East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN)
West Papua Advocacy Team (WPAT)
Comments on the U.S. Department of State Country
reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009
Contents
April 12, 2010 -
The bulk of the U.S. State Department's annual
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices on Indonesia (covering 2009)
catalogs continuing human rights violations in Indonesia, offering a
generally useful and fairly-detailed chronicle of those abuses and the
continuing impunity extended to those violating rights, principally the
Indonesian military and police. However, the report's overview
mischaracterizes the reports contents and some key developments are ignored.
While we do not examine the
Timor-Leste
report in detail, except as noted
below, some of the errors
we and
La'o Hamutuk noted last time have either been corrected or were not
repeated. However, several of the criticisms we made last year still apply.
As in the past, the State
Department, in both its summary and the main body of the report, pulls its
punches when addressing security force human rights violations, obstruction
of justice and other crimes. The police and the military remain largely
unaccountable to a judicial system that is deeply corrupt and cowed by the
power of the security forces. The military continues to evade civilian
control. Militias, established by the military in Aceh, West Papua and
elsewhere are similarly unaccountable. Their role is ignored in the report.
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In one of the most important oversights, the report leave out the severe and
repeated human rights violations in Merauke and Keerom, in West Papua at the
hands of a unit of Indonesia's Special Forces (Kopassus). The State
Department's failure to take note of this important human rights reports is
inexplicable.
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Indonesia's official National Commission on Human
Rights (Komnas HAM) questioned the report's overall tone, calling the
document "too optimistic." The chair of the commission Ifdhal Kasim
told the Jakarta Globe "There has been practically no improvement in the
handling human rights violations in Indonesia." He told the newspaper that
"the country's mechanisms for tackling human rights violations had failed,
pointing out that no cases of human rights abuse were brought to the courts
in 2009."
The report's overview wrongly contends that "civilian authorities generally
maintained effective control of the security forces." The statement is
partially qualified with an acknowledgement that "the Indonesian Armed
Forces (TNI) continued to be partly self-financed weakened this control,"
but the those few elements of the military's business empire that were
purportedly placed under "civilian" control were in fact turned over to the
Ministry of Defense, which is populated principally by active duty and
retired senior military personnel. A member of Indonesian Parliament who
sits on the commission overseeing defense and foreign affairs
has noted that only 13 percent of the millions of acres owned by the
military has been certified. Military
involvement in illegal business activities and overall impunity further
limit civilian control.
In one of the most important oversights, the report leave out the
severe and repeated human rights violations in Merauke and Keerom, in West
Papua at the hands of a unit of Indonesia's Special Forces (Kopassus). A
June 2009 Human Rights Watch report
What Did I Do Wrong? - based on interviews documents how Kopassus
soldiers "arrest Papuans without legal authority, and beat and mistreat
those they take back to their barracks," underscoring that the Kopassus
personnel continue to violate rights with impunity even as the
U.S. government considers resuming training Kopassus after 12 years. In
the fall, six Kopassus officers met with a Human Rights Watch official to
deny the abuses detailed in the report. These denials lacked
credibility. The Kopassus officers also sought to identify the report's
author in a not too subtle effort at intimidation. The State Department's
failure to take note of this important human rights reports is inexplicable.
In its substantive paragraphs, the State
Department report notes that the military continues to be involved in people
trafficking and, as during the Suharto era, to collude with "developers" in
forcing farmers and others off their land. However, the report leaves out
the systematic failure of the government to prosecute these crimes.
The introduction to the report also contends that "The government or its agents
did not commit any politically motivated killings; however, security force
personnel committed a number of killings in the course of apprehending alleged
criminals and terrorists." This claim ignores accounts that military personnel
(belonging to the Special Forces or "Kopassus") likely-assassinated civilian
activists in Aceh in 2009 because of their political advocacy (confirmed
in part after the report came out).
