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(III)
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:04 p.m., in room 2220, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith (chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. SMITH. [presiding] Good afternoon, and first of all, I want to apologize for the room change and for any inconvenience it may have provided to any of you, but this, I think, lends itself to those who wanted to be here, so I do thank you for coming.

Today's hearing, ladies and gentlemen, is on human rights in Indonesia. I hope our witnesses will address three fundamental questions.

First, is it true, as human rights advocates in our own State Department have suggested, that agents of the Government of Indonesia routinely engage in torture, extrajudicial executions, and other gross violations of fundamental human rights?

Second, is the U.S. policy toward Indonesia helping or hurting the situation?

Third, are the massive infusions of money from the International Monetary Fund and other international financial institutions likely to help the people of Indonesia or will they further enrich and empower the governing class?

The U.S. State Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997 reported politically motivated extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrests, and imprisonment in Indonesia. The report notes that abuses have historically been particularly numerous in East Timor, Irian Jaya, and Aceh, three areas in which there have been strong independence movements. The report notes, and I quote, "There are few signs of judicial independence, and that the courts were used against political activists and government critics rather than to punish officials who unlawfully harm the people." There are severe restrictions, as the report points out, on the freedom of speech, on the freedom of assembly, and on the freedom of religion.

Despite this dismal record, our government has made clear that the top priority in its relationship with Indonesia is trade and investment, not political reform or human rights protection. Even after the 1991 massacre in Dili, East Timor, in which security forces killed hundreds of peaceful mourners—including children in
their school uniforms—in a Catholic cemetery, our government con-
tinued to lavish assistance, including military assistance, on Ja-
karta.

You know, I pored over the documentation on human rights
abuses by the Suharto dictatorship, as well as his and his family's
personal corruption, and their enrichment, the billions of dollars
they have gleaned from their people at the expense of their poor.
And I can't help but see a compelling parallel with Mobutu in
Zaire. The inescapable conclusion is Suharto is the Mobutu of Asia.

I am particularly shocked to learn recently that the United
States has been providing combat training to Indonesian military
units, including some who were involved with the massacre. This
appears to be a dramatic end-run about the rules Congress care-
fully prescribed for military training and the education of Indo-
nesian forces in an effort to ensure that we would not provide them
with the means of carrying out further massacres.

Year after year the Administration has assured Congress that
the provision of international military education and training to In-
donesia is strictly limited to the so-called expanded IMET curricu-
lum, classroom training in human rights and related subjects. We
have also been assured that there is no way the Indonesian mili-
tary could use any of this training against the people of East
Timor, or against political, religious dissenters in Indonesia itself.

To provide training and marksmanship, psy ops—psychological
warfare—sniper training, and related subjects to some of the very
units that have brutalized the people of East Timor is an obvious
violation of this assurance.

This revelation is eerily reminiscent of a similar situation in
Rwanda, where the United States has provided marksmanship, psy
ops, and similar training to the Rwandan Patriotic Army through
the JCET program during the very period in which the RPA ap-
ppears to have been engaged in the mass killings of refugees across
the border in Zaire.

At a December 1996 hearing, I was assured that our assistance
to the RPA consisted of what the Department of Defense spokes-
man called the kinder, gentler side of military training, focused on
respect for human rights. We found out about the marksmanship
or the psy ops about 8 months later. The Administration has still
not been able to determine whether any of those soldiers who took
our marksmanship course subsequently participated in the killing
of refugees.

In the last 5 years, the U.S. Special Operations forces have con-
ducted at least 41 training exercises with the Indonesian military,
at a cost of more than $3.5 million to the U.S. taxpayer. Based on
the information provided to Congress so far, it appears that the
trainees, in most of these exercises, were Indonesia's elite Kopassus
special forces, the arm of the military accused of committing the
gravest human rights violations against that regime's political op-
ponents.

The lethal skills taught during those exercises have included
close-quarters combat, sniper skills, marksmanship, combat patrol-
ning, small unit tactics, and military operations in urban terrain.

Even before the U.S. training was publicly disclosed, those were
exactly the skills identified by Amnesty International as "likely to
be used in the context of counterinsurgency operations which may lead to human rights violations in Indonesia."

Since this training has come to light, the Administration has emphasized the benefit to U.S. forces as a justification for those activities. But it is obvious that, in the words of the former commanding general of the Pacific Special Operations Command, this special forces training also "improves the capability of the host nation" and, to continue his statement, "demonstrates the U.S. military's commitment to the Indonesian regime."

We need a simple and transparent set of rules to govern all of our military education programs. The first rule, however, should be that the United States does not give any kind of military assistance whatever to governments that murder their own people.

Finally, the world needs to know what is happening to the billions and billions of dollars it is pouring into Indonesia in response to the ongoing economic crisis. It is no secret that the vast majority of these dollars are going into the coffers of the government itself and of large-scale economic enterprises that helped create the crisis in the first place.

Supporters of the IMF package for Indonesia argue that, in return for the money, the government and the economic system will reform themselves. They also argue that without a restoration of financial stability there will be no political reform and human rights will be at greater risk than ever.

Skeptics argue that the brunt of the reforms in the IMF package, such as reductions in the government subsidies for food and fuel, will fall on the poor. They fear that the bailout will enrich and empower the Indonesian Government and the large-scale economic enterprises, many of them owned by members of the armed forces and/or the President's family, and that in the end there will be more of the same kind of behavior that led to the economic problems in the first place.

It seems even less likely that the IMF and the World Bank assistance will lead to political reform, since the bank and the IMF themselves insist they cannot insist on political conditions, not even the protection of fundamentally and internationally recognized human rights as a condition on loans or other assistance.

Finally, just let me say that I am very pleased that four of our five witnesses today are democracy and human rights activists from Indonesia, East Timor, and Aceh. I hope that these witnesses, and also Dr. Stephanie Fried of the Environmental Defense Fund, will help us understand how the Government of Indonesia really works, and what levers we should be using to get the government to respect human rights, and whether the current and proposed U.S. international actions will be helpful or harmful.

I had hoped that the Administration would send witnesses to this hearing, but they cited scheduling conflicts. We have asked them to tell us exactly when their witnesses can come and we will hold the second part of this hearing on whatever day and at whatever hour they choose. Congress and the American people have a right to know what our government is doing in Indonesia and why.

I'd like to ask our very distinguished witnesses at this point if they would begin with their statements and to proceed in order.
First, let me introduce Dr. Stephanie Fried who has worked on Indonesian environmental and social issues since 1984. A graduate of Cornell University and Bryn Mawr College, she spent 5½ years in Indonesia. Currently she is staff scientist and policy analyst at the Environmental Defense Fund where she specializes in Southeast Asian Natural Resources issues.

The next witness, Constancio Pinto, is the National Council of Maubere resistance representative to the United States and United Nations for East Timor. He left his country in 1992 after surviving the Santa Cruz massacre. Prior to that he endured detention and torture at the hands of the Indonesian military.

Third will be Jafar S. Hamzah. He is an attorney from Sumatra, Indonesia. He was formerly an officer of the branch of the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation in Jakarta. His specialties are Indonesia law and international human rights law.

The next witness to appear before the Committee is Ms. Aryati. She's an Indonesian human rights researcher and activist. Because of concerns for her safety, she is testifying today under a pseudonym. And I would ask, and we've already asked and the press has agreed, that they will maintain the confidentiality of her being.

And, finally, we will hear from Pius Lustrilanang, a coordinator of a coalition supporting opposition leader, Megawati Sukarnoputri. And he was abducted by the Indonesian Government in February, endured detention and torture for 2 months in a prison on Java. He is the first recently disappeared Indonesian activist to go public with his experience and, in so doing, does it at great risk to himself.

I would ask Dr. Fried if she could begin, and please feel free to be expansive because this is an extremely important hearing and we need to hear any information that you convey to the Subcommittee.

STATEMENT OF STEPHANIE G. FRIED, SCIENTIST, INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND

Ms. Fried. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman and honorable Members of the House, it is a great honor to testify before you in the company of courageous Indonesian citizens who, at great personal risk, have come here in order to present you with a full and open account of their experiences and their ideas. Some of them have been illegally detained and tortured, an all too common occurrence in Indonesia.

Others wish simply to express their thoughts freely, an exercise which is often met with harsh repression.

My name is Stephanie Fried and I am a staff scientist and policy analyst at the Environmental Defense Fund, a nonprofit organization with over 300,000 members. I have conducted research on Indonesian environmental and social issues since 1984.

I would like to draw your attention to concerns about the IMF and World Bank efforts in Indonesia, concerns which have been raised by EDF and 54 other environmental, development, and human rights organizations representing over 6 million members and supporters in 19 countries, including Indonesia.

There is a very real opportunity now to promote reform in Indonesia, as well as in the multilateral financial institutions. If this
opportunity is not taken, there is the potential for a great deal of
damage to and suffering on the part of the people of Indonesia who
will have to repay the loans incurred by the Suharto Government.

I would like to talk to you about three things. First, the current
structure of the Indonesian economy and the implications for pri-
vatization programs under these conditions. Second, the serious en-
vironmental and human rights implications as the IMF and World
Bank push for the expansion of the palm oil sector. Third, over-
arching concerns about the need for greater transparency, civil
service reform, and greater accountability in the IMF and World
Bank reform package.

The IMF should be given credit for being the only multilateral
development bank to make the breakup of Indonesia's corrupt eco-
nomically, socially, and environmentally destructive monopolies a
prerequisite for the disbursement of funds. This represents a sig-
nificant opportunity for reform, if acted upon.

Without sufficient follow through on the part of the IMF, how-
ever, there will continue to be substantial economic losses and so-
cial costs as a result of these monopolies. Unfortunately, the IMF's
initially encouraging declarations on the monopolies have been fol-
lowed by repeated IMF announcements, apparently echoing Indo-
nesian governmental claims that the monopolies and cartels have
been abolished.

As reported in the Wall Street Journal, the Journal of Commerce,
and in Indonesia's Samizdat Press on the Internet, there are clear
signs that the IMF-mandate of the breakup of the monopolies and
cartels has not succeeded. The disbanding of these monopolies must
be a litmus test for determining whether further disbursements of
IMF, World Bank, ADB, and other public funds, not those intended
for direct poverty relief, I should add, should be made in Indonesia.

In addition, the World Bank has informed us that the structural
and sectoral adjustment loans currently planned for Indonesia are
not bound by existing Bank social and environmental regulations.
We call for existing World Bank environmental and social policies
and procedures to be applied directly to structural adjustment
loans.

We call for a halt to plans for the rapid disbursement of large
World Bank loans to the Indonesian Government. There is cur-
rently an additional $2 billion slated for release within the next
few weeks.

A halt to the rapid disbursement of such loans which are not
subject to Bank standard, environmental, and social policies, in-
cluding transparency, public information, effects on indigenous peo-
ple and resettlement, unless these loans are purely for direct pov-
erty alleviation.

There are clear indications, including the makeup of Indonesia's
newly appointed cabinet, that the Suharto Government has no in-
tention of lessening the stranglehold of the Suharto family and
friends on the country's economic life. A report just released by Dr.
George Aditjondro, an Indonesia professor at Newcastle University
in Australia, details the corrupt activities of four of the lesser
known Indonesian ministers in the new cabinet. Dr. Aditjondro's
report includes reports on the transfer of $50 million to a Singa-
pore financial institution by an individual who shortly thereafter
was appointed to be a minister in the new cabinet; reports of the transfer of ministry-controlled trade to factories owned by a new minister's son; and by the same minister, the transfer of trade from a parastatal entity to a factory owned by a son of Suharto, as well as extensive business links between other new ministers and conglomerates associated with Suharto relatives.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to present you with an example of how privatization works in Indonesia. According to the *Wall Street Journal*, in February, control over the Jakarta water supply was removed from a state agency to the private sector. This meant that Mr. Suharto's grandson, Ari Sigit, and the son of one of Mr. Suharto's closest business allies, Mr. Liem Sioe Liong, gained control over the Jakarta supply. They then announced that water prices would be raised an average of 25 percent.

Next I will address the privatization and expansion of the oil palm sector in Indonesia.

The January 1998 IMF letter of intent, signed with Indonesia, called for the removal of all formal and informal barriers to foreign investment in palm oil plantations. The World Bank is currently preparing a $1-billion sectoral adjustment loan, a significant portion of which is intended to support the privatization of the oil palm sector. We have already heard what privatization implies under the current economic structure of Indonesia.

The Indonesian forest fires of 1997 and 1998, for the most part purposefully set, are one of the greatest environmental disasters of this century. These devastating fires spread poisonous smoke over 6 countries, caused over $3 billion in health, transport, and trade damages, and affected the health of over 50 million people. At the height of the fires, breathing the air in Malaysia was the equivalent of smoking five packs of cigarettes a day.

Mr. Chairman, officially sanctioned plantations were largely blamed for these fires. According to Senator Max Baucus, who visited Indonesia last year during the burning season, the fires were "caused largely by Malaysian and Indonesian timber companies clearing land for palm oil plantations, in violation of Indonesian law."

Senator Baucus continued, "Few of these companies have suffered any significant punishment and most people I met were pessimistic about the chances that this would change anytime soon."

The IMF letter of intent mandates the expansion of Indonesia's palm oil sector through the removal of barriers to foreign investment, a move likely to bring about a recurrence and intensification of the worst fires of the century with accompanying economic and social costs.

In addition to the human suffering brought on by the fires, plantation establishment in Indonesia commonly involves substantial violations of basic human rights. Plantation establishment often begins with the forced seizure and clear-cutting of forested territories inhabited by indigenous people and other forest dwellers.

With the loss of their food supplies and forest-based income, local communities are often severely impoverished as a result. If they dare to protest or question the clear-cutting of their productive forest gardens and fields, even if only to request that the companies
operate outside of the regions necessary for local food self-sufficiency, the security forces are immediately called in.

The 1996 State Department Report on Human Rights Practices in Indonesia documented the activities of security forces against village leaders who attempted to prevent a powerful plantation company from clear-cutting their forest garden in Indonesian Borneo.

According to the report, 14 village leaders were "stripped, repeatedly beaten, kicked, and pistol whipped, and some were burned with cigarettes."

According to a report received 3 weeks ago from Aceh Sumatra, from the Aceh Sumatra NGO Forum, on April 13, 1998, six people were shot by police in a conflict with local villagers at an oil palm plantation company which had seized and destroyed their productive lands. Forty people were arrested and over 100 fled the region.

Therefore, in the absence of meaningful, enforceable, environmental, and social conditionality tied explicitly into the IMF and World Bank loan disbursement schedules, we call for a halt in any direct or indirect encouragement by the Breton Woods Institution for the expansion or privatization of the Indonesian palm oil sector.

Loan conditionality should include standard, social, environmental, and transparency requirements, in addition to the prerequisite of an open transparent and participatory system of land-use planning, one which recognizes land and forest tenures of indigenous forest communities.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I would like to share with you the concerns of major Indonesian civil society organizations about the need for greater transparency, civil service reform, and accountability across the board during the implementation of the IMF and World Bank packages.

