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This backgrounder, focused on
Congressional action to support East Timor is an evolving document. This
is the most recent version.
Background on East Timor and U.S. Policy
East Timor Action Network, May 2000
1999 proved to be the most traumatic for East Timor since Indonesia's
invasion and occupation in 1975, but it ended on a promising note.
In January 1999,
Indonesia's President B.J. Habibie announced that the East Timorese
people would be able to choose between becoming an "autonomous" part of
Indonesia or being let go. On May 5, as Indonesia-backed paramilitaries
terrorized thousands of East Timorese people, the UN, Indonesia and
Portugal (the former colonial power)
agreed to conduct a "popular consultation." At the end of August,
the East Timorese voted overwhelmingly for independence, and the
Indonesian military and its militia began to systematically displace the
population and destroy the infrastructure. After 10 days, under intense
Congressional, grassroots and international pressure,
President Clinton suspended U.S.–Indonesian military ties. The
Indonesian troops withdrew from East Timor, and a UN-backed force took
control. East Timor is now under UN administration. As the East Timorese
recover from 24 years of occupation,
some 100,000 East Timorese remain trapped in Indonesia. Attempts to
prosecute those responsible for the massive destruction have been
halting and the reconstruction of East Timor has barely begun.
THE INDONESIAN INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF EAST
TIMOR is one of the worst atrocities of the 20th century.
The occupation killed over 200,000 Timorese people, one-third of the
original population. Indonesian rule over East Timor continued in
defiance of the United Nations
Security Council — which called on Jakarta to withdraw "without
delay" in 1975 and 1976 — as well as eight
General Assembly Resolutions. It was maintained with the help of the
United States.
Indonesia launched its December 7, 1975, invasion hours after President
Gerald Ford and
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Indonesian dictator
Suharto in Jakarta. After the invasion, the U.S. doubled military aid to
Indonesia and blocked the UN from taking effective enforcement action.
The United States has
transferred more than $1.1 billion worth of weaponry to Indonesia
since 1975.
Finally, East Timor Votes
In May 1998,
Suharto was forced from office
by the Asian economic crisis and student-led demonstrations, replaced
as President by his protégé B.J. Habibie. Suharto's ouster enabled
positive change in East Timor. In January 1999, Indonesia agreed to
allow the East Timorese to decide whether they wanted to be an
autonomous province within Indonesia or to become independent. On May 5,
Indonesia and Portugal
signed a UN-brokered agreement, establishing the process for an August
vote in East Timor, and a UN team went to the territory to conduct the
plebiscite.
Even prior to the agreement, elements of the Indonesian government
tried to sabotage that process, at great cost in human suffering. The
Indonesian police, placed in charge of security by the UN agreement,
worked with the military to execute a campaign of terror. Indonesia
supported and funded its paramilitary militia and other
pro-Indonesia campaign activities in violation of the UN accord. The
militia and military repeatedly threatened the East Timorese people that
if they voted for independence, they would face death and destruction
comparable to the period when Indonesia invaded in 1975, perhaps the
only promise that the Indonesia military kept during the consultation.
The UN repeatedly called on the Indonesian government to stop the
paramilitary mayhem, but despite pledges to do so, the violence
continued.
In this intense climate of fear 98.6% of those registered went to polls
on August 30. During the five days of the UN took to count the ballots,
Indonesian-backed violence escalated and thousands of civilians fled to
the hills and mountains. (see
Autumn 1999 Estafeta)
On September 4, 1999, the
UN announced that 78.5% had voted for independence. The Indonesian
military and its militia escalated their campaign to systematically
destroy buildings; threaten foreign observers, UN personnel and
journalists; forcibly relocated people to West Timor and other parts of
Indonesia; and kill East Timorese church workers, political leaders and
others.
On September 9, President Clinton
suspended all its military transfers and training and annnounced the
coordinated suspension of pending World Bank and IMF funds to
Indonesia. On September 15, after obtaining Indonesian government
agreement, the
UN Security Council endorsed
the deployment of an Australian-led peacekeeping force (InterFET),
and the Indonesian military began to withdraw. Australian troops
began arriving on September 20.
On October 20, Indonesia's
national assembly ratified
the August 30 vote in East Timor, renouncing any claim to the
territory, and the UN
formally took over its administration.