The report acknowledges only three killings in Aceh - there were at
least 29 mysterious killings and assaults - and
fails to report on the background of security force violence that provides
context to understand the nature of those killings.
The State Department report fails to identify Article 106 of the
Indonesian Criminal Code which criminalizes peaceful political dissent. The
article, which dates to the Dutch colonial era and which was used
extensively by during the Suharto dictatorship to punish dissenters, remains
a tool of prosecutors, particularly in West Papua. Article 106 criminalizes
dissent as constituting rebellion and/or treason and is not compatible with
Indonesia's obligations to protect free speech under terms of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Articles 19-21).
Indonesia signed the convention in 2006.
Police Violations
The report's overview similarly
mischaracterizes the performance of the police which in recent years have
benefited from significant U.S. training and other assistance. In its
summary, the report claims that "the Indonesian National Police adopted a
use of force policy that strictly proscribes the use of deadly force and
allows it to track and minimize the use of force by police." This policy has
not yet been effectively implemented. The substantive portion of the report
contains a litany of beatings, torture and murder by the police. The report
admits that prosecution of police offenders is rare and where there have
been prosecutions, the courts consistently assign minimal sentences.
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It remains a bitter irony (not acknowledged in the report) that police and
military personnel, in the rare instances in which they are prosecuted and
convicted of killings and other crimes, are given light sentences of a few
weeks or months in prison, while peaceful political dissent is often
punished with many years in prison.
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It remains a bitter irony (not acknowledged in the report) that police and
military personnel, in the rare instances in which they are prosecuted and
convicted of killings and other crimes, are given light sentences of a few
weeks or months in prison, while peaceful political dissent is often
punished with many years in prison.
Indonesian NGOs have noted that police abuse has been particularly common
among police units that target alleged terrorists, especially the
U.S.-created and funded Detachment 88. Security forces routinely ignore
rules regarding presumption of innocence and employ arbitrary arrest,
torture and in some cases such as that of Papuan Kelly Kwalik,
extra-judicial killing.
Timor-Leste
As in the previous year, the State Department report ignores the
near-universal impunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed
from Indonesia's illegal invasion in 1975 through its withdrawal in 1999.
Indonesia continues to be unwilling to acknowledge the need for
accountability or to cooperate with any efforts at justice for these crimes.
The international community's ongoing failure to act to end this impunity
has created a situation of de facto amnesty, which undermines the rule of
law in both countries and internationally. The Timor-Leste report observes
that there is a "perception of impunity" in the country. In addition to the
factors mentioned in the report, this perception grows from this failure to
deal with the serious crimes committed during the Indonesian occupation, as well
as pardons and sentence commutations issued by President Jose
Ramos-Horta on May 19, 2008 and December 25, 2009. Those released have
included former militia and those convicted for their actions during the
2006 crisis. United Nations and bilateral
Status of Forces Agreements grant immunity to many internationals from civil
or criminal action for wrongs they commit in Timor-Leste, on or off duty.
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Although Indonesia was the principal motivation behind the illegal 2009
release of former militia-leader Martenus Bere by the Prime Minister of
Timor-Leste, no mention is made in the Indonesia report.
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Although Indonesia was the principal motivation behind
the illegal 2009 release of former militia-leader
Martenus Bere by the Prime Minister of Timor-Leste, no mention is made
in the Indonesia report. (The
report on Timor-Leste describes this and additional information is
available at
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Justice/99/bere/09MaternusBere.htm.)
During the 10th anniversary of Timor-Leste's independence referendum,
Indonesia demanded that Timor-Leste release a recently arrested former
militia leader,
Martenus Bere, "without charge, trial, or proper court authorization,"
according to the Timor-Leste report. UN-backed prosecutors had twice
indicted Bere for, among other crimes, his role in the massacre of 30
civilians, including three priests, at a church. "The crimes against
humanity charges against Bere included murder, extermination, enforced
disappearance, torture, inhumane acts, and rape," the report says. On 30
August, Bere was illegally transferred from pre-trial detention to the
custody of the Indonesian ambassador in Dili. He remained under diplomatic
protection for two months before being moved to Indonesia, where he was
freed.