For years the World Bank has described its involvement in Indonesia as a model of success to be emulated in other developing countries, despite persistent criticism of the lack of financial transparency within Indonesia, astonishing levels of corruption, and indications that a substantial portion of bank funds invested there, as much as 30 percent, remain unaccounted for.

In February, decrying the fact that the bank ignored Indonesia's obvious corruption and alliance on the use of force to control its population, INFID, an association of over 100 Indonesian and foreign NGOs, concluded that if the current crisis continues, the percent of Indonesia's population in poverty, after decades of World Bank intervention, will be approximately equivalent to the poverty levels of 1967.

Meanwhile, however, the nation's natural resource base has been devastated by unsustainable exploitation at the hands of a corrupt and internationally-supported government and Indonesia's debt burden has grown to $65 billion from $2.1 billion in 1996.

In a statement released today, and just put into my hands 10 minutes ago, INFID, the international NGO forum in Indonesia, states that no one believes that economic stability can be restored without fundamental political change that involves respect for fundamental rights, clear checks on executive power, full accountability of public officials, an end of corruption and nepotism, and the ability of ordinary Indonesians to participate fully in political life.
International financial institutions have attempted to separate economic and political power in Indonesia. Such an approach is infeasible and is indeed in part responsible for the current crisis. INFID believes that lasting economic reform can only take place in conjunction with fundamental political reform.

In March, Muchtar Pakpahan, the jailed leader of SBSI, an independent Indonesian labor union, told visiting Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth that, "Washington should not give aid to Jakarta until President Suharto implements reform; political, social, and economic reforms."

In April, the directors of the Indonesian Economic Think Tank, Econit, publicly stated that "the IMF reform package would very unlikely address the main cause of the crisis, mainly free and unbridled crony capitalism."

WALHI, Indonesia's largest environmental organization issued a press release decrying the repressive statements and actions of military and civilian officials. The Indonesian Legal Foundation, an organization of courageous lawyers dedicated to supporting a rule of law in Indonesia, called on the Indonesian civilian government and the armed forces to ensure the success of the IMF program by, among other things, guaranteeing the right to assemble, freedom of association, freedom of union, and the right to express opinion. "Only with these freedoms, will the people truly be able to help themselves and to lighten the burden of the government in overcoming this crisis."

According to INFID, the World Bank, and I would add the IMF, has "ignored the political and institutional dimensions of development which include the development of the rule of law, the recognition of human rights, effective democratic mechanisms and structures which can produce an accountable government, and effective social control which can actually enhance the economic development process."

The Jakarta office of the IMF has not responded to written requests made by the major Indonesian civil society organizations for meetings to discuss the planned bail-out package. It took us at EDF 2 months to secure a 1-hour meeting with the U.S. executive director of the IMF, a meeting, which I might add, did not adequately address our concerns.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, we call for the Bank and the Fund to ensure that loans to Indonesia during the current crisis are accompanied by rigorous, monitorable, enforceable measures to promote civil service reform, greater financial accountability and transparency, and respect for good governance, and human rights.

The World Bank should follow its own public information policy in the proposed $1-billion adjustment loans, and all other loans in the current crisis.

We urge the IMF and the World Bank to promote the establishment of an independent anticorruption commission to prevent leakage of funds and to work toward the creation of a clean and accountable government bureaucracy.

Finally, the IMF should undertake long overdue reforms to ensure transparency and public access to information concerning its activities. The IMF should make publicly available the Article IV consultations, evaluation, audit documents, interim committee, de-
development committee documents. Staff country reports should also be made publicly available following board discussion of such documents, as should the minutes of board meetings.

In the case of Indonesia the Fund should respond to repeated requests by Indonesian and other civil society organizations and NGOs for direct meetings in Indonesia and abroad.

The Fund should also undertake major reforms to promote a more participatory open process and involve elements of civil society in the formulation of its policies and recommendations for borrowing nations.

Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Ms. Fried appears in the appendix.]

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Fried, thank you very much for your very comprehensive statement and the multiple recommendations that you have made which I think will be very helpful to the Subcommittee as we try to chart a course in the coming days, weeks, and months, vis-à-vis, Indonesia, the IMF, and all of the related institutions.

Let me, before yielding to our next witness, Constancio Pinto, I'd like to ask Mr. Sherman if he has any opening comments.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to make some opening comments and for your wisdom in holding these hearings.

We're, I think, aware of the crony capitalism, the human rights violations, the absence of democracy, and the repression of the people of East Timor. What I hope that we learn from these hearings is what we, as Members of Congress, can do about it.

What was presented to us on the Banking Committee, on which I also serve, was a bill to provide additional American funds to the IMF, up or down. The Treasury Department has not worked with us to give Congress any particular control over what actions the IMF will take. I am very reluctant to put the IMF in a position where it cannot help the people of South Korea, who are moving forward with democracy, or the people of Thailand. At the same time we want to make sure that human rights and the other issues I mentioned are dealt with in Indonesia.

And, so the first issue is, what can we do to influence IMF policy in Indonesia without adversely affecting South Korea and Thailand?

The second issue is, what can the IMF do? It is easy to say they should insist upon this or insist upon that, but basically the government in Jakarta has 200 million hostages. If crony capitalism is severely threatened, they have the opportunity to say, well, then you will face instability. Let us tell you about the half a million people who died in these islands in the 1960's. Do you want that kind of instability again? How many hundreds of thousands of deaths can be reported on CNN before you relent? And give us the money.

And I would hope witnesses would address the issue of whether there's a soft-landing opportunity here. Whether there's a way to prod the Indonesian Government toward moving toward liberalization without being faced with the stark issue that even if we could, as a Congress, influence the IMF to withhold aid from Indonesia, under certain circumstances whether we could devise a set of circumstances or requirements that on the one hand would improve
human rights in Indonesia and on the other hand would not lead to hundreds of thousands of deaths as a result of civil disturbances.

Thank you.

Mr. Smith. Thank you, very much, Mr. Sherman.

Mr. Pinto.

STATEMENT OF CONSTANCIO PINTO, UNITED STATES AND UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF MAUBERE (EAST TIMOR) RESISTANCE

Mr. Pinto. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Member of U.S. Congress, ladies and gentlemen, first of all, allow me to express my profound gratitude to this prestigious body in allowing me to address before you problems of violations of human rights that my people and my country have endured for almost 23 years under Indonesia's illegal and brutal occupation.

My name is Constancio Pinto. I am Timorese. I was born in East Timor and raised in East Timor. I escaped into the United States in 1993.

East Timor is a small country. Its size is relatively equal to the size of the state of Massachusetts. The population of East Timor is 850,000 people. For more than 400 years, East Timor was under Portuguese colonial rule. East Timor economically is self-sufficient. It has oil, natural gas, and agricultural goods. As a colonized people, the East Timorese have aspired to individual freedom and liberty, the same as the people of this great country aspired to centuries ago during the British colonization.

Thus, in 1975, the East Timorese decided to declare independence from Portugal. However, because of greed and power, the independence of the small nation of East Timor could not survive.

On December 7, 1975, Indonesia launched a bloody invasion of East Timor. The invasion was an act of aggression and violated international law and the U.N. resolution 1415 (XV), which strongly observed the right to self-determination of every people under colonial rule.

The invasion of East Timor was comparable to the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's armed forces which slaughtered hundreds of unarmed civilians.

I was 12 years old at the time when Indonesia invaded East Timor. In East Timor more than 60,000 civilians of different ethnic groups, Timorese, Chinese, Portuguese, and Australian, and different ages, including children and old men and women, were killed. They were killed inside their houses, they were dropped into the ocean, and they were dropped alive from helicopters.

I survived the massacre and escaped into the jungle with my parents. In the jungle we faced tremendous suffering, mass slaughter, and starvation perpetrated by the Indonesian army. As a result of the direct invasion and illegal occupation of East Timor, over 200,000 people have died. They died of mass slaughter, starvation, and torture in jail. As many other young Timorese, my life has been affected by the Indonesian invasion.

In 1991, at the age of 28 years old, I was arrested by the Indonesian police and intelligence and I was tortured from 9 o'clock in the morning until 1 o'clock in the morning of the next day. The tor-
tured was immeasurable. They kicked my stomach and my knees with boots, they punched my head and pointed the gun at my head and threatened to kill me and all of my family. The intensity of torture was beyond human understanding.

Even though they saw I was bleeding everywhere from my nose, my mouth, and my ears, they still tortured me. At one point, two of the Indonesian special forces, the Kopassus, threatened to throw me alive into the sea. This method of torture is one of many systematic methods of torture carried out by the Indonesian special forces, Kopassus.

This unit is one of the worst Indonesian armed forces in East Timor. They are the ones that tortured me and continued to do so to other Timorese.

Mr. Chairman, allow me to share with you other related stories that happened to two of my friends, Domingos Seixas and Henrique Belmiro. Domingos Seixas was sentenced to 12 years in prison. On the day when he was arrested, he was dropped into the ocean with his neck tied up into a heavy rock. For some reason, the rock slipped away and Domingos survived the attempted drowning. Domingos was taken to prison where his genital organ was electrocuted. What happened to me and Domingos was incomparable to what happened to Henrique Belmiro, another friend. On the day Belmiro was arrested, his finger and toe nails were pulled out with pliers during the interrogation. All of these atrocities were committed by the Kopassus.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to express in this forum my disappointment with the training of Kopassus carried out by the U.S. Army and Air Force units in Indonesia under the Joint Combined Exchange Training, JCET, program. The United States should stop all types of military support to a dictator that for 33 years has continuously committed gross human rights violations in defiance of the universal declaration of human rights. Training Indonesian Kopassus and all Indonesian troops is just like training Saddam Hussein's troops.

Not to speak of the suffering enduring by the Timorese women. Often the Timorese women were raped in front of their husbands, boyfriends, friends, and families. There are thousands of Timorese women who were subjected to forced sterilization through the implementation of the Indonesian family planning program, KB. According to Miranda Sissions, a graduate student from Yale University, almost all injections of contraceptives were covertly given to women under the guise of vaccinations. Many Timorese women believed that these injections could permanently sterilize them.

Mr. Chairman, today the Indonesian army has turned its attention on East Timorese youth. Today, the Indonesian army does not view the danger as coming from a handful of the guerilla fighters in the jungle but the youth in the cities. All peaceful actions and freedom of speech and assembly are considered politically dangerous. Thus, peaceful actions encounter military repression. One of the prominent examples of the repression against peaceful actions was the Santa Cruz massacre which occurred in 1991 where more than 271 people were gunned down in cold blood.

Those who were wounded were taken into hospitals and later some of their heads were smashed with rocks and others were in-
jected with lethal injections. More than a hundred people were killed this way. Until today there has not been an independent investigation of the massacre. Those who were responsible for the massacre were sentenced to 6 months.

The organizers of the peaceful actions were sentenced to 9 years to life imprisonment, such as in the case of Grigorio Sandanha who was sentenced to life imprisonment. Such repression forced hundreds of young Timorese to leave their homeland. From 1995 to this day, more than 200 young Timorese have successfully escaped to Portugal, leaving their families back home. Hundreds more endured constant persecution.

Mr. Chairman, to conclude, I would like to reiterate that human rights violations such as torture, rape, persecution, arbitrary disappearances, executions, and imprisonment in East Timor have become the daily bread of the East Timorese people.

The Timorese want just one thing: that is our right to self-determination be recognized. Let us freely choose whatever we want to be, be it an independent state, integration into Indonesia, or an association with another country. To achieve this, the role of the United States is vital.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pinto appears in the appendix.]

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much for your very moving statement, for bearing witness to the atrocities that you yourself and some of your friends have suffered because we need to hear who it is that we are supporting, who it is that when we engage in diplomatic niceties, what he does when he and his people are in a different venue and a different setting and that is torture.

And, again, as I said in my opening statement, there seems to be very little doubt about the prevalence and the intensity and the horrific nature of the use of torture in Indonesia by the Suharto dictatorship. What I find so unbelievably baffling and dismaying is how our own government can chronicle these atrocities in the Country Reports, completely ratified and backed up by other independent human rights organizations and by eyewitnesses and victims, like yourself, and then turn around and so subordinate those issues to become nonexistent.

So, I do thank you for your very incisive words and for bearing witness to the truth.

I'd like to ask Mr. Hamzah if he would make his presentation at this point.

STATEMENT OF JAFAR SIDDIQ HAMZAH, FORMER STAFF ATTORNEY, INDONESIAN LEGAL AID FOUNDATION

Mr. HAMZAH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and honorable Members of the House, and ladies and gentlemen.

First of all, I would like to thank all of you for giving me a chance to testify in this hearing. Suharto, after being in power for 32 years, now finds himself in a very difficult political situation. Even though he continues to control political power in his hands in a real sense, in the past few months the strength of the opposition forces that want to bring an end to his authoritarian rule has grown immensely. I feel certain and I have strong hope that in the
next few months, Suharto will be increasingly marginalized, if not overthrown through a people-power revolution altogether.

A historical analysis of Suharto’s 32-year rule reveals that he is a political figure who reacts violently to criticism and to challenges against his authority. He is not one to reform his policies in response to criticism. On the contrary, Suharto and the new order regime respond to internal and international criticism not only in a defense manner, but through overt military violence, on a psychological level, the most pernicious form of intimidation of civilians to bow the military force. The bloody events in history that occurred during his rule are too numerous to enumerate. Among them are the tragedy of 1965, in which about 1 million suspected Communists were mercilessly executed, imprisoned and persecuted; the Malari student riots in 1974; Tanjung Priok in 1984; East Timor; Aceh; Warside Lampung; the mysterious killings known as Petrus from 1982 to 1983; and many other cases.

Members of the government and armed forces who are responsible for these atrocities and who ought to have been put to trial for their crimes, not only continue to stay in power, but through Suharto’s support have entrenched themselves in their crony positions even deeper and do not feel accountable to anyone.

I wish to present a few facts about the political violence in Aceh, in North Sumatra, where I come from. In the past few months, the Malaysian Government, in close collaboration with the Indonesian Government, undertook a forced repatriation policy of thousands of Acehnese who are victims of political persecution, but who were never granted political refugee status in Malaysia.

In the past few weeks, as a consequence of the force repatriation policy, 24 Acehnese people were killed by Malaysian police. In addition, 27 of them were executed extrajudicially after arriving in Aceh. Five-hundred-forty-five or more other political refugees who were forcibly repatriated are being held in Rancong, Aceh, a Kopassus Special Forces Military Camp known as a torture site.

On April 10, 35 Acehnese sought political asylum in different foreign embassies in Malaysia, including 8 going to the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, the other to the Swiss, French, and Brunei embassies; 14 others to UNHRC in Kuala Lumpur.

With regard to the violent forcible repatriation of Acehnese undertaken by the Malaysian and Indonesian Government working together, I wish to make the following recommendations to the U.S. Congress and the international community.

First. The thousands of Acehnese in Malaysia who are being forcibly repatriated are not illegal immigrants, but political refugees who fled Aceh because of the extremely repressive socio-political situation very similar to that of East Timor and West Papua. Aceh continues to be a special region for military operations. Since 1989, during the intensification of military counter-insurgency, thousands of civilians have been killed. These human rights violations are very well documented by international organizations, including the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation where I worked as a human rights lawyer for 7 years, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch or Asia Watch.