Subsequent investigations found that 60 to 80 percent of East Timor's
property destroyed or damaged and that up to three-quarters of the
population were displaced following the vote. The UN
recently estimated
that at least 1500 people were killed, although the exact number may never
be known. UN and Indonesian human rights investigations have pointed to
clear Indonesian military complicity in the violence surrounding the
ballot process.
Congress Acts After 1991 Santa Cruz Massacre
On November 12, 1991, Indonesian troops armed with American-made M-16
rifles gunned down more
than 270 Timorese civilians in Dili. Since then, a bipartisan effort
in Congress and an expanding grassroots movement set out to reverse our
government’s mistaken course. After the massacre,
52 Senators wrote to President Bush, calling for active U.S. support
for the implementation of the UN resolutions on East Timor "with an eye
toward a political solution that might end the needless suffering in
East Timor and bring about true self-determination for the territory."
It was the
first of many bipartisan House and Senate letters affirming support
for East Timor’s self-determination.
Since then, Congress has repeatedly acted on several fronts to
encourage resolution of East Timor’s political status and to protect the
human and political rights of its people.
Military Training
In October 1992, after statements by Indonesian officials indicating
that the massacre was an act of policy,
Congress cut off Indonesia's International Military Education and
Training (IMET) aid. The cut-off was opposed by the Bush
Administration’s State Department, the Pentagon, lobbyists for the
Indonesian military and some U.S. corporations, but was signed into law
as part of the FY1993 (fiscal year 1993) Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act. This legislation was re-enacted for FY1994 and
FY1995.
In the FY1995 bill, the House of Representatives also tried to close a
loophole under which Indonesia had been allowed to purchase some of the
same training. The committee report accompanying the bill expressed
"outrage" that the administration "despite its vocal embrace of human
rights" allowed the purchase of training.
In 1995, Congress continued to ban IMET (for FY1996) on military
subjects and made it clear that it does not accept the human rights
conduct of Indonesia's military. Some IMET — the "expanded" version
(E-IMET) which purports to focus on human rights and civilian control of
the military – was allowed. In March 1997, the House Foreign Operations
Appropriations Subcommittee received administration testimony that the
Pentagon sold Indonesia military training without congressional
notification or consent throughout 1996.
In June 1997, Suharto wrote to President Clinton rejecting E-IMET and a
proposed sale of F-16 jet fighters. Suharto stated that he would
not accept restrictions on military transfers based on human rights.
Nevertheless, Congress has limited appropriations to E-IMET for FY1997
through FY2000.
In March 1998, Rep. Lane Evans (D-IL) and ETAN
released Pentagon documents showing that U.S. Army and Marine
personnel had trained Indonesian soldiers under the Joint Combined
Exchange Training (JCET) program every few months since 1992. In
violation of the spirit of the IMET training ban, Green Berets and other
U.S. soldiers had continued to train Indonesian Kopassus (Special
Forces) and other forces in sniper tactics, urban warfare, psychological
operations, and other techniques of repression. Kopassus troops have
been implicated in some of the worst atrocities in East Timor and
Indonesia. Although the JCET training was technically legal, many in
Congress were angry that the Pentagon had evaded the clear intention of
the IMET prohibition. Responding to congressional and grassroots
pressure, the Pentagon suspended the JCET program for Indonesia in May
1998.
Two bills (H.R.3802
and H.R.4874) were
introduced during the 105th Congress to ban all military
defense services and training to countries that have been barred from
receiving IMET training or other military assistance. Although neither
bill passed, Reps. Chris Smith (R-NJ), Lane Evans (D-IL), Nita Lowey
(D-NY), Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) and others introduced the similar
International Military Training Transparency and Accountability Act
(H.R.1063) in the 106th Congress. The bill’s sponsors wrote
their colleagues "The executive branch must understand that when
Congress says to halt military assistance to murderers, torturers, and
thugs, we mean what we say."
In the
FY1999 Defense Appropriations Act, Congress withheld funding from
U.S. military training programs for units of any foreign country's units
are guilty of human rights violations. The
FY1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act, that mandates a detailed report
to Congress of all overseas military training of foreign militaries
conducted or planned by the Pentagon in 1998 and 1999. These provisions
resulted from the controversy surrounding the ongoing training of
Indonesian troops.
Weapons Transfers
Since the 1991 massacre,
the State Department has licensed hundreds of military sales to
Indonesia. The items sold have ranged from machine guns and M-16s to
electronic components, from communications gear to spare parts for
attack planes. Every shipment sent the political message that the
Indonesian armed forces had U.S. support for their illegal occupation of
East Timor.