Indonesia continues to provide sanctuary for more than
300 people indicted by the UN-Timor-Leste Serious Crimes Unit for crimes
against humanity, war crimes and other major offences. These include
high-ranking Indonesian officials, including General Wiranto who was a
candidate for Vice President in the 2009 Indonesian election. The ongoing
impunity which Indonesia provides for perpetrators of major crimes during
the occupation of Timor-Leste continues to be an obstacle to improvements in
human rights, judicial independence, and democracy in both countries.
Both the Indonesia and Timor-Leste reports repeat last year's error that
Indonesia's President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono accepted all the
recommendations of the bi-lateral Commission on Truth and Friendship (CTF).
As we noted then, President Yudhoyono
refused to articulate the recommended apology for Indonesian actions in
Timor in 1999. (See
page xx of CTFs final report which says, the "Commission recommends for
official acknowledgment through expressions of regret and apology
for the suffering caused by the violence in 1999" [emphasis in original]).
The Timor-Leste report correctly notes that the CTF "assigned 'institutional
responsibility' for such violations [committed in 1999] to the Indonesian
Armed Forces." However, the CTF report also concluded that the Indonesian
police and civilian government also bore institutional responsibility for
these crimes.
The Indonesia report ignores the issue of responsibility, and although the
Indonesia report highlights a few CTF recommendations directed at
Indonesia, it does not mention the call for a joint Commission for
Disappeared Persons. Indonesian opposition has so far prevented the
commission's creation.
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The State Department report again fails to acknowledge
the recommendations in Timor-Leste's
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation's (known as the CAVR)
directed at the United States and Indonesia and the lack of formal response
to the report from either government.
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The State Department report again fails to acknowledge
the recommendations in Timor-Leste's
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation's (known as the CAVR)
directed at the United States and Indonesia and the lack of formal response
to the report from either government.
Transmigration
The Report, in its substantive
portion, usefully criticizes resumed Government "transmigration" policies:"
Human rights activists asserted that the government-sponsored
transmigration program transplanting poor families from overcrowded Java and
Madura to less populated islands violated the rights of indigenous people,
bred social resentment, and encouraged the exploitation and degradation of
natural resources on which many indigenous persons relied. In some areas,
such as parts of Sulawesi, the Malukus, Kalimantan, Aceh, and Papua,
relations between transmigrants and indigenous people were poor.
The report fails to note that the "transmigration" program targets major
new "development" areas including West Papua where ethnic tensions are
already high and increasing (see below). In the past, "transmigration" on
the island of Borneo has lead to bloody conflict between the marginalized
indigenous Dayak and arriving transmigrants. More fundamentally, the report
fails to acknowledge that "transmigration" has long-term consequences that
raise concerns about ethnic genocide.
West Papua
The State Department report fails to acknowledge adequately the
deteriorating human rights and security environment in West Papua where
security force intimidation is at levels not witnessed since the era of the
Suharto dictatorship. Recently
a group of NGOs told the UN Human Rights Council
that "The climate of impunity and the heavy presence of military troops that
have put Papua under de facto-military control facilitate the rising level
of violence."
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As in its previous reports, the State Department largely ignores the
obligation of the state to provide a minimal level of access for its
citizens to health, education, and employment services.
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The State Department also largely ignores sustained violence in the
area of the Freeport-McMoran gold and copper mine which has been the scene
of extensive human rights violations, environmental degradation and security
force extortion and intimidation for years. The report only briefly refers
to months of attacks staged by unknown parties along the main road
connecting the mine with the town of Timika, contending: "In addition to
killings by security forces and OPM, there were a number of violent
incidents, including some killings by unknown parties in Papua and West
Papua. Some of the incidents occurred in the vicinity of a giant gold and
copper mine."