The refugees are caught in a cycle of daily humiliation and violence. Because of institutionalized state violence and repressive
counter-insurgency measures, again the supporters of the independence movement, Aceh Merdeka, many Acehnese flee by boat to Malaysia, without official passports or immigration papers. In Malaysia, they are not granted refugee status, but put in detention camps, or hunted down by police as illegal aliens. In Indonesia they are branded as terrorists or GPK, Aceh Merdeka, and tortured, disappeared, or executed extrajudicially. Worse of all, they are not able to leave Malaysia legally, because they do not even have passports.

Second, we strongly recommend the formation of an international human rights team, under the auspices of the United Nations, to conduct an independent investigation of the political situation in Aceh, and the inhuman treatment of refugees in Malaysia. Acehnese should not be forced to return to Aceh where it is certain that they will be killed, tortured, or persecuted by the Indonesian military, until such time that fundamental changes occur and Acehnese can live in their own land free of fear. Most importantly, that the status of Aceh as a Special Region for Military Operations is ended.

Third, we strongly urge the U.S. Government to grant political asylum to the Acehnese in the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, and to those who are seeking asylum here in the United States, who will most definitely be the targets of political repression, if not execution, if they are sent home. Based on the background I have provided, I wish to make a strong plea to Members of the U.S. Congress to recognize the political refugee status of Acehnese fleeing Indonesia and grant them asylum status.

Fourth, put pressure on the United Nations and other international human rights commissions to form an investigative team and open an UNHCR office in Aceh to focus specially on monitoring human rights violations in this region.

Fifth, bring the Malaysian Government to an international court of justice and make it publicly accountable for its illegal actions against refugees resulting in the death of 24 Acehnese and violating international human rights laws.

Thank you very much for your time and patience.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hamzah appears in the appendix.]

Mr. Smith. Mr. Hamzah, thank you very much for, again, not only chronicling the program, but also providing some very concrete steps that the U.S. Government and other governments who are interested can take, so I do appreciate that.

And I think you will be pleased to know that our Subcommittee has been in touch with the UNHRC and the PRM Bureau of the U.S. Government, Population, Refugee, and Migration Bureau, about the Aceh refugees in Malaysia and we've asked them to resist forcible repatriation and we're also trying, and we will follow up on this to make sure that there are some, at least some, who could come here and be resettled. I think we do far less than what we are capable of here in the United States, not just from Indonesia, but in other parts of the world. We are very miserly in our acceptance of refugees, regrettably, and, as you probably know, something on the order of 7 percent of our immigration flow, 8 per-
cent, happen to be refugees and there are those who would like to see that number go down.

I personally and our Subcommittee has tried to ratchet that number up and so we will follow up on your recommendation, I can assure you.

I would like to ask our next witness, Mr. Lustrilanang, if he could present his testimony now and then we'll go to our final witness.

STATEMENT OF PIUS LUSTRIHANANG, INDONESIAN DEMOCRACY ADVOCATE

Mr. LUSTRIHANANG, Mr. Chairman and honorable Members of the House, it is a great honor to be able to testify in front of this august body and I want to thank you all for this opportunity. My name is Pius Lustrilanang, and I am an active member of the pro-democracy movement in Indonesia.

I regard myself as fortunate to be able to testify in front of you. I was kidnapped, held for 2 months, and released. Other victims who were held together with me have disappeared without trace. In my language we differentiate between hilang and dihilangkan. The first term means to disappear and the second term, dihilangkan, is the active form, the translation of which is to make disappear.

I am fortunate that I no longer belong to the category of those who were made to disappear. When, on February 4, 1998 I was taken to the place of detention, which was also a torture center, one of the kidnappers told me, "There are no laws here and no human rights. You simply have to answer all our questions. And remember, some people come out of this place alive and some as corpses. If you want to stay alive, you better behave."

My release is the result of domestic and international pressures and also the wide exposures in the domestic and international press. I want to use this opportunity to thank all the human rights organizations, NGOs, and individuals all around the world that have campaigned for me.

My gratitude goes also to those governments that have made representations to the Indonesian Government. My sincere gratitude to all the members of the press who have put disappearances on the international agenda. I speak on behalf of many others, including many of my close friends, who are still held in detention.

Mr. Chairman, giving testimony like this is not without risk. It took me more than a week of consideration before I decided to go public. In fact, I'm the first Indonesian victim of disappearances to have done so. We all received death threats, not only to ourselves, but even worse, to our next of kin and the other detainees. Our abductors warned us that if we told our stories it would have nasty consequences. I drew the conclusion that giving a full account of my 2-month disappearance was worth the risk. It also serves as protections for myself and my family. Exposing myself might also accelerate the release of the other detainees.

I was kidnapped on February 4 while waiting for public transport in front of the general hospital in Jakarta. Suddenly, somebody with a pistol told me to get into a car. Another three persons were sitting in the car. They immediately handcuffed and blind-
folded me. We drove in the direction of Bogor and after approximately a 1-hour drive, we arrived at the place where I was held for 2 months.

The prison compound was quite modern. In the section where I was held there were six cells, two rows of three cells, complete with a detector camera. In the 2 months I was held, I never saw my kidnappers. Either I was blindfolded or they were hooded. But being able to see the eyes of the various people who delivered my food, I was able to distinguish at least a dozen different people.

The first 3 days were the worst. They gave me electric shock, kicked, and hit me all over my body. I was put in a tub of water and my head was pushed down over and over again. At that time I thought I would never survive. I was in the hands of professionals. They did everything as part of a routine.

The main thrust of the interrogations was about my activities as coordinator of SIAGA, a loose coalition to support Megawati and Amien Rais, the two main opposition figures. What was the strategy of SIAGA, who else participated in the preparation of actions, and so on. It became obvious to me that the kidnappers were safeguarding President Suharto’s reelection in March. All stumbling blocks, people like me, had to be removed. The ones that were mutually detained with me in the same block had the same background. This period is one of the worst periods in the history of the Suharto regime. Hundreds of arrests took place, at least a dozen others were kidnapped like me, and an extra 35,000 troops were stationed in the capital, Jakarta. Holding a peaceful protest in the streets of Jakarta became a virtual impossibility.

I do not possess definite proof about the identification of my kidnappers. I do not believe that they were part of any organized crime gang or any of the pro-government political groupings. Everything was far too professional. Sometimes I was able to communicate with the other detainees to compare our experiences. All evidence suggests that we were in the hands of the armed forces. Every afternoon around 3 o'clock I heard the sound of a trumpet, for roll call. The clearest evidence was on the day of my release on the morning of April 3. One of the officers revealed that he was an AKABRI, armed forces academy, graduate. Actually, he was the one who gave me a final dose of electric shock before my release. “As a token of remembrance,” he said.

The top officials of ABRI, the Indonesian armed forces, have categorically denied their involvement in kidnappings. Commander-in-Chief, and concurrently Minister of Defense, General Wiranto and local territorial commanders have said this in public. Police officers do not wear hoods during interrogation. From deducting the facts there is a high probability of the involvement of a special unit within ABRI.

I want to remind this Subcommittee that in the Indonesian political system, the head of state is also the supreme commander of the armed forces.

On April 27, I made a full report in front of the Indonesian National Commission of Human Rights. I came abroad to testify in front of international and national bodies, as I am doing here in Washington. The Indonesian Government is in particularly weak position. A deep economic crisis goes hand in hand with a growing
political crisis. A crisis of legitimacy is also evident. Although it may sound paradoxical, this weakened government has become more vicious and brutal toward voices of dissent. Increased international pressure is of paramount importance. My release is a shining proof that international pressure on the Indonesian authorities can improve the human rights situation.

In these last few days, the government has announced that they will set up two fact-finding teams. One of the teams has to find out whether members of the security forces are involved in the kidnappings. I welcome this announcement, another proof of positive results due to pressure. But I have to say at the same time that we have bad experiences with government fact-finding teams. After the Santa Cruz massacre in Dili, East Timor, in November 1991, similar fact-finding teams were established, also due to strong international pressure. The results were more than disappointing. No independent inquiry has been made up to this very day, and only a few low-ranking officers, who were sacrificed like lambs, received minor sentences.

Mr. Chairman and honorable Members of the House, I also want to use this opportunity to raise the matter of impunity. President Suharto is by far the longest-serving ruler in Asia. In the more than three decades of his rule, fundamental freedoms have suffered greatly. The human rights situation in Indonesia is fundamentally flawed. Over the years, the U.S. State Department, in its annual Human Rights Reports, has recorded some of these violations. Often, the perpetrators of those violations are publicly known. In more cases, they are members of the security forces.

The tragedy in Priok more than a decade ago, the killings in Lampung and Aceh, and the tragic events on July 27, 1996, have occurred without the perpetrators being held accountable. The international community together with the growing democratic forces in Indonesia have to find ways to prevent senseless killings like this and to make sure that perpetrators will appear in court to give an account for their acts.

We also have to use internationally available instruments like the structures of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. It is urgent for your government to press for the sending of special teams to Jakarta. I would like to mention here the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, which is going to visit East Timor anyhow in the coming months. Also, the U.N. Working Group on Disappearances and the Special Rapporteur on Torture are important to investigate the present situation. In cooperation with local human rights organizations, I'm confident that we can improve the situation.

Mr. Chairman, despite the traumatic experiences of my 2 months in captivity, I feel very optimistic. The winds of change are blowing in Indonesia. Because of the limited time given, I have included as an appendix a more detailed account of my experience. I sincerely hope that our mutual efforts will prevent repetitions of the things that happened to me.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lustrilanang appears in the appendix.]
Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much for your very telling testimony, and, again, for bearing witness to the atrocities that were brought to bear upon you by the security forces in—again, hearing from victims who have bravely overcome, and now come forward and tell the world their stories, just rips off the veneer and the facade of the Suharto Government. That when you look at CNN or any of the news coverages of the Western diplomats traipsing to Jakarta, with smiles and with all kinds of handshakes, knowing that the brutality that this man does—and his regime—that needs to be known and you have helped to fill that void.

It is not a given, it is not self-evident that people know the atrocities that are daily committed by the Indonesian Government and dictatorship, as well as the environmental exploitation and all of the other grave actions taken by that government, so it is important that you are bearing witness and we thank you.

I'd like to ask our final witness, before getting to questions, Ms. Aryati, and, again, I want to thank the press for their willingness to keep her identity from being disclosed.

STATEMENT OF MS. ARYATI, INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS RESEARCHER/ACTIVIST

Ms. ARYATI. Mr. Chairman, honorable Members of Congress, ladies and gentlemen. Before I read my testimony, I wish to thank you for allowing me to provide this testimony.

I come to speak to you here today with some trepidation. Indonesia is not a free country where one can express criticism of the government without worry about the possible consequences upon one's safety. I have no guarantees of protection; I am not a prominent leader of a mass organization, nor a member of the elite who has high connections. I am an Indonesian from a middle-class background who is scared about telling you my honest opinions.

I take this risk because I feel compelled to. I am one of the youths of my country who will have to bear, for many years into the future, the burden of what mistakes and crimes the government is committing today. I take this risk also in the hope that the U.S. Government, so long a staunch and powerful supporter of Suharto's militarism, will reform itself and do something to ensure that Indonesia does have a government that respects and guarantees basic civil liberties, such as the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, and the freedom of association.

Mr. Chairman, first I would like to present some facts about the military in Indonesia.

To understand the Suharto Government, you have to understand the Indonesian military, for we have been living under an institutionalized martial law regime for the past 33 years. It is no ordinary military. It has what is officially called a dual function, external defense and internal policing. Imagine for a moment that the U.S. military had overthrown the U.S. Government by staging a coup and orchestrating the slaughter of about 500,000 people. Imagine the military then set up headquarters in each state, each county, each city, and each town. Imagine that it placed one-third to one-half of the U.S. military's troops in these headquarters. Imagine that there were no laws governing their actions nor any, legislative oversight. Imagine further that the civilian administra-
tion was constantly monitored and controlled by the military and that many of the civilian administrators were themselves military officers. If you can imagine this scenario then you have a pretty good idea of how the Indonesian military operates. It is omnipresent, all-pervasive, and beyond the law.

When the U.S. military speaks about training Indonesian military officers to respect human rights, we can only laugh. The structure of the Indonesian military places it as an all-powerful institution and the laws of our country allow it complete freedom to do what it wills. A few courses in good behavior are not going to alter what is a very oppressive system of military rule. Besides, we are not even certain that the U.S. military is sincere in claiming that it is providing such training.

The U.S. Congress should feel no qualms about cutting off the JCET training if it is thinking about our benefit. Once the JCET training became public knowledge, the Pentagon claimed that it was meant only for the benefit of U.S. soldiers who were given the opportunity to see how another military operates. So, by the Pentagon's own admission, the training was not designed to help the Indonesian military acquire less brutish habits.

Mr. Chairman, let me explain how the government instills in us a culture of fear and robs us of our basic civil rights. In response to the student protests sweeping the country, the government has decided to intimidate the students by resorting to the tactic of disappearances. According to the leading legal aid organization in Indonesia, Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (YLBHI), there are 50 persons that have disappeared over the past 3 months.

One student activist, Pius Lustrilanang, is present here. Another one who disappeared is Andi Arief. Military personnel kidnapped him from his home, in full view of his family, on March 28. The top generals of our country not only denied that the military had kidnapped him, they joked to the press that he had simply disappeared of his own accord.

For 3 weeks, his family, his friends, and his fellow students worried themselves to the point of exhaustion. Knowing how the military operates, they were concerned for his very survival. On April 22, he turned up in the Jakarta central police station. The police had no arrest warrant and no explanation for how he got there.

Andi Arief told his lawyers that he had been kidnapped by the special forces, Kopassus, held for 3 weeks of interrogation, and then dumped at the police station.

One must note that the military did not break the law by kidnapping these 50 activists because none of the laws of our country apply to the military. Thus, Andi Arief's parents cannot sue Kopassus for arresting their son without a warrant and holding him in detention without habeas corpus. This is precisely what makes ordinary citizens so terrified of the military; it is unpredictable and unaccountable.

It has been said that one can judge a government by its prisons. Well then, let us look at Indonesian prisons. There we will find people whose only crime was to criticize the government. Sri Bintang Pamungkas, the leader of an independent political party, and an ex-member of the Parliament, criticized the Suharto Government. He is now in Cipinang prison in Jakarta on charges of
subversion. Accompanying him in that prison are 12 members of the banned People’s Democratic Party convicted of thought crimes. In the language of the prosecutors, they deviated from the state ideology.

There are presently at least 25 political prisoners in Indonesia’s prisons, some are in their teens, some in their 70’s. Just in the past 3 months, 250 people have been arrested on political crimes, such heinous crimes as holding peaceful meetings and holding peaceful demonstrations. We have a government that has a pathological fear of any public assembly that it does not control and any public leader who does not grovel before our President. Every single independent political party and trade union has been systematically destroyed by the government. In regions of the country where there has been serious organized resistance to the government, such as Irian Jaya, West Papua and occupied East Timor, it has not been satisfied with arrests. It has resorted to massacres.

