Remembering A Shared History
Suharto and the United
States
Edward
Masters:
U.S.
Ambassador
to Indonesia, 1977-81
Ambassador Masters’ tenure in
Indonesia coincided with some of the worst atrocities in
Indonesian-occupied East Timor and the territory of West Papua,
during which time tens of thousands died in massacres led by
Indonesia’s military, or of starvation and disease attributable
to Indonesian military operations. Masters supported the
expansion of U.S. military assistance to Indonesia, including
the dispatch of A-4 and F-5 ground attack fighters later used in
East Timor.
From September 6 to September
8, 1978, Masters traveled to East Timor with nine other foreign ambassadors to view the "basic GOI [Government of Indonesia]
approach to the East Timor problem." Masters offered extensive
praise of Indonesian efforts in Timor, claiming -- the
Indonesian military presence had been much reduced; movement was
free; refugees were being cared for; and that Indonesia was
devoted to the economic development of the “province.” Masters'
visit came at the tail end of Operation Seroja, a
territory-wide Indonesian campaign of aerial bombardment,
encirclement and forced relocation of tens of thousands of
Timorese, in which thousands are reported to have died.
[see
Telegram 12521 from U.S. Embassy Jakarta to State Department,
"Ambassador's visit to East Timor: Indonesian Policy and
Possible U.S. Response," September 14, 1978 -
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National
Security Archive]
In December 1979, Masters
testified before the House Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs that Indonesia
enjoyed widespread support in East Timor, and that starvation
there resulted from policies of neglect attributable to the
Portuguese.
Paul
Wolfowitz:
U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, 1986-1989
Ambassador Wolfowitz makes
much of his alleged record of opposing corruption
while ambassador
to Indonesia. During his tenure, Indonesia approved
PAKTO 1988
(Policy Package of October 1988), a U.S.-backed radical
liberalization of the financial sector, which exponentially
widened the scope of corruption and set the stage for the
collapse of the banking sector in 1997-1998. The question
remains of why Wolfowitz and the U.S. government backed such
deregulation knowing that Indonesia had zero capacity for
oversight-supervision? [more about Wolfowitz's role in Indonesia
can be found here.]
John C.
Monjo:
Chargé d’Affaires 1982-83, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, 1989-92
John C. Monjo was Charge’
d’Affaires to Indonesia during the period of “mysterious
killings,” a government sponsored program of extra-judicial
killings of alleged street criminals, in which approximately
five-thousand people were killed in Jakarta and other large
cities across the archipelago. Lt. Gen. Ali Murtopo admitted in
July 1983 that “mysterious killings” were being conducted, “in
accordance with the regulations of the Ministry of Defense and
Security.” President Suharto later took personal credit for the
campaign of killing.
Mr. Monjo was ambassador
during the November 1991
Santa Cruz massacre, in which Indonesian troops opened fire
on civilians attending a funeral in the Santa Cruz cemetery of
Dili, East Timor. The Indonesian military killed 271 people in
this single incident. Following this massacre, the U.S. nearly
doubled its military aid to Indonesia. Monjo opposed any effort
to restrict or ban military training and assistance to
Indonesian armed forces, despite the fact that several
U.S.-trained generals were conducting the violence in East
Timor.
Robert L.
Barry:
U.S.
Ambassador
to Indonesia, 1992-95
In February, 1993, U.S.
Ambassador to Indonesia Robert Barry traveled to East Timor and
came back apparently convinced of the need for a change in both
Indonesian and U.S. policy toward East Timor,
noting, "The
repressive and pervasive Indonesian military presence is the
main obstacle to the government's goal of integration." Barry
described the mood in East Timor as "grim and repressive," and
noted that "given the cruelty of Indonesian Army pacification
tactics over the years, it is little wonder that their
omnipresence is a source of smoldering resentment.” Barry ruled
out self-determination for East Timor but concluded that
"integration will never be palatable as long as it is demanded
at gunpoint."
J. Stapleton
Roy: U.S.
Ambassador
to Indonesia, 1996-99
J. Stapleton Roy served as
U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia during the period leading up to and
following Suharto’s ouster, as well as Indonesia’s destruction
of East Timor following its August 30, 1999 vote for
independence.
On September 22, 1999,
Ambassador Roy met with an Indonesian general to discuss the
deployment of international forces to East Timor and the larger
question of U.S.-Indonesian relations. The general expressed
strong opposition to then-Indonesian President B.J. Habibie's
East Timor policy, which he suggested was never supported by the
Indonesian Armed Forces. Remarkably, just days after the U.S.
cut military ties with Indonesia over the destruction of East
Timor,
Ambassador Roy told his Indonesian colleague that the
U.S. "does not want East Timor to further damage ties between
the two nations," emphasizing the need to "pay attention to
Indonesian sensitivities" regarding the deaths of Indonesians in
East Timor during the 24-year Indonesian occupation.
The United
States-Indonesia Society,
1994 - Present
Since its founding in 1994,
USINDO has played a central role in influencing U.S. policy
regarding Indonesia. USINDO was organized and funded by major
U.S. corporations with significant investments in Indonesia,
including Freeport-McMoRan, Texaco, Mobil, Raytheon, Hughes
Aircraft and Merrill Lynch. USINDO has relied on the support of
retired senior U.S. diplomats and other U.S. government
officials, many of whom have held senior positions in the
organization, including as trustees. USINDO also included
Suharto-regime heavyweights as trustees, such as the father,
brother and sister of the notoriously brutal General Prabowo, a
Suharto son-in-law, and the famously corrupt James Riady. Until
the 1998 overthrow of the Suharto regime, USINDO consistently
advocated on behalf of the dictatorship and its military,
seeking to blunt or refute Congressional, NGO and media critics
of rampant corruption and human rights abuses in East Timor,
West Papua, Aceh and elsewhere within Indonesia. USINDO worked
closely with the U.S. administration, especially the U.S.
Embassy in Jakarta, acting as its agent in the effort to counter
Congressional, NGO and media criticism of the Suharto
dictatorship, including massive human rights violations. Since
the fall of Suharto, USINDO has persistently lobbied the US
Congress for expanded U.S. military support for the still
unreformed and unaccountable Indonesian military. While USINDO
has consistently denied its role as an Indonesian lobby, it has
in reality been Indonesia's most outspoken apologist in
Washington.
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