In July 1993, after years of unrestricted weapons transfers to
Indonesia, the State Department, under congressional pressure, blocked a
transfer of U.S. F-5 fighter planes from the Jordan to Indonesia, citing
human rights as one of the reasons. The Jakarta Post
editorialized that the cancellation of the deal "resounded like [a]
sonic boom" in Indonesia.
In September 1993, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
unanimously adopted an amendment by Senator Russell Feingold (D-WI)
to condition major arms sales to Indonesia on human rights improvements
in East Timor. The Feingold amendment sent political shock waves through
Jakarta, though the authorization bill to which it was attached never
reached the Senate floor.
Early in 1994, the State Department banned the sale of small and light
arms and riot control equipment to Indonesia. The ban was the first
across-the-board prohibition on any type of weapons sale to Indonesia.
The small arms ban set an important precedent of tacit State Department
acceptance that withholding weapons sales can advance human rights.
In July 1994, the
Senate restated the 1958 U.S.- Indonesia treaty
restricting the use of U.S.-supplied weapons to "legitimate self-defense"
and strictly forbidding their use for "an act of aggression." The
appropriations bill, as passed, continued the IMET ban and prohibited
small arms sales to Indonesia.
In 1995 and 1996,
the State Department expanded the ban to include helicopter-mounted
equipment and then armored personnel carriers. Although these moves were
taken to avert stronger legislation, Assistant Secretary Barbara Larkin
wrote that "we all agree [that these arms] should not be sold or
transferred to Indonesia until there is significant improvement in the
human rights situation there."
In November 1996, House International Relations Committee Chair
Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) wrote the Washington Post opposing the
administration’s proposal to sell nine F-16 fighter planes to Indonesia.
The sale was repeatedly postponed due to congressional and grassroots
pressure until, in June 1997,
Suharto wrote Clinton rejecting the F-16s and all remaining IMET and
E-IMET training.
The House version of the FY 1998 State Department Authorization bill
included three provisions on East Timor, including a restriction on U.S.
government weapons sales and military assistance to Indonesia pending
substantial improvements in human rights. The full bill failed in
conference committee.
In November 1997, Congress passed and the President signed the
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY1998. The law requires
the U.S. government to state in military contracts to Indonesia that the
U.S. "expects" that any lethal weapons or helicopters will not be used
in East Timor. It was a milestone, reaffirming international law that
East Timor is distinct from Indonesia, in contrast with Indonesia’s
claims. This law also renewed the ban on IMET training, called for an
envoy in East Timor, and encouraged the administration to support
international efforts to find a just solution. Both the restriction on
weapons sales and the IMET ban were renewed in 1998 in the
FY1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act.
Self-Determination for East Timor
From the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, official U.S. policy has been to
recognize the de facto Indonesian annexation of East Timor while
acknowledging that no valid process of self-determination had taken
place. This was increasingly challenged by members of Congress over the
last five years.
Senator Claiborne Pell
(D-RI) visited East Timor in 1996, and reported : "When asked how a
plebiscite on the issue of independence versus integration would turn
out, I was told that over 90% of the people would choose independence
and that number would include some who formerly supported integration."
Fifteen Senators, led by
Russell Feingold (D-WI), wrote President Clinton in 1996: "We
believe now is the time for the United States to take a leading role in
advocating for the right of the East Timorese to choose their own
government through a UN-sponsored referendum." Clinton replied: "I note
with interest your support of a UN-sponsored self-determination
referendum in East Timor. I will take your idea into consideration."
On July 10 1998, the Senate
unanimously
adopted
S.Res.237, introduced by Feingold and Jack Reed (D-RI). This
resolution called on President Clinton to encourage the new leadership
in Indonesia to institute genuine democratic reforms. The resolution
also urged the President to work actively to carry out the UN
resolutions on East Timor and to support an internationally-supervised
referendum on self-determination.
In 1998, Reps. Lowey, John Porter (R-IL), Tom Lantos (D-CA), and Chris
Smith introduced
H.Con.Res.258, which also supported a referendum and called for
direct Timorese participation in UN negotiations; it gathered more than
80 co-sponsors. In October 1998, Congress adopted the Foreign Operations
Manager’s Statement accompanying the
FY1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act, which incorporated language from
this resolution supporting a "referendum to determine a comprehensive
settlement of the political status of East Timor."