You can guess what type of society we have. We are a people who are terrified of expressing our own opinions and terrified of getting involved in politics of any kind. Politics for us is a spectator sport, and a cruel sport it is. We are daily bombarded by the statements of officials who are barely literate, barely articulate, and barely educated. When faced with public criticisms, they speak of crushing, smashing, and hacking. They treat the youths of our country, those in their teens and 20’s, who are sincerely and peacefully attempting to change this society, as though they were foreign agents bent on subversion. We are not citizens of a state, we are subjects of a modern, militarized sultanate.

It is obvious today that Suharto’s reign is coming to a miserable end. The number of public demonstrations and public protests has been escalating. There also has been growing support for East Timor independence. In fact, some East Timorese students have been leading some of the demonstrations and have worked together with the Indonesian students. While this is a necessary condition for democracy in Indonesia—that is, the ending of Suharto’s Presidency—it is not a sufficient condition. The military, with its dual function, is prepared to continue Suhartoism without Suharto. What I mean is that the sources of the systematic human rights abuses we see today are not going to vanish with the demise of the Suharto Presidency. For genuine democracy to exist in Indonesia, our laws will have to be changed to embody basic principles of human rights and the military will have to be confined to the barracks and put under civilian oversight.

Mr. Chairman, at this opportunity, I’d also like to give some explanation about the economic conditions of the past few months and the impact of the IMF bailout on the people at large.

For the past 33 years we have been told this system of martial law was necessary for our material benefit. The religion of the government, its legitimating ideology, has been economic development, what is called in Indonesian, pembangunan or development.

But what have we to show for 30 years of development? Two hundred families have fat Swiss bank accounts while millions of people have had their land expropriated. A few timber contractors and palm oil companies have accumulated fortunes while chopping and burning down most of the rain forest. Thirty years of develop-
ment has meant the victimization of many Indonesians. And we have not heard all their laments precisely because there has been no freedom to criticize what the state calls its development program.

Thirty-plus years of development under martial law has meant the accumulation of an enormous debt. For 30 years, the United States, Japan, and Europe provided billions of dollars annually as foreign aid to the Suharto regime. The U.S. Government, since Suharto took power in 1965 by ordering the massacre of thousands of people, has consistently maintained that his regime provides stability and security. Every single U.S. President since Nixon, including the present incumbent, has, to their shame, celebrated the Suharto regime for its economic accomplishments and political stability. In effect, the U.S. Government has said that the Indonesian people are best kept under the thumb of a sultanate and that democracy was opposed to our best interests.

U.S. academics and retired Foreign Service personnel, such as those at the U.S. Indonesia Society here in Washington, DC, have been saying that Indonesians would just have to sacrifice their political freedoms for economic growth. The economic crisis of the past 9 months has paid to these cynical propositions.

Now, after suffering so that development could proceed, what is the prospect of the Indonesian people under the IMF bailout? In short, we are now expected to suffer even more to pay off a debt that we did not incur. Thanks to the Suharto regime's deal with the IMF, all Indonesians have been put into debt bondage. Our labor and resources are supposed to be devoted to paying off the debt for the next generation. Meanwhile, those 200 families who contracted the debt have enough money in their own personal accounts to pay it off many times over.

Is it possible to deny that this current economic austerity plan by the IMF is a gross injustice? The Indonesian people never approved of accepting all those loans. We weren't even allowed to know what the government's economic policy was for all those years.

Not even our farcical showcase parliament was given authority over economic policy, nor is it given any authority now. But the IMF is telling us that we have to share the debt burden equally. While it is apparently acceptable to the IMF that political power is monopolized, it absolutely insists that the debt be democratically distributed. Those governments that have loaned money to the Suharto regime and its crony capitalists for the past 30 years are now supporting the IMF's agreement. Thus, they appear to us like heroin pushers who, after keeping an addict hooked for years and driving him ever deeper in debt, throw him back on his family when he is near collapse, telling them that they have to foot the bill for his rehabilitation and for all his past debts.

Mr. Chairman, please do not believe that you are doing us any favors by authorizing money for the IMF loans to Indonesia. We need democracy in order to settle our economic problems but that is not a word you will find in the agreement between Suharto and the IMF. The IMF, with the blessing of the Clinton Administration, is actually hoping to engineer an economic recovery under the same political conditions of institutionalized martial law. This is, I as-
sure you, an impossible dream. The protests against the Suharto regime have by now reached the point of no return. The Indonesian people, now that they have had the opportunity to express their long-suppressed grievances against this regime, are not going to be satisfied until it falls. Democracy is a rare commodity these days, but it is no less vital to us than rice.

It is paradoxical that the IMF is willing to dictate terms to Suharto when it comes to managing the economy but not when it comes to fundamental economic rights, such as the right of workers to organize. The IMF refuses to insist that, as a condition for receiving the loans, the government recognize workers rights. It calls that meddling in the internal affairs of Indonesia, when it already controls the government's economic policy. If the IMF's agreement meddled in such a way as to allow the Indonesian people to have a greater voice over economic policy, then perhaps the U.S. Congress should support it. But, as it stands, the agreement is a worthless piece of paper signed by a collapsing dictator.

The IMF money is not going to benefit us. As you know, much of the money will be simply transferred to foreign banks that made risky loans to the Indonesian Government and Indonesian enterprises. The money will enter Indonesia for a moment and then get sent back out as debt payments. These payments are supposed to restore "investor confidence" but one has to wonder what kind of investors these are who believe in being rewarded for making bad decisions. It is astonishing that the foreign banks that made risky loans to a corrupt and unstable economic system want to be repaid in full. It is even more astonishing that they want the Indonesian people to pay for their bad decisions.

Look at the tragic conditions Indonesia is now in after 30 years of U.S.-supported stability and development. Indonesia has an abundance of fertile land yet we are now begging other countries to give us supplies of our staple food, rice. The Food and Agricultural Organization estimates that Indonesia needs to be given 2 million tons of rice for the estimated 7.5 million Indonesians who will require food assistance within the next year. There is a famine in eastern Indonesia and East Timor now. We, living in other parts of the country, hardly hear anything about it and what we do hear are government whitewashes. We have been told by the Suharto regime and the U.S. Government to exchange our political freedoms for economic prosperity. We have wound up with neither.

In conclusion, I would like to propose some recommendations for the U.S. Congress.

As U.S. Congressmen, you must realize that the only force that the military appears to feel accountable to is the U.S. Government. You greatly determine whether the Indonesian Government receives economic aid from the IMF and political legitimacy in international forums such as the United Nations. I can assure you that the Suharto regime, feeling entirely unaccountable to the Indonesian people, does feel beholden to the U.S. Government. It panics on seeing any sign of displeasure with it here in Washington, DC.

I urge you to listen to more people than just Indonesian Government officials and retired State Department officials. Since the government has not allowed for any opposition political leaders or parties to exist, it may seem difficult to know to whom one should lis-
ten. I suggest that you listen to those who have had the determination to sacrifice for their beliefs and the bravery to risk military violence to assert what they believe to be the truth.

You should listen to people such as Sri Bintang-Pamungkas who has demanded the international community refrain from loaning money and giving military aid to Indonesia until a democratic regime can be established. You should especially listen to the youth, such as Pius Lustrilanang, who have no interests other than those of the nation's.

In conclusion, I would recommend that the U.S. military not assist the Indonesian military. The U.S. Government should restrict itself to civilian relations with the Suharto regime. The U.S. Congress should not authorize money for the IMF to be loaned to the Suharto regime.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Aryati appears in the appendix.]

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much for that brilliant and very persuasive statement and I think it provides for all of us here, and, by extension, the Administration because they have representatives here and will see this hearing record, insights that go beyond the surface-appeal argument of just stability for stability's sake, to help the bankers out, that human rights ought to come first and I thought your statement that the Indonesians suffer more for a debt that we did not incur and many other statements, I think, need to be heard by many Members of Congress who are poised to just almost rubber stamp the additional funds for the IMF and for the donors' meetings that are in the offing, like in July.

Human rights have to become center stage, not an insular issue that is just brushed aside.

I would like to ask you, the entire panel, if you would, if the IMF and the international bailout—is it likely to extend Suharto's Government's brutality and suppression of human rights? And Mr. Lustrilanang, you had said earlier that there are a number of U.N. missions that are poised to go to Indonesia. In the past, and I have been in Congress now 18 years and I have seen these missions, I have been a staunch advocate of missions being deployed to abusive regimes, dictatorships, but very often, once they get there, they are denied access. They certainly don't have unfettered access, they are given sometimes almost a Potemkin village view of the world and once they leave, those who were forthcoming and gave vital and accurate information very often have very severe retaliatory actions taken against them by the government.

Do you believe that these missions will succeed? And, please, all of you, if you would, respond to this and, again, do we extend the lease on life with the dictatorship of the Suharto regime, the very brutal regime, is it likely to get worse, stay just as bad, or will there be some mitigation of the abuses?

Please, anyone on the panel, if you would like to begin.

And while you are preparing to answer, there are some who argue that by providing these additional funds, this mammoth amount of funding, that one of the conditions of breaking up the monopolies will lead to a breaking up of the power structure, which, again, might lead to a breakout of freedoms. Do you believe in that view, as well?
Ms. ARYATI. Would you like me to answer? I think—Sir, you asked whether IMF would break up monopolies? Is that your question?

Mr. SMITH. Whether or not it would up the monopolies, whether or not Suharto's lease on—and the egregious abuses committed by his military and his government will continue, be abated, stay the same, and whether or not the working groups are likely to have some success and whether or not there is some fear that there might be retaliation against those who do speak out in country?

Mr. LUSTRILANANG. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, because my English is too poor I want to speak in Indonesian and my friend will translate into English.

[Mr. Lustrilanang speaks in Indonesian, translated by Ms. Aryati.]

Ms. ARYATI, TRANSLATING FOR MR. LUSTRILANANG. He said that he thinks the IMF bailout should be given with two conditions. First that the government should be willing to conduct political and economic reform and that the second, that it should be willing to pay attention to the improvement of human rights and democracy in Indonesia.

Mr. LUSTRILANANG. Oh, yes. OK

Ms. ARYATI, TRANSLATING FOR MR. LUSTRILANANG. Regarding the plan for U.N. commission to come, he thinks that is very important for them to come because without neutral monitoring agency, the Indonesian Government would only form this commission which would not conduct objective investigation to all human rights abuses.

Mr. HAMZAH. I think regarding the IMF bailout, we Indonesian people need the money, you know, to make the life, survive, and so on. On the other hand, Suharto also needs that money more. And I quite believe the first person who will benefit from the IMF bailout is Suharto and his regime because it will be able to keep him in power.

So, if under this condition, a lot of corruption and so on today, crony capitalism, collusion, the IMF keep giving that bail out to Indonesia, I am very much worried that the money will go to Suharto, not to Indonesia, not to Indonesian people, I mean.

So, it will only hurt to keep Suharto in power mainly.

Mr. SMITH. The documentation of the use of torture and its pervasiveness and your eyewitness accounts that you have given today shatters the myth that this government somehow acts in a civilized manner. The question I have is how high does the culpability go? Are Suharto and his top leaders a part of or do they just look the other way when the military commits these atrocities or are they themselves implemented in these very high crimes and this cruel behavior? Implicated is the word I was looking for.

How high does it go, the line of responsibility. Right to the top?

Ms. ARYATI, TRANSLATING FOR MR. LUSTRILANANG. He said in the 1980's Suharto ordered the killings of thousands of criminals. The order has come from him.

Mr. SMITH. Before you answer, I'm going to have to leave for a moment to catch a vote on the floor of the House, but I will come right back. Chief of Staff Joseph Rees and General Counsel will continue the questioning, and I will return. So please continue.
Ms. Aryati, translating for Mr. Lustri lanang. In my case, I believe that Suharto might be behind the kidnapping operation because, as you might know, the chief commander of ABRI has denied publicly that the ABRI is behind the operation. Of course, that's a public statement. So there might be force higher than the chief commander of the ABRI who ordered the kidnapping of the political activists.

Mr. Rees. Mr. Pinto, did you have an answer to that question too?

Mr. Pinto. Yes, I would like to add that every decision come from the top down. One other clear example was 1991, hours after the massacre, the Indonesia armed commander, Tri Sutrisno, made a public statement by saying that delinquents like those, the Timorese, have to be shot. This is an unquestionable statement. It's from Tri Sutrisno, the armed commander of Indonesia.

And, in my case, when I was in jail, one day I asked them why they tortured me so much. So one of the Indonesia Kopassus, his name I still remember, his name is Onasum, and he told me, "Well, that's because my boss told me to torture you. And if my boss told me to kill you, then I will kill you." He was blatantly talking about it.

So, whatever human rights violations occur in East Timor and Indonesia and Aceh and Sumatra, it's clear that Suharto's regime is involved, Suharto himself, we could say.

Mr. Rees. I wanted to go back—I'm sorry, did you have something else on this? I wanted to go back to a question that the Chairman asked a moment ago and pursue it a little. Because there are policymakers in the United States who believe that on the one hand the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, they're not going to start imposing direct conditions that you have to have democracy because there are lots of countries in the world that don't have democracy, some of them are big shareholders in the World Bank, and so that would be asking too much of the World Bank and the IMF.

But, by imposing conditions, economic conditions on the Indonesian Government, such as the conditions that certain big monopolies be broken up into smaller units, that the IMF will impose structural reform that will reduce the power of the governing elite and thereby reduce their political power.

Now, has this breakup of monopolies already started? Is it having any effects one way—we know that they've also said that they can't subsidize food and that is having a hard effect on the Indonesian people. But, what about the breakup of monopolies. Is that something that is going to reduce the power of the governing class? Do the Indonesian people even know this is going on? Are you able to say whether this IMF condition might be a good one that would lead to structural reform?

Ms. Aryati. Let me answer that one. Well, as far as I know, the break up of monopolies has not been going on that successfully. At least, one monopoly by Suharto's son, Tommy, is still going on. And I don't believe that this breakup of monopolies will necessarily grant access to everybody who is interested in doing business, because you might know of the case of the distribution of water. They said that the state would break up the monopoly, but it turned out
that a private company which took up this monopoly is part of Suharto's cronies.

Mr. REES. Right.

Ms. ARYATI. So there is the possibility that if the Suharto Government would say, OK, let's break up the monopoly, but then they would distribute it to the companies of his own crony or his own family.

Mr. REES. Right. Anyone else on that question?

Mr. HAMZH. I think the policy of Suharto toward monopolies, that he said that he will edit-op, still as a lip service, while, in fact, you can see after the Indonesian Government stopped the monopoly of his sons, Tommy Oncalof, then the cigarette producers commented in the Indonesian newspaper that, in fact, the monopoly's still going on because they cannot get a stamp from the Indonesian Government to sell the cigarette, if they didn't buy from Tommy, from Suharto's sons, what we call SBPPC.

And the other thing is, also, after the government stopped his monopoly, one of Suharto's sons went to monopolize another thing, the distribution of the soap and toothpaste to the community. So you can see, you stop this kind of monopoly, and then he went to another thing. And that's what they always do. I think yesterday in The New York Times they put the story regarding this also.