The report describes the expansion of state security violence in West
Papua, including violence targeting peaceful demonstrators and civilians in
custody by the police and military. The report fails to connect the dots
linking the employment by security forces of brutal force and intimidation
and the denial of the right of freedom of speech and assembly. Key factors
in the growing tension and violence include the growing military presence in
West Papua and the continued marginalization of Papuans in their own land.
As in its previous reports, the State Department largely
ignores the obligation of the state to provide a minimal level of access for
its citizens to health, education, and employment services - rights stated
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In West Papua access to basic
government services such as education and health care, as well as to land
and economic opportunity are so inadequate as to be health and even life
threatening. Inadequate health and education services, especially in the
central highlands, has given impetus to an exploding HIV/AIDS epidemic.
The plight of Papuans is exacerbated by institutionalized discrimination
against indigenous Papuans inherent in "development" plans for West Papua.
The State Department reports on this in general terms:
During the year indigenous persons, most
notably in Papua, remained subject to widespread discrimination, and there
was little improvement in respect for their traditional land rights. Mining
and logging activities, many of them illegal, posed significant social,
economic, and logistical problems to indigenous communities. The government
failed to prevent domestic and multinational companies, often in collusion
with the local military and police, from encroaching on indigenous peoples'
land. In Papua tensions continued between indigenous Papuans and migrants
from other provinces, between residents of coastal and inland communities,
and among indigenous tribes.
While the above is accurate and welcome, the report does not sufficiently
address the human rights consequences of environmental destruction arising
from government policies. This includes new "development" plans announced or
inaugurated in 2009 to establish palm oil plantations and other large-scale
agricultural activity. The government-aided projects will favor national and
foreign firms and will employ large numbers of non-Papuans. No provision has
been made for legally addressing Papuan land rights and, as in the past,
security forces are employed to suppress local protest over extra-legal land
confiscation. Rights of traditional owners, particularly indigenous people,
to give their free, prior and informed consent to the development of their
lands, increasingly recognized under international law, are largely denied
in Indonesia.
Aceh
The report also fails to note that in Aceh
violence against political activists has escalated. The report chronicles
some of the violence in Aceh during the run-up to the April 9 legislative
elections but misses key incidents, including a grenade attack on a party
facility of the former rebel organization which killed five. The report more
seriously fails to note the pattern of violence which targeted principally
party activists associated with the former rebel organization, and the
likely role of the military in that violence. For example, it fails to note
the arrest of military personnel for tearing down that party's political
signs.
The report does not mention that key elements
of the 2005 internationally-brokered peace agreement have not been
implemented. The Helsinki peace agreement between the government of
Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Law on Governing Aceh
that implements the agreement called for the establishment of an ad
hoc-human rights court and a local truth and reconciliation commission to
deal with human rights violations committed during the conflict. Indonesia's
failure to make good on this legal undertaking underscores the government's
reluctance to hold accountable those responsible for past human rights
violations, which only undermines any efforts to prevent future violations.
Munir
In a particularly egregious omission, the
report ignores the intimidation of witnesses and lack of cooperation of the
military and others in the 2008 prosecution of retried general Muchdi
Purwoprandjono for the 2004 assassination of
leading human rights advocate and military critic Munir Said Thalib. This
obstruction of justice was widely commented on in the Indonesian media and
by NGOs but is ignored in this and the previous report. As we
wrote to Secretary of State Clinton in November 1999: The
Action Committee in Solidarity with Munir (KASUM) -- in
a report to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights
Defenders -- noted that Muchdi's trial was marred by the systematic
retraction of sworn statements by key witnesses and the presence of
organized groups seeking to influence the trial. KASUM's report concluded
that "the Indonesian justice system is not yet able to effectively prosecute
senior officials with powerful connections, due to weak prosecution capacity
and witness intimidation." It called Muchdi's acquittal "a setback for the
enforcement of human rights and the protection of other human rights
defenders more broadly."
see also