President Habibie's advisers cited these congressional actions as
influencing his decision to allow the UN vote. In response to the many
congressional calls to respect East Timorese rights, the Administration
also shifted its policy toward support for self-determination, strongly
supporting the UN process and allocating $10 million dollars toward the
August vote.
The Clinton Administration
During his first presidential campaign candidate Bill Clinton said
that the U.S. approach to East Timor had been "unconscionable." In a
1993 press conference, President Clinton turned aside the argument that
pressuring Indonesia on East Timor and human rights would have an
adverse impact on business. The relationship of U.S. corporations in
Indonesia engaged in many lines of business with Jakarta is one of
mutual profit, a basic fact unaffected by Timor policy.
In June 1997, President Clinton dropped in on a Washington meeting
between East Timorese Nobel
Prize Laureate Bishop Carlos Belo and National Security Advisor
Sandy Berger. Five months later, Clinton met with Suharto at the APEC
summit. As he had in every bilateral meeting with Indonesia since taking
office, President Clinton raised the issues of human rights and the
treatment of people in East Timor.
President Clinton suspended U.S. military ties with Indonesia on
September 9, 1999. Administration officials have reiterated that
resolving the refugee crisis and substantial military reform are
prerequisites to resuming military ties. The U.S. provided logistical
support for InterFET.
The U.S. will contribute $25 million in economic support funds (not
including emergency humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping funds) for
East Timor in FY 2000. This money will go to support development, East
Timorese NGOs, security, the UN Transitional Administration in East
Timor (UNTAET),
and a
World Bank trust fund. Despite East Timor's great needs for
development, reconstruction, institution-building, and indigenous NGO
support, the Administration has requested only $10 million requested for
FY2001.
Congressional Action Pre-and Post-Ballot
Throughout 1999, numerous members of Congress publicly and privately
expressed concern about the Indonesian activity surrounding the UN
consultation. An August
6 letter, signed by 100 members of the House of Representatives was
typical. It expressed grave concern over developments in East Timor and
called on "the United States and its allies [to] use all the influence
we can possibly bring to bear on Jakarta to help ensure a democratic
process in East Timor."
On July 21, the House unanimously amended the
State Department Authorization bill (HR 2415) to call on the Clinton
administration to "immediately intensify efforts to prevail upon the
Indonesian Government and military" to take steps to end
anti-independence violence.
In late August, just prior to the vote, Senators Reed (D-RI) and Tom
Harkin (D-IA) and Rep. Jim McGovern (D-MA) went to East Timor. After
visiting a church in Suai full of frightened refugees
they called for immediate deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. Two
weeks later, the same church became the site of one of the bloodiest
massacres in East Timorese history.
On September 27, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed
S. 1568. Introduced by Senator Feingold and others it imposed "an
immediate suspension of assistance to the Government of Indonesia until
the results of the August 30, 1999 vote" were implemented. Similar
legislation (HR 2895)
was introduced in the House, by Rep. Patrick Kennedy (D-RI) and others.
On September 28, the House of Representatives passed H. Res 292, support
the peacekeeping mission and human rights in East Timor.
On September 30, the House Subcommittee on International Operations and
Human Rights, chaired by Rep. Chris Smith, held a hearing on East Timor.
The witness list featured just freed East Timorese independence leader
Xanana Gusmão, as well as Nobel Laureate Jose Ramos-Horta and
journalist Allan Nairn, one of the last foreigners to remain in
Dili, during the militia escalation. He was detained by the Indonesian
military for 10 days in September.
In November 1999, as part of the
FY2000 Foreign Operations appropriations, Congress put President
Clinton's ban on military training and weapons transfers into law. It
listed conditions before training can resume. These "Leahy conditions,"
stipulate that the Indonesian government and military must allow
"displaced persons and refugees to return home to East Timor" and bring
to justice military and militia members responsible for human rights
atrocities. They also require Indonesia to actively prevent militia
incursions into East Timor, work with UNTAET, and demonstrate
accountability through cooperation with investigations and prosecutions
of Indonesian military and militias responsible for human rights
violations.