Mr. REES. What about the distribution of humanitarian aid? First, I assume one of our policies that I think most people in the U.S. Congress, even those who are very concerned about human rights abuses, would agree is that you don't stop pure humanitarian aid, you don't stop distribution of essential health materials and food. And we have a big program, the United States and also the World Bank and other donors, a big program of trying to respond to the economic crisis with distribution of food and medicines and so forth.

Are those being channeled in a way that they are getting through to the people they are supposed to help? Or are they going to—if we give them to the government, can we count on the government to actually distribute them to the people, or is that aid also being siphoned off in directions that it shouldn't be? And what is the solution, how do we make sure that our humanitarian aid really goes to help people?

Mr. HAMZH. As long as the people responsible for the distribution of this humanitarian aid are from the government or from the bureaucrat, I think I doubt it. As a case in last March in an Indonesian magazine they published a story that Suharto's daughter, Tutu, who is social minister now, brings a program of free lunch for the workers, for the lower-class workers. And they give food stamp to every worker, I don't know how many thousands of them in Jakarta, and these workers had to show this food stamp to the "waroom," which meant to the food place, that was already determined by her.

And then, at the end of the month, this owner of the "waroom" claimed the money from the social department and, according to this story, when this person tried to claim to the government, the officers there wanted him to sign that he already accepted the money, not as he will accept the money or not that he will receive
the money from the officers. So I think this kind of corruption still is a really hard problem that we face.

So, I support the idea of humanitarian aid, but for the distribution of that food, it has to be under the monitor of the United Nations or U.S. officers and also involve the human rights organizations in Indonesia.

Thank you.

Mr. REES. Thank you. Yes?

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So, I support the idea of humanitarian aid, but for the distribution of that food, it has to be under the monitor of the United Nations or U.S. officers and also involve the human rights organizations in Indonesia.

Thank you.
Mr. ARYATI. Well, I'm not sure whether they really do the job because as far as I know, all of these ministries have been very corrupt but I don't have evidence about that, but my experience, and many people's experience in dealing with the government bureaucrats, has always involved corruption, bribery, and so forth, so I don't believe that there is any single government ministry which would be so honest.

Mr. REES. Well, if you think about it and you have people in Indonesia who can give us specific evidence about this one way or the other, obviously in delivering humanitarian aid we want to make sure we do the right thing and often it's pointed out by the government people we have who work in this area, they say, look, the government is everywhere, they have clinics, you know they are the people we should be working with.

And if that's true, then that's what they should do. If there are problems, though, we need to know about it and we will certainly pass them along to the people in our agency for international development, and so forth. So if you want to respond later on any of this it's fine.

Mr. FRIED. If I might add a word to that. Again, this is based on a report by Dr. George Aditjondro in response to your question on health. According to Dr. Aditjondro, the new minister of social welfare, which apparently oversees the health ministry and the birth control department, is reported to, since assuming office, have transferred, for example, the ministry's oversight of the birth control injection trade. They transferred that from one company to a company owned by his son, and then he arranged for the transfer of a condom factory, formerly managed by a parastatal organization, to a business owned directly by Suharto's son, Bambang.

He is also a treasurer of a Suharto-run social foundation. So that's the story on reproductive health, and then again this is based again on a new report by Dr. Aditjondro.

Mr. REES. And you'll give us a copy of that report for the record.

Ms. FRIED. Yes, certainly.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix on page 115.]

Mr. REES. Thank you. Yes, lots of time it seems like that's the biggest chunk of U.S. foreign aid anyway so we're probably doing a good job of subsidizing that factory.

At the recent U.N. Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva, the United States and the European Union had been planning on presenting a resolution on human rights and self-determination for East Timor. Instead they agreed to a chairman's statement, in which the chairperson of the Human Rights Commission noted that the Government of Indonesia had agreed to provide better access for the Red Cross and other nongovernmental organizations into East Timor and also to ratify the convention against torture as well as making several other commitments.

Did this statement represent a step forward, or would a resolution have been better, even though the resolution might have meant that the Government of Indonesia would not have made these commitments?

Mr. PINTO. Well, since 1993 we have several resolutions on the human rights situation in East Timor and the Indonesia Govern-
ment reluctantly refused to implement those resolutions, so this time we have a chairman's statement and I hope Indonesia will implement what is agreed to in the future.

I would say that it was not a step forward or backward, because we have been seeing the implementation of what they agreed. So I hope that Indonesia will do this.

Mr. SMITH. [presiding] Thank you, Mr. Rees, for carrying on the hearing. I have a couple of other questions and then—there have been reports for several years and, Mr. Pinto, you mentioned this in your testimony, of coercive population control practices in Indonesia, particularly in East Timor. You spoke about a vaccine, or at least people coming in under the pretense of receiving a vaccine.

Are Indonesian family planning programs, particularly those assisted by the United States designed to help people plan their families voluntarily or to meet targets for population reduction? And are family planning programs in East Timor or anywhere else that any of you have knowledge of more coercive than one area or another; is East Timor more coercive, for example, than other parts of Indonesia?

And, if so, do they appear to be motivated by a desire for further reduction almost in a genocidal way of the East Timorese population?

Mr. PINTO. Yes, I say that it's—this book contains information about the family planning in East Timor and I would like to give you this book so you could have much more competent information about it.

I think that the family planning in East Timor is different from the family planning program in Indonesia. In East Timor, I would say, it's a way of genocide. While we've lost more than a third of the population over the 23 years of Indonesian occupation and sterilizing women is a way contributing to the genocide.

At least according to one of the doctors from England in 1991, according to his research, more than 500 students were sterilized and they were given depo provera injections and what they were told, that they were having some vitamin injection. So when you are in a situation where you have lack of food, you feel that having a vitamin injection is then as good.

Mr. SMITH. Was this administered solely by the government?

Mr. PINTO. By the government, by the KB program.

Mr. SMITH. Was there any involvement by the nongovernmental organizations?

Mr. PINTO. No, there was no nongovernment organization in East Timor that dealt with this case.

Mr. SMITH. So, in your view, this is an attempt to reduce the population, because it's an unwanted population. It has nothing to do with a voluntary planning program.

Mr. PINTO. Yes.

Ms. ARYATI. I'd like to add from a report done by a women's organization a couple of years ago where it said that in certain areas suspected to be the place where a lot of Communists, well, this is a vague categorization, but in these areas the military accompanied the staff from the family planning department to force the women to join the family planning program.
And each of the family planning offices would have a map where they would mark the areas where women would be forced to have the family planning, so I think it has some political motive behind the family planning program and I believe that in East Timor it was intentional.

Mr. SMITH. Were those kinds of abuses reported to the Indonesian Human Rights Commission? Has that been raised, and what is your impression of that commission? Is it authentic?

Ms. ARYATI. Which? I'm sorry.

Mr. SMITH. The Indonesian Human Rights Commission.

Ms. ARYATI. Yes. Well, so far, I think they have been doing quite a great job in pressuring, at least in making it public, making the human rights violation public.

For example, the case of the disappearances has appeared in public because of the National Commission of Human Rights action in doing that. They don't have any legal forces. They don't have any power to apply legal forces on the institution which they believe to be responsible for the human rights violations. But at least by making it public, it makes the Indonesian people in general know what kinds of human rights violations and it advocates, in some ways, about human rights principals and their rights to——

Mr. SMITH. Are you aware as to whether or not the coercive population has ever been brought to them?

Ms. ARYATI. I don't think so.

Mr. SMITH. Is that something that might be considered to try to—again, light and scrutiny sometimes mitigate some of the worst offenses, even though the offense goes on, just a thought.

Let me ask you, when Bishop Belo returned to Dili in December 1996, there was a mass demonstration of support that somehow turned into a riot. It has been known for sometime that in the wake of that demonstration there were arrests and there were disappearances. I've recently heard reports of a number of people who had been in the crowd, including several high school girls, were taken into custody and then savagely tortured and killed. Can any of you comment on those reports and have they been brought to the attention of the Indonesian Human Rights Commission or, perhaps, to the U.S. State Department?

Mr. PINTO. Yes, there was a demonstration after Bishop Belo arrived in East Timor, after he got another Peace Prize in Sweden, in Norway.

As a result of that demonstration, hundreds of people were arrested and those who were arrested currently are in jail, most of them young people, 18 to 20 years old.

Some women were also arrested and they were raped. We don't have evidence of the rape, but based on personal account, many of the women were raped by the Indonesian officers.

Whether this information was submitted to the U.N. Human Rights Commission, it was raised at the U.N. Human Rights Commission and, by Zeram Zorta, one of the Nobel Peace Prize winners, and also it was raised at the European Union in Brussels.

To the Indonesian Human Rights Commission, I don't have information about it, whether they have information, they should have, probably provided by the Indonesian troops.
Mr. REES. I just want to follow up on that. We have received quite recently reports that have not been anywhere else. And I just want to make sure that you understand what we are asking about. That women, young women, were not only raped, but tortured in sexual ways, as well as other ways, and that some of them were killed. Now, obviously if this is true, we want to bring it to our State Department, and we want to—because it's not in our human rights report, but if you're not sure of the authenticity of those reports, that's something else that we should know too before we—have you heard these reports and are you looking into them?

Mr. PINTO. Well, I've heard this report, but my organization wants to figure it out whether the report is true. We don't want to provide information that does not have foundation.

Mr. REES. OK.

Mr. PINTO. Yes, we have this booklet here, these are true pictures that we got from the Indonesian Army, we bought them from the Indonesian Army in East Timor.

Mr. REES. And how did the pictures come to happen? Why are there pictures of this? Who takes the pictures?

Mr. PINTO. These pictures were taken by Indonesian soldiers, those who tortured their victims, and happen to be corrupt and we were able to buy from them. They are in East Timor.

Mr. REES. Why did they take the pictures?

Mr. PINTO. I think for their own documentation—

Mr. SMITH. Amusement? Amusement? Is it some shoddy game they play?

Mr. PINTO. Probably.

Mr. SMITH. Because I looked at those pictures and they were absolutely horrifying, that anyone (a) could do that and (b), document it by way of picture it is beyond the pale.

Yes?

Mr. HAMZAH. I would like to add a little bit more about the rape of the woman. It seems to me it not only happened in East Timor, but also in Aceh in 1991, just about 2 weeks before the Ramadan—you know, this for the Muslim is a highly holy man's. It was a mass rape in a district in North Aceh. I investigated the case with journalists from Asia Week based in Jakarta. So, in that time, according to the villagers, according to the victims, at 4:30 in the morning, the military officers fired a gun into the air. So all villagers, I mean men, have to run to a place already decided, decided by the military. The second time they have to arrive there—if they still haven't arrived there yet, then the military will shoot them. So all women at home were raped by the military, and a friend of mine, a journalist, after the investigation asked about the case to the minister of defense of Indonesia at that time, in 1991.

So, this minister of defense or this general say, this something uncommon because Aceh—in the region where the military operation is going on. So this minister or this general say that's something uncommon, naturally because the authorities were there for a long time, 6 months, and so on, and they get stressed.

And this, my friend, this journalist, asked him, is it what you mean—I mean, the general was so mad at that time. Thank you.
Mr. SMITH. Is there any fear on the part of the military and from top to bottom that some day these gross violations of human rights will be made known? And that there will be an accounting? In Rwanda, and we've had numerous hearings in our Subcommittee, and we were part of getting the money, or at least the U.S. donation for the war crimes tribunal in both Bosnia and Rwanda, and now there are some very high-level people who committed atrocities that are being held accountable and hopefully many more will.

It seems to me that the international community is beginning, rather lethargically, but still beginning, to try, it has some political will and I certainly think it needs to be increased, to hold doers of torture accountable for their misdeeds.

We all know that when Pol Pot died, there were rather extensive notes on the victims that were killed by the Khmer Rouge. And, certainly the key person that the community would have wanted to have held accountable was Pol Pot himself.

In Bosnia, Milosevic and Mladic and Karadic and all the other committers of crimes need to be held accountable. There are indictments out for Mladic, for example. And in Indonesia, and in Asia, in general, there is no suspension of violation of human rights, nor should there be in terms of the world community holding accountable those who commit such gross violations.

Is there any sense in the military, or by Suharto himself, that there will be an accounting some day? That all of this will be laid bare despite the sanitizing that goes on day in and day out or the overlooking by those who know or should know?

And what can we do to begin to ratchet up the pressure to hold these people accountable? I mean, this is the first of a series of hearings and hopefully the European community and others will engage in a focus and will bring that light onto Indonesia, especially since there is such a significant amount of money being poured into saving the Suharto regime.

Mr. PINTO. Yes. I think by comparing Suharto's behavior with Pol Pot and other regime in Bosnia, Suharto is responsible for the massacre in Indonesia since 1965 and East Timor, a third of the population. And I think Suharto has to be brought before the tribunal.

Mr. SMITH. Brought before the tribunal?

Mr. PINTO. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. Why are the killings of Indonesians no less of importance to the world community than—and the rapings of women—than the killings that went on in Bosnia or Croatia or Rwanda or in the Congo?

It seems to me it's a double standard unless the international community begins to make him accountable and his helpers in those crimes.

Ms. ARYATI TRANSLATING FOR MR. LUSTRILANANG. So he thinks that he could see the Suharto regime is getting afraid of the demand from the students, the student demonstrations, because there has been demand for Suharto to be brought in, as a war criminal. So he could see that the repression actually increased along with the increasing radicalism of the students' movement. So it seems like the Suharto Government is trying to repress that demand.
Mr. SMITH. Just a few final questions, and I thank you for your sense of testimonies and your patience.

What is the current situation in Irian Jaya? Has it gotten better or worse in the last year or two? The human rights situation?

Ms. FRIED. Would it be possible for me to call to the stand someone who has actually worked directly with organizations in Irian Jaya—

Mr. SMITH. That would be very helpful. They will identify themselves when they come up?

Ms. FRIED. Yes. If Ms. Abigail Abrash would come to the microphone.

Ms. ABRASH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me introduce myself. My name is Abigail Abrash and I'm program director for Asia and the Middle East with the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights.

It's an unexpected pleasure to have this opportunity to address your question about human rights in Irian Jaya. I've been focusing on the human rights situation in that province of Indonesia for the last 5 years and have visited the area twice. Based on the information that we have about the human rights situation in that province, it is clear that military operations in the Central Highlands of Irian Jaya are resulting in human rights abuses against the local population, against indigenous communities that are based there.

That area has been a closed military area for the last 2 years or more as a result of a hostage taking there by the OPM which is a guerilla movement in Irian Jaya. And, as retaliation, the military has been conducting operations against local peoples living in the area. I think you probably are aware of a much more visible and much more public set of abuses by the military in that province which took place around the Freeport-McMoRan mining area in Tamika in the south part of Irian Jaya, and Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission and the Catholic bishop of Jaya Pura both confirmed that there had been numerous and very serious human rights violations by the military against the local people in that area, including cases of disappearance, or documented cases of disappearance, those individuals have never been discovered, either living or dead; numerous cases of extrajudicial cases, arbitrary detention, and very severe cases of torture.

