselves
"Mahidi" in his honor. Since 1999, the TNI has organized
militia groups in West Papua paralleling those in East Timor. Simbolon
now oversees the development of these militia groups.
- In addition to facilitating an unsuccessful attempt to insert Laskar
Jihad units in Aceh, TNI forces are reportedly establishing militia
units in Aceh which are being used to intimidate the civilian
population through terror. There is broad expectation that, under
military pressure, the Indonesian government will declare a state of
emergency or martial law in Aceh in the very near future, giving the
military an even freer hand.
- As with senior military personnel, militia leaders responsible for
gross human rights violations in East Timor have evaded justice. The
trial of the most notorious militia leader Eurico Guterres for his
central role in the East Timor violence, which finally began in late
June, focuses on his supposed "failure to control his armed
personnel" when in fact he led at least several attacks in 1999
that killed numerous East Timorese and was indeed recorded on film on
the day of a deadly attack ordering thousands of militia followers to
"capture and kill if you need" independence supporters who
had "betrayed integration" with Indonesia.
- Laskar Jihad
- In 2000, several thousand Laskar Jihad militants sailed to
Maluku from bases in Java with no interference from Indonesian
security forces despite orders from then President Wahid to
prevent such a transfer. The Jihad members then significantly
exacerbated communal fighting in the province.
- Laskar Jihad units have expanded their operations in West Papua
where they work with TNI forces in the latter's efforts to repress
growing, largely peaceful West Papuan demands for an end to human
rights abuses and racial discrimination, as well as support by
many for independence.
- Laskar Jihad militia elements operate freely in Central Sulawesi,
where they have exacerbated communal fighting.
(3) allowing displaced persons and refugees to return home to East
Timor, including providing safe passage for refugees returning from West
Timor and demonstrating a commitment to preventing incursions into East
Timor by members of militia groups in West Timor;
Reality:
- Militia threats and misinformation continue to hamper the safe
repatriation of many of the 50,000 East Timorese refugees in
Indonesia. Known rapists and murderers live freely among the refugees
without fear of arrest. § The UN Secretary General has reported that
hard-line militia may still pose a long-term threat to East Timor's
peace and security.
- The taking of more than 1500 East Timorese children from their
parents during and after the forced evacuation of East Timor in 1999
has yet to be adequately addressed by Indonesian authorities; the vast
majority have not been reunited with their families. Many were placed
in Indonesian orphanages under the control of pro-Indonesian East
Timorese leaders.
- Well-equipped militia teams dispatched into East Timor in 1999 and
2000 to destabilize the UN administration could not have operated
without the knowledge and support of the TNI, which maintained a
strong position at the East-West Timor border.
(4) demonstrating a commitment to accountability by cooperating with
investigations and prosecutions of members of the armed forces and militia
groups responsible for human rights violations in East Timor and
Indonesia;
Reality:
A May
2002 Amnesty International report assesses the general problem of
impunity as follows, "Resistance by the authorities to bringing
perpetrators of human rights violations to justice continued to prevail
and the vast majority of allegations of human rights violations were not
investigated. The cases that were investigated did not result in trials.
Thousands of cases of past violations remained unresolved."
- Indonesia has refused all extradition requests by East Timor's
Serious Crimes Investigation Unit, including requests for East
Timorese militia leaders currently residing in Indonesia, despite an
agreement between Indonesia and East Timorese authorities. At the ad
hoc tribunal on East Timor in Jakarta, high-ranking military personnel
regularly pack the court to intimidate judicial staff. §
Investigations into the 1984 massacre of civilians at Tanjung Priok,
which is supposed to be the basis of the second ad hoc human rights
tribunal established under the same law that provided for the Jakarta
court on East Timor, have been severely hampered by a complete lack of
cooperation by the TNI.
- The investigation of the brutal torture and murder of well-known
Acehnese human rights lawyer and permanent U.S. resident Jafar Siddiq
Hamzah in August 2001 has gone nowhere. Indonesian authorities have
even refused to release autopsy results to Jafar's family.
(5) demonstrating a commitment to civilian control of the armed
forces by reporting to civilian authorities audits of receipts and
expenditures of the armed forces;
Reality:
The International Crisis Group in a May 2002 report observed, "Better
military training will not alter the fact that there is a fundamental lack
of political will on the part of the Indonesian national civilian and
military authorities to exert control over private armies, punish abusive
soldiers, end military corruption or proceed with long-promised
reforms."
- The Indonesian military continues to draw between two-thirds to
three-quarters of its income from off-line budgeting and an extensive
network of legal, semi-legal, and illegal activities that include
illegal logging (notably in West Papua); sale of fishing licenses to
foreign fishing vessels including some which employ highly-destructive
drag nets; prostitution; illegal drug activities (notably Aceh-grown
marijuana); and outright extortion (which target minority businesses,
notably Chinese). Numerous "foundations" purportedly assist
enlisted personnel and retirees. In reality, these operations collude
with the highly corrupt Indonesian business community to assure cash
flow to active duty and retired senior officers. In reference to the
250 financing units operated by the military, former Minister of
Defense Juwono Sudarsono recently said that the "TNI should make
those resources accountable."
- Indonesia was ranked 88th out of 91 in the 2001 Corruption
Perceptions Index published by Transparency International.
(6) allowing United Nations and other international humanitarian
organizations and representatives of recognized human rights organizations
access to West Timor, Aceh, West Papua, and Maluku: and
Reality:
- West Timor, still considered too dangerous for a permanent UN
presence, remains at the highest UN security classification.
Negotiations to lower the security status of part of West Timor
(furthest from the border with East Timor) via a memorandum of
understanding have floundered; lowering the status of the particular
area most populated by refugees has not even been under consideration.
In the meantime, humanitarian conditions in West Timor continue to
deteriorate.
- In February 2002, an Amnesty International delegation was forced to
leave West Papua while on a mission to assess the human rights
situation in the province. § Despite repeated requests since 1993,
the Indonesian government has refused to invite the UN special
rapporteur on torture. In general, Indonesia has been markedly
reluctant to cooperate with UN human rights mechanisms.
- Notwithstanding pleas by peaceful civil society groups in Aceh, West
Papua, and Maluku, the Indonesian government and TNI have strongly
resisted the involvement of other international humanitarian groups
and representatives of recognized human rights organizations in these
areas.
(7) releasing political detainees.
Reality:
The administration of President Megawati has continued the practice of
political imprisonment, sometimes through the utilization of the
"Hate-sowing Articles" of the Criminal Code.
- According to the Department
of State's 2001 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Indonesia,
"…there is ample evidence that arbitrary arrests and detention
without trial are employed systematically in Aceh." Acehnese NGO
activist Muhammad Nazar served ten months in prison for
"spreading hatred."
- At least four political prisoners, and possibly several times that
number, have been charged and sentenced to multi-year prison terms for
violence in 2000 in Wamena, West Papua, despite a clear lack of
evidence connecting them to any wrong-doing there.
- Labor activists, political activists, and human rights defenders
throughout Indonesia have been imprisoned for non-violent activities
and views.
July 2002
East Timor Action Network
etan@etan.org
see also NGO Letter to House and Senate
Appropriations Committee on U.S.-Indonesia Military Assistance
see also Legislative Action and
U.S.-Indonesia Military
Assistance pages
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