The ‘‘East Timor
Repatriation and Security Act of 2000" (H.R. 4357), introduced in
the House in May 2000 by
Rep. Jim McGovern and others, would maintain the current prohibition
of U.S. military relations with the Indonesian armed forces unless the
President certifies that Indonesia has met certain conditions, including
respecting the territorial integrity of East Timor, the security and
safe return of refugees, and bringing to justice those individuals
responsible for crimes against humanity in East Timor and elsewhere.
chair
The Current Situation
East Timor is now ruled by a UN transitional administration (UNTAET)
with independence is expected within two to three years. Unemployment
remains extremely high in East Timor leading to some social unrest.
The situation of
over 100,000 refugees in West Timor and other parts of Indonesia
remains dire. East Timorese in camps face ongoing threats and
intimidation by military-supported militia. UNICEF has recently reported
that one in four children under the age of five suffers from
acute malnutrition. Earlier this year the UN High Commissioner on
Refugees (UNHCR) reported that over 700 people, mostly children, have
died from various illnesses since last September due to inadequate
sanitation and medical care for the refugees. Access to many of the
camps by humanitarian organizations remains limited, and aid workers
have been threatened. The Indonesian military and its militia allies
spread disinformation to discourage East Timorese from returning home.
UNHCR recently reported that repatriation has come to a standstill.
East Timor is not yet fully secured against militia and Indonesian
military (TNI) threats. The UN reported 16 militia incidents between
Feb. 21 and March 7, 2000, alone. East Timor's enclave of Oecussi has
also come under regular militia attack, with the support of TNI. Several
thousand militia members are still active along the West Timor border,
where the TNI continues to conduct exercises. TNI and militias often
prevent East Timorese from spontaneously returning and harass aid
workers trying to enter and leave West Timor.
At the end of January, Both the
Indonesian National Commission of Inquiry and the
UN's International Commission of Inquiry released reports revealing
high-level military collaboration in the atrocities committed against
the people of East Timor last year. UNTAET is holding a number of
militia suspects pending the establishment of a court system in the
territory. One Indonesian General,
Johny Lumintang former deputy commander of the Army, is being sued
in U.S. court by East Timorese victims of post-ballot violence. The UN
panel recommended that establishing an international tribunal with
substantial Indonesian and East Timorese presence. Indonesian Attorney
General Marzuki Darusman is
moving forward with indictments within the next few months. However,
Indonesia's parliament has yet to pass the laws governing these
prosecutions.
Preparations for an international tribunal would guarantee justice
for East Timor should Indonesia's efforts at prosecution falter or fail
to meet international standards. None of these efforts are looking back
beyond January 1999. Genuine justice for East Timor will only come when
there is a full accounting for human rights abuses from 1975 on.
President Abdurrahman Wahid has significantly reduced the power of the
Indonesian military, as he continues to assert democratic government.
But the powerful military and intelligence bureaucracies will not easily
surrender the power and corruption they have become accustomed to. Most
of the military leaders responsible for violence in East Timor last year
have been promoted, while military-backed human rights abuses have
escalated in some areas of Indonesia, including Ambon, Aceh and West
Papua.
Genuine democratic reform in Indonesia would mean an end to "dual
function" of the military. This would include the removal of military
officers from civil service, as well as from un-elected parliamentary
seats. It would include the dissolution of the "territorial command
structure" of the military at every tier of society, from
non-commissioned officers in most villages to several or more battalions
stationed in every province. These powers are not codified in
Indonesia's constitution nor in its laws.
A halt to military and military-sponsored militia violence against the
peoples of Indonesia should include a permanent end to special military
operational areas in West Papua and Aceh; an end to "sweepings" (where
people even remotely associated with a movement deemed threatening by
the Indonesian military are arrested and detained); and the withdrawal
of Indonesian troops from West Papua, Aceh, and other areas, including
West Timor.
The best way for the United States to support Indonesia's civilian
government is to unambiguously tell the Indonesian military that their
former Washington patron no longer supports illegal or violent attempts
to maintain power or subvert Indonesia's emerging democracy. Any
restoration of U.S. support for Indonesia's military undercuts that
message, jeopardizing both Indonesian democracy and East Timor's
long-term security.
chair
* General
Try Sutrisno, now Indonesia’s Vice President, said: "Such people must be
shot and we will shoot them." General Herman Mantiri, the new regional
commander for East Timor, said that the massacre was "quite proper"
since "they were opposing us, demonstrating, even yelling things against
the government."
October 1998 version of
Background on East Timor and U.S. Policy
April 1998 version of
Background on East Timor and U.S. Policy
November 1997 version of
Background on East Timor and U.S. Policy
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