So, in answer to your question, the military is certainly conducting operations in Irian Jaya which are resulting in human rights abuses there.

Mr. SMITH. I thank you very much for that—

Ms. ABRASH. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. —and thank you for the heads-up, Dr. Fried.

Ms. FRIED. Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask two final questions and anything else you would like to add before we conclude the hearing.

As you know the population of East Timor is overwhelmingly Catholic. Acts of violence by government agents in East Timor have sometimes included the desecration of religious objects and the use of anti-Christian slogans. To what extent is the repression in East Timor motivated by religious differences, rather than political or ethnic issues?
Mr. PINTO. The question of East Timor is not a religious or ethnic issue. Yes, the Indonesian Government in the past 3 or 4 years tried to create some problems between the Timorese and the Indonesian settlers in East Timor by disrespecting the church, the Catholic church, being that the East Timorese are Catholics, and so they basically tried to change the issue into a religious one. But there hasn't been any single problem between the Timorese and Indonesians settlers there.

I must say that our position is clear, the Timorese, that we are struggling against the Suharto regime, not against the people of Indonesia.

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Fried.

Ms. FRIED. Actually I was just going to translate a little bit that was left out of Pius' answer to the last question on why Bosnia received attention and Indonesia didn't. He stated that, in fact, this was largely due to the fact that Indonesian citizens had very little access to the international arena, and were often unable, as private individuals, to make their thoughts and desires known to the outside world and that the international consensus appeared to still trust the Suharto Government.

And that perhaps accounted for a difference in the international perception of Indonesia versus Bosnia.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you for that. And, hopefully that changes as the record becomes more apparent to more people.

Let me ask one final question. As you know, during the last 2 years there have been dozens of burning of Christian churches in East Java and elsewhere. Has the government moved vigorously to prosecute those involved? Is there any evidence of government complicity in the church burnings? And, if not, who is responsible. And, finally, have the condemnations of the church burnings by leaders of Indonesia's largest Muslim organizations been helpful in bringing about religious reconciliation?

Ms. AYATI.

Ms. ARYATI. As far as I know, the riots of the past 2 months have been more related to the increasing price of food, so the people did not attack a particular ethnic group, but it so happened that the policy of the Indonesian Government had put the Chinese only in an economic arena, so when the people attacked shopkeepers, they happened to be Chinese.

And in terms of church burnings, there has been some indication that the military was behind the forces who attacked the churches. In one case, the problem was not even religious conflict. It was a problem within the Muslim community itself, which then led to the church burning by an agent provocateur. So it often happens that such an organized riot was due to the military support to that, or the military just ignored the existence of the riot. For example, in East Java, the military didn't come to the area to secure the area until 5 hours after the riot, while the actual military station was only half an hour from the arena.

So there is some indication that the military actually turned the Chinese into a scapegoat to distract the public's criticism toward Suharto and try to find a scapegoat in that sense.

But in other cases, there is evidence that the public are mad at the Chinese businessmen because the military were supporting
them in doing their business. The military received bribes and security fees from the businessmen. In this case, the public discontent toward the military and the Chinese are combined, and they just attacked the Chinese because they couldn't attack the military.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. HAMZAH. I would like to put some more points on the—that the people in Indonesia will get very much profit or benefit from Suharto's regime, the Chinese minorities.

I mention this because this is related to the riots, that most of the time they became the victims of the riots. Last night I called—I got information from Indonesia, from Medan, the place that I used to work, that 1,200 of stores were burned, in Medan, and that's all Chinese, I mean Chinese store. And maybe in this way you will see that this is a kind of racism, but in fact is not. Even in the same thing last 1994, when the workers riot, that hundreds of Chinese companies became the victims of this vandalism. But the problem here is that in Medan, the Chinese businessmen control all the city, all the stores, if you walk from one store to another one, those belong to the Chinese. So if there is a strike or a riot and they burn the store, ultimately the Chinese will be the first victim of this because these food stores belong to them. So, I think the same case in the other riots also.

Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith. I apologize for being this late. I was at a hearing of the Africa Subcommittee that, as a matter of fact, is still going on.

I just want to first, commend you for holding this very important hearing and to have an opportunity to hear witnesses just give first-hand accounts of what is going on. I, for many years, have had a problem with the behavior of the Indonesian Government, especially in East Timor when it was under colonial rule for many years and then when the colonialists decided to leave and Indonesia decides it is a part of their jurisdiction. I think that that's wrong and I also have a question about the fact that we know that corruption is rampant and there is still this push to have the IMF bail out Indonesia's ruling party, really, because they are the economy and they run the economy and it's for the family of the ruling leaders.

And I think that that is also wrong. I will certainly get an opportunity to read the testimony, that's sort of hind sight, because I was unable to be here; it is though an issue that is close to my interests and I will be certainly in conversation with the chairman to see where do we go from here.

Thank you very much for the opportunity.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Payne.

And I just want to say to our witnesses, Mr. Payne and I, and we may be from different political parties, but when it comes to human rights we work in solidarity and we both speak out with one voice, so it is an honor to serve with him and I can assure you that we will do everything we can and follow up because you not only documented abuses and showed patterns of abuses, you've also given us a large number of very specific action items to follow up
on and I can assure you we will look at them all very carefully as well as will other Members of the Subcommittee and the Full Committee and our respective leadership.

So I thank you very much. You have given us valuable information, timely information, and it will be acted upon; and this is the first of a series of hearings so I thank you for your input.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:23 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]
STATEMENT OF REP. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH (R-NJ)
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights
Human Rights in Indonesia
May 7, 1998

Today's hearing is on human rights in Indonesia. I hope our witnesses will address three fundamental questions: First, is it true, as human rights advocates and our own State Department have suggested, that agents of the Government of Indonesia engage in torture, extrajudicial executions, and other gross violations of fundamental human rights? Second, is United States policy toward Indonesia helping or hurting the situation? Third, are the massive infusions of money from the International Monetary Fund and other international financial institutions likely to help the people of Indonesia, or will they just further enrich and empower the governing class?

The U.S. State Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997 reported politically motivated extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment in Indonesia. The report notes that abuses have historically been particularly numerous in East Timor, Irian Jaya and Aceh, three areas in which there have been strong independence movements. The report notes that "there were few signs of judicial independence" -- that the courts were used against political activists and government critics rather than to punish officials who unlawfully harm such people. There are severe restrictions on freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religion.

Despite this dismal record, our government has made clear that the top priority in its relationship with Indonesia is trade and investment, not political reform or human rights protection. Even after the 1991 massacre in Dili, East Timor, in which security forces killed hundreds of peaceful mourners -- including children in their school uniforms -- in a Catholic cemetery, our government continued to lavish assistance, including military assistance, on Jakarta.

I was particularly shocked to learn recently that the United States has been providing combat training to Indonesian military units, including some of those involved in the Dili massacre. This appears to be a dramatic end run around the rules Congress carefully prescribed for military training and education of Indonesian forces, in an effort to ensure that we would not provide them with the means of carrying out further massacres.
Year after year the Administration has assured Congress that the provision of "International Military Education and Training" to Indonesia is strictly limited to the so-called "expanded IMET" curriculum: classroom training in human rights and related subjects. We have also been assured that there is no way the Indonesian military could use any of this training against the people of East Timor or Irian Jaya, or against political or religious dissenters in Indonesia itself. To provide training in marksmanship, "psy ops" (psychological warfare), sniper training, and related subjects to some of the very units that have brutalized the people of East Timor is an obvious violation of this assurance.

This revelation is eerily reminiscent of a similar situation in Rwanda, where the United States has provided marksmanship, psy ops and similar training to the Rwandan Patriotic Army through the JCET program during the very period in which the RPA appears to have been engaged in the mass killing of refugees across the border in Zaire. At a December 1996 hearing, I was assured that our assistance to the RPA consisted of what a Defense Department spokesman called the "kindler, gentler side" of military training, focused on respect for human rights. We found about the marksmanship or the psy ops until eight months later. The Administration has still not been able to determine whether any of the soldiers who took our marksmanship course subsequently participated in the killing of refugees.

In the last five years, U.S. Special Operations forces have conducted at least 41 training exercises with the Indonesian military, at a cost of more than three and a half million dollars to U.S. taxpayers. Based on the information provided to Congress so far, it appears that the trainees in most of those exercises were Indonesia's elite Kopassus special forces -- the arm of the military accused of committing thegravest human rights violations against that regime's political opponents. The lethal skills taught during those exercises have included: close quarters combat, sniper skills, marksmanship, combat patrolling, small unit tactics, and military operations in urban terrain. Even before the U.S. training was publicly disclosed, those were exactly the skills identified by Amnesty International as "likely [to]... be used in the context of counter-insurgency operations which may lead to human rights violations" in Indonesia.

Since this training has come to light, the Administration has emphasized the benefit to U.S. forces as the justification for those activities. But it is obvious that -- in the words of the former Commanding General of the Pacific Special Operations Command -- this special forces training also "improves the capability of...the host nation" and "demonstrates [the U.S. military's] commitment" to the Indonesian regime. We need a simple and transparent set of rules to govern all our military education programs. The first rule should be that the United States does not give any kind of military assistance whatever to governments that murder their own people.

Finally, the world needs to know what is happening to the billions and billions of dollars pouring into Indonesia in response to the ongoing economic crisis. It is no secret that the vast majority of these dollars are going into the coffers of the government itself and of large-scale economic enterprises that helped to create the crisis in the first place. Supporters of the IMF
package for Indonesia argue that in return for the money, the government and the economic system will reform themselves. They also argue that without a restoration of financial stability there will be no political reform and human rights will be at greater risk than ever. Skeptics argue that the brunt of the reforms in the IMF package — such as reductions in government subsidies for food and fuel — will fall on the poor. They fear that the bailout will enrich and empower the Indonesian government and the large-scale economic enterprises, many of them owned by members of the armed forces and/or the President's family, and that the end result will be more of the same kind of behavior that led to the economic problems. It seems even less likely that the IMF and World Bank assistance will lead to political reform, since the Bank and IMF themselves insist they cannot insist on political conditions — not even the protection of fundamental and internationally-recognized human rights — as a condition on loans or other assistance.

I am particularly happy that four of our five witnesses today are democracy and human rights advocates from Indonesia, East Timor, and Aceh. I hope that these witnesses, and also Dr. Stephanie Freed of the Environmental Defense Fund, will help us understand how the government of Indonesia really works, what levers we should be using to get the government to respect human rights, and whether current and proposed U.S. and international actions will be helpful or harmful. I had hoped that the Administration would send witnesses to the hearing, but they cited schedule conflicts. We have asked them to tell us exactly when their witnesses can come, and we will hold a second part of this hearing on whatever day they choose. Congress and the American people have a right to know what our government is doing in Indonesia and why.

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.
IMF and World Bank Lending in the Indonesia Crisis:
Environmental and Human Rights Concerns

Stephanie Fried, Ph.D., Staff Scientist
Environmental Defense Fund
Fellow, Program on Environment
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Testimony before the
Committee on International Relations
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.
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Mr. Chairman and honorable members of the House. It is a great honor to testify before you in the company of courageous Indonesian citizens who, at great personal risk, have come here in order to present you with a full and open account of their experiences and their ideas. Some of them have been illegally detained and tortured, an all too common occurrence in Indonesia today. Others wish simply to express their thoughts freely, an exercise which is often met with harsh repression in modern-day Indonesia.

My name is Stephanie Fried and I am a staff scientist and policy analyst at the Environmental Defense Fund, a non-profit organization with over 300,000 members that links science, economics, and law to seek solutions to environmental problems. I have conducted research on Indonesian environmental and social issues since 1984.

I would like draw your attention to concerns about the IMF and WB efforts in Indonesia -- concerns which have been raised by EDF and 54 other environmental, development and human rights organizations representing over 6 million members and supporters in 19 countries, including Indonesia. There is a very real opportunity now to promote reform -- in Indonesia, as well as in the multilateral financial institutions. If this opportunity is not taken, there is the potential for a great deal of damage to and suffering on the part of the people of Indonesia who will have to repay the loans incurred by the Suharto government.

I would like to talk to you about three things: (1) the current structure of the Indonesian economy and implications for privatization programs under these conditions; (2) the serious environmental and human rights implications of the IMF and World Bank push for the expansion of the palm oil sector; (3) overarching concerns about the need for greater transparency, civil service reform, and greater accountability in the IMF and World Bank reform package.

1. The current structure of the Indonesian economy

The IMF should be given credit for being the only Multilateral Development Bank to make the breakup of Indonesia's corrupt, economically, socially, and environmentally destructive monopolies a prerequisite for the disbursement of funds. This represents a significant opportunity for reform, if acted upon. Without sufficient follow-through on
the part of the IMF, however, there will continue to be substantial economic losses and social costs as a result of these monopolies.

Unfortunately, the IMF's initially encouraging declarations on the monopolies have been followed by repeated IMF announcements, apparently echoing Indonesian government claims, that monopolies and cartels have been abolished. As reported in the Wall Street Journal, the Journal of Commerce and in Indonesia's samizdat press on the Internet, there are clear signs that the IMF-mandated break-up of the monopolies and cartels has not succeeded.

The disbanding of these monopolies must be a litmus test for determining whether further disbursements of IMF, World Bank, ADB and other public funds - those not intended for direct poverty relief - should be made in Indonesia.

In addition, since the World Bank has informed us that the Structural and Sectoral Adjustment loans currently planned for Indonesia are not bound by existing Bank social and environmental regulations, we call for existing World Bank environmental and social policies and procedures (i.e. Operational Directives, Operational Policies and Bank Procedures) to be applied directly to Structural Adjustment Loans. We call for a halt to plans for the rapid disbursement of large World Bank loans to the Indonesian Government - currently an additional $2 billion slated for release within the next few weeks - a halt to the rapid disbursement of such loans which are not subject to standard Bank environmental and social policies (transparency, public information, effects on indigenous peoples, resettlement, etc.), unless the loans are purely for direct poverty alleviation (i.e. food supplies, medical supplies, job creation).

There are clear indications - including the make-up of Indonesia's newly-appointed cabinet - that the Suharto government has no intention of lessening the stranglehold of Suharto family and friends on the country's economic life.

A report just released by Dr. George Aditondro, an Indonesian professor at Newcastle University in Australia details the corrupt activities of four lesser-known Indonesian Ministers in the new cabinet - including reports of the transfer of $50 million to a Singapore financial institution by an individual shortly to be appointed Minister in the new cabinet; reports of the transfer of Ministry-controlled trade to a factory owned by a new Minister's son and, by the same Minister, the transfer of trade from a parastatal entity to a factory owned by a son of Suharto; as well as extensive business links between other new Ministers and conglomerates associated with Suharto relatives.
Mr. Chairman,

I would like to present you with an example of how "privatization" works in Indonesia. According to the Wall Street Journal, in February, control over the Jakarta water supply was removed from a state agency to the "private sector". This meant that Mr. Suharto's grandson, Ari Sigit and the son of one of Mr. Suharto's closest business allies, Mr. Liem Sioe Liong, gained control over the Jakarta water supply. They then announced that water prices would be raised an average of 25%.

Next, I will address the privatization and expansion of the oil palm sector in Indonesia.

2. Oil Palm Plantations

The January, 1998 IMF letter of intent signed with Indonesia called for the removal of "all formal and informal barriers to [foreign] investment in palm oil plantations." 1/ The World Bank is currently preparing a $1 billion Sectoral Adjustment Loan, a significant portion of which is intended to support the "privatization" of the oil palm sector. We have already heard what "privatization" implies under the current economic structure of Indonesia.

The Indonesian forest fires of 1997 and 1998 -- for the most part, purposefully set -- are one of the greatest environmental disasters of this century. These devastating fires spread poisonous smoke over six countries, caused over $3 billion in health, transport, and trade damages, and affected the health of over 50 million people.2/ At the height of the fires, breathing the air in Malaysia was the equivalent of smoking five packs of cigarettes per day.

Mr. Chairman

Officially sanctioned plantations were largely blamed for these fires. According to Senator Max Baucus who visited Indonesia during last year's burning season, the fires were "caused largely by Indonesian and Malaysian timber companies clearing land for palm oil plantations in violation of Indonesian law." 3/ Senator Baucus continued, "Few of these companies have suffered any significant punishment, and most people I met were pessimistic about the chances this would change any time soon."

The IMF letter of intent mandates the expansion of Indonesia's oil palm sector through the removal of barriers to foreign investment, a move likely to bring about a recurrence and intensification of the worst fires of the century, with accompanying economic and social costs.
In addition to the human suffering brought on by the fires, plantation establishment in Indonesia commonly involves substantial violations of basic human rights. Plantation establishment often begins with the forced seizure and clear-cutting of forested territories inhabited by indigenous peoples and other forest dwellers. With the loss of their food supplies and forest-based income, the local communities are often severely impoverished as a result.

If they dare to protest or question the clearcutting of their productive forest gardens and fields, even if only to request that the companies operate outside of the regions necessary for local food self sufficiency, security forces are immediately called in. The 1998 U.S. State Department Report on Human Rights Practices in Indonesia documented the activities of security forces against village leaders who attempted to prevent a powerful plantation company from clearcutting their forest gardens in East Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo). According to the report, 14 village leaders were "stripped, repeatedly beaten, kicked and pistol whipped, and some were burned with cigarettes" by the security forces. (page 9) According to a report received three weeks ago from the Aceh (Sumatra) NGO forum, on April 13, 1998 six people were shot by police in a conflict between local villagers and an oil palm plantation company which had seized and destroyed their productive lands. Forty people were arrested and over one hundred fled the region.

Therefore: In the absence of meaningful, enforceable environmental and social conditionality tied explicitly into IMF and World Bank loan disbursement schedules, we call for a halt to any direct or indirect encouragement by the Bretton Woods Institutions for the expansion or privatization of the Indonesian palm oil sector. Loan conditionalities should include standard social, environmental and transparency requirements, in addition to the prerequisite of an open, transparent, and participatory system of land use planning, one which recognizes the adat land and forest tenure of indigenous forest communities.

3. Overarching concerns about the need for greater transparency, civil service reform, and greater accountability in the IMF and World Bank reform package.

Mr. Chairman, In conclusion I would like to share with you the concerns of the major Indonesian civil society organizations about the need for greater transparency, civil service reform and accountability across the board during the implementation of the IMF and World Bank aid packages.

For years, the World Bank has described its involvement in Indonesia as a model of success, to be emulated in other developing countries despite persistent criticism of the lack of financial transparency within Indonesia, astonishing levels of
corruption, and indications that a substantial portion of Bank funds invested there -- as much as 30% -- remains unaccounted for.

In February, decrying the fact that the Bank ignored Indonesia's obvious corruption and reliance on the use of force to control its population, INFID, an association of over 100 Indonesian and foreign NGO's, concluded that if the current crisis continues, the percent of Indonesia's population in poverty, after decades of World Bank intervention, will be approximately equivalent to the poverty levels of 1967. Meanwhile, however, according to INFID, the nation's natural resource base has been devastated by unsustainable exploitation at the hands of a corrupt and internationally supported government -- Indonesia's forests declined by at least 45 million hectares since 1970 -- and Indonesia's debt burden has grown to US$ 65 billion from US$2.1 billion in 1968.

In a statement released today (May 7, 1998), INFID declared that:

No one believes that economic stability can be restored without fundamental political change that involves respect for fundamental rights, clear checks on executive power, full accountability of public officials, an end to corruption and despotism, and the ability of ordinary Indonesians to participate fully in political life. ...

International financial institutions have attempted to separate economic from political reform agendas, but given the intertwining of economic and political power in Indonesia, such an approach is unfeasible and is indeed in part responsible for the current crisis. INFID believes that lasting economic reform can only take place in conjunction with fundamental political reform.

In March, Muchtar Pakpahan, the jailed leader of SBSI, an independent Indonesian labor union, told visiting Assistant Secretary of State, Stanley Roth that "Washington should not give aid to Jakarta until President Suharto implements reforms" -- political, social and economic reforms.29/

In April, the directors of the Indonesian economic think tank, Econit, publicly stated that "the IMF reform package would very unlikely directly address the main cause of the crisis, namely 'free, unbridled crony capitalism.'" 30/

WALHI, Indonesia's largest environmental organization, issued a press release decrying the repressive statements and actions of military and civilian officials.

The Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation, YLBHI, an organization of courageous lawyers dedicated to supporting the rule of law in Indonesia (chaired by Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights Award recipient, Bambang Widjajanto) called on
the Indonesian civilian government and the armed forces to ensure the success of the IMF program by, among other things, guaranteeing

the right to assemble, the freedom of association, of union, and the right to express opinions. Only with these three freedoms will the people truly be able to help themselves and lighten the burden in overcoming this crisis.32/

LBH also requested that the Indonesian government:

openly announce the reform program, including concrete steps which will be taken; publicly announce which institutions and individuals will be responsible for addressing this crisis, specifically the management of the IMF aid funds. A transparent mechanism is absolutely required so that steps may be taken if corruption should occur;

Due to the disproportionate impact on the poor, LBH also requested that food and transportation sector subsidies not be removed. LBH called on the Indonesian government to act firmly in accordance with the law against all forms of corruption in the management of IMF funds – such as the use of aid funds to pay private sector debts.

According to INFID, the World Bank – and I would add, the IMF -- has "ignored the political and institutional [dimensions of] development, which include the development of rule of law, recognition of human rights, effective democratic mechanism[s] and structure[s] which can produce accountable governments and an effective social control which actually can enhance the economic development process." The Jakarta office of the IMF has not responded to written requests made by major Indonesian civil society organizations for meetings to discuss the planned bailout package for Indonesia. It took us two months to secure a one hour meeting with the US ED to the IMF, a meeting which, I might add, did not adequately address our concerns.

Mr. Chairman,

In conclusion,

We call for the Bank and the Fund to ensure that loans to Indonesia during the current crisis are accompanied by rigorous, monitorable, enforceable measures to promote civil service reform, greater financial accountability and transparency, and respect for good governance and human rights. The World Bank should follow its own public information policy in the proposed billion dollar adjustment loans and all other loans in the current crisis. We urge the IMF
and the World Bank to promote the establishment of an Independent Anti-Corruption Commission, to prevent the "leakage" of funds, and to work towards the creation of a clean and accountable government bureaucracy.

Finally, the IMF should undertake long overdue reforms to ensure transparency and public access to information concerning its activities. The IMF should make publicly available the Policy Framework Papers and Letters of Intent at the
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Expertise: Southeast Asian environmental issues, forestry, agriculture, rural poverty, indigenous rights, development, social and environmental aspects of multilateral development bank lending, support for indigenous environmental efforts.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the US Congress, ladies and gentlemen, first of all allow me to express my profound gratitude to this prestigious body in allowing me to address before you problems of violations of human rights that my people and my country have endured for almost 23 years under Indonesian illegal and brutal occupation.

My name is Constancio Pinto. I am Timorese. I was born and raised in East Timor.

East Timor is a small country. Its size is relatively equal to the size of the state of Massachusetts. The population of the territory is 850,000 people. For more than four hundred years, East Timor was under Portuguese colonial rule. East Timor economically is self-sufficient. It has oil, natural gas and agricultural goods. As a colonized people, the East Timorese have aspired to individual freedom and liberty the same as the people of this great country have aspired to them centuries ago during the British colonization. Thus, in 1975 the East Timorese decided to declare independence from Portugal.

However, because of greed and power, the independence of the small nation of East Timor could not survive.

On December 7, 1975 Indonesia launched a bloody invasion of East Timor. The invasion was an act of aggression and violated International law and the United Nations resolutions 1415 (XV) which strongly observed the right to self-determination of every people under colonial rule.

The invasion of East Timor was comparable to the invasion of Kuwait by...
Saddam Hussein armed forces and slaughtered hundreds of unarmed civilians. I was 12 years old at the time when Indonesia invaded East Timor. In East Timor more than 60,000 civilians of different ethnic groups (Timorese, Chinese, Portuguese, and Australian) and different ages (including children and old men and women) were killed. They were killed inside their houses, they were dropped into the ocean and they were dropped alive from helicopters. I survived the massacre and escaped into the jungle with my parents. In the jungle we faced tremendous suffering, mass slaughter and starvation perpetrated by the Indonesian army. As result of the direct invasion and the illegal occupation of East Timor over 200,000 people have died. They died of mass slaughter, starvation and torture in jail. As many other young Timorese, my life has been affected by the Indonesian invasion.

In 1991, at the age of 28 years old, I was arrested by the Indonesian police and intelligence and I was tortured from 9 o'clock in the morning until 1 o'clock in the morning of the next day. The torture was immeasurable. They kicked my stomach and my knees with boots; they punched my head and pointed the gun at my head and threatened to kill me and all of my family. The intensity of torture was beyond human understanding. Even though they saw I was bleeding everywhere from my nose, my mouth and my ears, they still tortured me. At one point, two of the Indonesian special forces, the KOPASSUS threatened to throw me alive into the sea. This method of torture is one among many systematic methods of torture carried out by the Indonesian special forces, KOPASSUS. This unit is one of the worst Indonesian armed forces in East Timor. They are the ones that tortured me and continue to do so to other Timorese.

Mr. Chairman, allow me to share with you other related stories that happened to two of my friends Domingos Seixas and Henrique Balmuro. Domingos Seixas, was sentenced to 12 years in prison. On the day when he was arrested, he was dropped into the ocean with his neck tied up into a heavy rock. For some reason, the rock slipped away and
Domingos survived the attempted drowning. Domingos was taken to prison where his genital organs were electrocuted. What happened to me and Domingos was incomparable to what happened to Henrique Belmiro, another friend. On the day Belmiro was arrested his finger and toe nails were pulled out with pliers during the interrogation. All of these atrocities were committed by the KOPASSUS.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to express in this forum my disappointment with the training of KOPASSUS carried out by U.S. Army and Air Force units in Indonesia under the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program. The United States should stop all types of military support to a military that is loyal to a dictator that for 33 years has continuously committed gross human rights violations in defiance of the Universal Declaration of the United Nations. Training Indonesian KOPASSUS is just like training Saddam Hussein's troops.

Not to speak of the suffering enduring by the Timorese women. Often the Timorese women were raped in front of their husbands, boyfriends, friends, and families. There are thousands of Timorese women who were subjected to forced sterilization through the implementation of the Indonesian family planning program (K3B). According to Miranda Sessions, a graduate student from Yale University, almost all injections of contraceptives were covertly given to women under the guise of vaccinations. Many Timorese women believed that these injections could permanently sterilize them.

Mr. Chairman, today, the Indonesian army has turned its attention on East Timorese youth. Today, the Indonesian army does not view the danger as coming from a handful of the guerrilla fighters in the jungle but the youth in the cities. All peaceful actions and freedom of speech and assembly are considered politically dangerous. Thus, peaceful actions encounter military repression. One of the prominent examples of the repression against peaceful actions was the Santa Cruz massacre which occurred in 1991.
where more than 271 people were gunned down in cold blood. Those who were wounded were taken into hospitals and later some of their heads were smashed with rocks and others were given injected with lethal injection. More than a hundred people were killed this way. Until today, there has not been an independent investigation of the massacre. Those who were responsible for the massacre were sentenced to six months. The organizers of the peaceful actions was sentenced to nine years to life imprisonment, such as in the case of Grigorio Saldanha who was sentenced to life imprisonment. Such repression forced hundreds of young Timoros to leave their homeland. From 1995 to this day more than 200 young Timoros have successfully escaped to Portugal, leaving their families back home. Hundreds more are endure constant persecution.

Mr. Chairman, to conclude, I would like to reiterate that human rights violations such as torture, rape, persecution, arbitrary disappearances, executions and imprisonment in East Timor have become the daily bread of the East Timoros people.

The Timoros want just one thing, that is that our right to self-determination be recognized. Let us freely choose whatever we want to be. Be it an independent state, integration into Indonesia, or an association with another country. To achieve this, the role of the United States is vital.
Soeharto, after being in power for 32 years, now finds himself in a very difficult political situation. Even though he continues to control political power in his hands in a real sense, in the past few months the strength of the opposition forces that want to bring an end to his authoritarian rule has grown immensely. I feel certain and I have strong hope that in the next few months, Soeharto will be increasingly marginalized, if not overthrown through a "people power" revolution altogether.

A historical analysis of Soeharto's 32-year rule reveals that he is a political figure who reacts violently to criticism and to challenges against his authority. He is not one to reform his policies in response to criticism. On the contrary, Soeharto and the New Order regime respond to internal and international criticism not only in a defensive manner, but through overt military violence -- on a psychological level, the most pernicious form of intimidation of civilians to bow to military force. The bloody events in history that occurred during his rule are too numerous to enumerate, among them:

-- the tragedy of 1965, in which about 1 million suspected communists were mercilessly executed, imprisoned and persecuted;
-- the Malari student riots in 1974
-- Tanjung Priok
-- East Timor
-- Aceh
-- Warsidi Lampung
-- the mysterious killings known as Petrus from 1982-83; and several other cases.

Members of the government and Armed Forces who are responsible for these atrocities and who ought to have been put to trial for their crimes not only continue to stay in power, but through Soeharto's support have entrenched themselves in their crony positions even deeper and do not feel accountable to anyone.

I wish to present a few facts about the political violence in Aceh, in North Sumatra, where I come from. In the past few months, the Malaysian government, in close collaboration with the Indonesian government, undertook a forced repatriation policy of thousands of Acehnese who are victims of political persecution, but who were never granted political refugee status in Malaysia.
In the past few weeks, as a consequence of the forced repatriation policy, 24 Acehnese people were killed by Malaysian police. In addition 27 of them were executed extra-judicially after arriving in Aceh. 545 or more other political refugees who were forcibly repatriated are being held in Rancong, Aceh, a Kopassus Special Forces Military Camp known as a torture site.

On April 10, thirty-five Acehnese sought political asylum in different foreign embassies in Malaysia, including 8 going to the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, the other to the Swiss, French and Brunei embassies. 14 others to UNHCR in Kuala Lumpur.

With regard to the violent forcible repatriation of Acehnese undertaken by the Malaysian and Indonesian government working together, I wish to make the following recommendations to the U.S. Congress and the international community:

1. The thousands of Acehnese in Malaysia who are being forcibly repatriated are not illegal immigrants, but political refugees who fled Aceh because of the extremely repressive socio-political situation very similar to that of East Timor and West Papua. Aceh continues to be a Special Region for Military Operations. Since 1989, during the intensification of military counter-insurgency, thousands of civilians have been killed (these human rights violations are very well documented by international organizations, including the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation where I worked as a human rights lawyer for 7 years, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch/Asia).

The refugees are caught in a cycle of daily humiliation and violence. Because of institutionalised state violence and repressive counter-insurgency measures against the supporters of the independence movement, Aceh Merdeka, many Acehnese flee by boat to Malaysia, without official passports or immigration papers. In Malaysia, they are not granted refugee status but put in detention camps, or hunted down by police as illegal aliens. In Indonesia, they are branded as "terrorists" or GPK Aceh Merdeka, and torture, disappeared or executed extra-judicially. Worse of all, they are not able to leave Malaysia legally, because they do not even have passports.

2. We strongly recommend the formation of an international human rights team, under the auspices of the UN, to conduct an independent investigation of the political situation in Aceh, and the inhuman treatment of refugees in Malaysia. Acehnese should not be forced to return to Aceh where it is certain that they will be killed, tortured or persecuted by the Indonesian military, until such time that fundamental changes occur and Acehnese can live in their own land free of fear (most importantly, that the status of Aceh as a "Special Region for Military Operations" is ended).

3. We strongly urge the U.S. government to grant political asylum to the Acehnese in the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, and to those who are seeking asylum here in the U.S. -- who will most definitely be the targets of political repression, if not execution, if they are sent home. Based on the background I have provided, I wish to make a strong plea to
members of the U.S. Congress to recognize the political refugee status of Acehnese fleeing Indonesia and grant them asylum status.

4. Put pressure on the United Nations and other international human rights commissions to form an investigative Team and open a UNHCR office in Aceh to focus specially on monitoring human rights violations in this region.

5. Bring the Malaysian government to an international court of justice and make it publicly accountable for its illegal actions against refugees resulting in the death of 24 Acehnese and violating international human rights laws.

Thank you very much for your time and patience.
Migrants poisoned – then killed

John Sweeney in Macap Umbo discovers Malaysia’s way with unwanted workers

MALAYSIA, jumping to redness in the face, is a common sight. Sometimes it’s a sign of anger; at other times it’s a sign of frustration. The anger is often directed at unknown parties, both in the government and in society. The frustration is directed at the problems that have been created by the system itself.

The system in Malaysia is broken. The government has failed to address the root causes of the problem. The people have been left to deal with the consequences of the system. The consequences are severe.

The people who come to Malaysia are often viewed as a threat. They are seen as a burden. The government has failed to address the problem of illegal immigration. They have not provided the necessary resources to address the problem. The people who come to Malaysia are often viewed as a threat.

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The government has failed to address the problem of illegal immigration. They have not provided the necessary resources to address the problem. The people who come to Malaysia are often viewed as a threat.
Kind Attention: Ms Anne Wolfe

Date: 1st April 1998.

Dear Ms Anne Wolfe,

Re: 545 Achehnese Refugees detained in Ranchoon/ Lhok Seumawe.

Kindly refer to our letter dated yesterday April 10, 1998.

Today we received a saddened report that many Achehnese Refugees that were forcibly refouled by Malaysia March 26, 1998 and subsequently detained in the notorious Ranchoon Military Concentration Camp, Lhok Seumawe, were tortured and killed by the Indonesian Military as soon as they arrived there.

As of yesterday, the Achehnese at Ranchoon (numbers still unknown) were forced to dig holes and then machine-gunned by the army. Their bodies were simply thrown into the same pits.

In many districts in Acheh, many people men, women and children were taken away by the army. Some reported massacred in a single spot at Bunuh Geudong Arus, Clumpang Minjek a sub district of Fidie/Bigai which involved more than 100 persons on or about April 9, 1998.

In general, situation in Acheh is tense just like in 1989-91, where many people disappeared, tortured, and killed or their whereabouts simply unknown.

We hereby call to all civilized nations (governments) in the world and NGOs to apply pressures to Indonesian Government to immediately stop capturing, torturing and killing innocent unarmed Achehnese under their control.

The fate of these Achehnese now depend on your timely and concerted actions.

Thank you and regards.

Joseph Lembaro.

e.t.

1- UNHCR K.L
2- Ms Elizabeth Wong/SUARAM
Fax: 03-2411746

To: The Officer in charge,
U K N C R
Subang Laut.

Dear Sir,

Re: Fate and whereabouts of some Acehnese deportees in Aceh.

We are receiving reports about the fate and whereabouts of some Acehnese deportees who were sent by Malaysia to Ranchoh Military Detention Camps, Lhok Saumawe, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and comments</th>
<th>Last place known in Malaysia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The above 6 men were asked to report everyday to the local military authority at their respective village or hometown.

Thank you and regards,

Yours sincerely,

Joseph Lembero.

c/e: 1) Amnesty International (London).
2) W.S. Committee for Refugees.
3) Ms Elizabeth Wong (Suara).
Fast 44-171-9:56-1157

Amnesty International
London.

April 26, 1998.

Dear Mr. C...,

Ref: Abduction, torture & disappearance in Aceh since
March - April 1998.

Please refer to our Report no: 3/Aceh dated April 24, 1998.

Following are more names of Acehnese - men and women abducted
by the Kopassus unit around Pidil district, Aceh.

Name | From village/district of
--- | ---
01- Ummiyati - 50 yrs/ F. | Tjot Murong Lamlo, Pidil.
02- Resmiyyati - 25 yrs/ F. | do.
03- Kasiah - 22 yrs/P. | do.
04- Faridah - 21 yrs/F. | do.

Nos. 1 - 4 belong to one family.

05- Atsjah - 28 yrs/F | Tjot Murong Lamlo, Pidil.
06- Faridah - 27 yrs/F | do.
07- Kasiah - 33 yrs/P. | Tumpudeng Keumale, Pidil.
08- Yabuni - 7 yrs/M. | Udjong Rimba Beureunu, Pidil.
09- Affam - 18 yrs/M. | do.
10- Abubakar - 34 yrs/M. | do.
11- Hanafiah Hasbaliah - 60 yrs/M. | Sukon Baroh Teuspin Raja, Pidil.
12- Zulkifili Awahab - 37 yrs/M. | Lhok Bukit Lung Putu, Pidil.
13- Syukri Mahmud - 22 yrs/M. | do.
15- 6 more persons from Tjubo Lung Putu, Pidil; their particulars are still unknown to us.

The above persons were abducted by the Kopassus at their houses
and ever since were brought over to Rumoh Gudong Arun,
Gaulumpang Minjeuk, Pidil, sometime in March 1998.

We do not know exactly what happened to them. From past experiences
the army used to apply atrocities to captives and we could not rule
out sexual molestation towards women.

Thank you in advance.

Yours sincerely,

Joseph Lambaro.

c.c. 1) U M W-C R.Feesa Lawsm.
2) U.S. Committee for Refugees.
3) Ms Elizabeth Vong (Darham).
To: Ms Anne Wolfe
Amnesty International
London.

April 24, 1998.

Dear Ms Anne Wolfe,

Re: Abductions, torture & disappearance in Aceh since
March - April 1998.

Kindly refer to our letter dated April 18, 1998.

Today we received reports of some people being arrested by the KOPASUS unit in following areas in Aceh.

A) In Jayahl, Aceh Utara District, about 70 km, West of Lhok Seumawe.

1) Hordani Ibrahim – 33 yrs. He was arrested on April 14, 1998 at his home and brought over to Pulo Kitong Military Post in Bireuen about 45 kms, West of Lhok Seumawe. His fate is unknown. He is the son of Ibrahim bin Abdulrahman. Video E no. (1).

2) Zakeria Ismail – 32 yrs. of Kueunah Tambo, Sanslanga, Aceh Utara District about 75 kms West of Lhok Seumawe. He was arrested by the KOPASUS at a road-block being suspected as ASNLFS sympathizers. Now in Pulo Kitong Military Post. Fate unknown.

B) In Pidieh District, about 120 km West of Lhok Seumawe.

1) Ibrahim bin Ahmad - 80 yrs old man from Kampung Didoh. Arrested at his house on April 20, 1998. The Kopasus demand to know the whereabouts of his son Geutjik Adja, an active ASNLFS member. Brought over to Rauh Geudong Arun, Gaulumpang Minjauk - 15 kms South of Sigli town. Fate unknown.

That is all for now.

Regard.

Yours sincerely,

Joseph Lamberto.

---

Fax: 44-171-956-1157

Report no: 3/ Aceh.

Cc:
1) U N H C R Kuala Lumpur.
2) U.S. Committee For Refugees.
3) Ms Elisabeth Wong (Suaram).
NAME-LIST OF 33 ACHENNESE ESCAPEES FROM LENGCENG DETENTION CAMP, FORCED THEIR WAY INTO THREE FOREIGN EMBASSIES AND A PALACE IN KUALA LUMPUR AT ABOUT 7:30 AM-8:00 AM, FRI., APRIL 10, 1992.

1) Swiss Embassy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>From</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1- Hasnuddin Ali</td>
<td>27-7-1955</td>
<td>Dajah Tuha Fidie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2- Yusri bin Yunus</td>
<td>01-4-1978</td>
<td>Djarot Masjang Fidie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3- Yusuf Muhammad</td>
<td>06-3-1970</td>
<td>Bliang Gande Batoe Iliak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4- Djammuddin Ampon Tu</td>
<td>10-9-1964</td>
<td>Nuvanaah Rajeek Pase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5- Tanmri Abdollah</td>
<td>9-12-1973</td>
<td>Matang Tamgoh More Fidie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6- Syafri Abd Rahman</td>
<td>18-7-1968</td>
<td>Lhok Bako Pase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7- Hasnuddin Yeuse</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Simang Keuramat Pase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8- Nurdi Sand</td>
<td>08-2-1977</td>
<td>Bako Dindang Peureulak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9- Zulkifli Abdollah</td>
<td>01-1-1973</td>
<td>Peureulak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10- Musaik Abdi Gusin</td>
<td>29 yrs.</td>
<td>Alum Buo Peureulak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11- Hassan Beeri Kajah</td>
<td>1-12-1998</td>
<td>Peureulak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

2) France Embassy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>From</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>02- Mohammed Kajid</td>
<td>23 yrs.</td>
<td>Batee Iliak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03- Naif Muin</td>
<td>24 yrs.</td>
<td>Nuvanaah Lhao Fidie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04- Khalidir Amim</td>
<td>26 yrs.</td>
<td>Matang Goulampang Dus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05- Zainal Abidin Kasen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06- Fadli bin Ismail</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07- Munavar Hassan</td>
<td>20 yrs.</td>
<td>Samilenga Beta Biliik.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3) In the Royal Brunei Palace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>From</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01- M. I. M. Musaf</td>
<td>22 yrs.</td>
<td>Blang Ara Pase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02- Aswar Ibrahim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03- Zulka Bini N. Dish</td>
<td>27 yrs.</td>
<td>Simang Tapak Tuam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04- Sjukri Banjarah</td>
<td>25 yrs.</td>
<td>Matang Sidjuek Pase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05- Munwar Afi</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Batee Iliak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06- Bajhubil Juma</td>
<td>13-3-1969</td>
<td>Peureulak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07- Ismail Ygu Pana</td>
<td>28 yrs.</td>
<td>Pase.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4) OA Embassy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>From</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01- Ismail Usman</td>
<td>40 yrs.</td>
<td>Tiro Fidie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02- Mansurjaf Abu Bakar</td>
<td>31 yrs.</td>
<td>Kuto Blang Gourugok B.Iliak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03- Aswar Iban</td>
<td>27 yrs.</td>
<td>Tualang Tjut Peureulak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04- Zaini bin Abu Bakar</td>
<td>27 yrs.</td>
<td>Kuto Dajah Peureulak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05- Hasnuddin Ieuse</td>
<td>33 yrs.</td>
<td>Birocon Batoe Iliak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06- Hadi A rahman</td>
<td>22 yrs.</td>
<td>Gip Bungfok S.Ieuse B.Iliak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07- Heiwan Kasam</td>
<td>22 yrs.</td>
<td>Matang Gip Dyo Batoe Iliak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08- M. Saad bin M. Rasiid</td>
<td>23 yrs.</td>
<td>Simang 4 Djran A.Harat.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: 1) There might be some spelling errors with regard to the given names. We received these names directly from the Embassy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>From</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Faisal bin Karim</td>
<td>26 yrs.</td>
<td>Mtg Cip Dua B.Iliek Pass.</td>
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<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Ikali bin Zakeria</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Arusan Pe Lhok Pidie</td>
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<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Saleiman bin Usman</td>
<td>12-12-1977</td>
<td>Buloh B. Ars Pase.</td>
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<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>M. Idal bin Saleiman</td>
<td>20 yrs.</td>
<td>Batee Iliekk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Tekander Selah</td>
<td>24 yrs.</td>
<td>Peureulak.</td>
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<td>06</td>
<td>Hamli bin Abdallah</td>
<td>03-08-1969</td>
<td>Kuta dajah, Peureulak</td>
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<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Adillaiah bin Kenjah</td>
<td>40 yrs.</td>
<td>Bl.Parch, A-Seulatan</td>
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<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Bustami bin Ibrahim</td>
<td>23 yrs.</td>
<td>Snb Peusangan P.1ek</td>
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<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>M. Tuoof A. Jelil</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Blang Adoe, Pase</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Hamid Asahari</td>
<td>12-12-1970</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Mukhlis Behren</td>
<td>32 yrs.</td>
<td>Bl .Pidi A. Seulatan</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Muhammed Mjak Din</td>
<td>24 yrs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date of Birth</td>
<td>Date of Death</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Samsul Bahari bin Abdullah</td>
<td>19-09-1996</td>
<td>19490 (Nombor Badan)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Suffian bin Tuji Mahin</td>
<td>05-08-1965</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Anwar bin Mahned</td>
<td>05-11-1967</td>
<td>26720</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Mohd Dali bin Nurkin</td>
<td>01-03-1971</td>
<td>26269</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Mohd Yusuf bin Amran</td>
<td>27-06-1948</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Buntani bin Muhammad Yusuf</td>
<td>10-12-1975</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Mohd Zakal bin Malacor</td>
<td>17-03-1977</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Damakkin bin Malignan</td>
<td>24-10-1938</td>
<td>26277</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Lyanadi bin Janis</td>
<td>11-07-1973</td>
<td>25265</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Njaj Muh bin Baharuddin</td>
<td>10-01-1973</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Fauzi bin Abdul-Rahman</td>
<td>10-10-1968</td>
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<td>Ali bin Dyakaluddin</td>
<td>01-10-1977</td>
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<td>Suardi bin Laman</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Szauaund bin Mohd Yusuf</td>
<td>13-04-1968</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Mahbub bin Bumrusah</td>
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<td>Hazuddin bin T.A Harud</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>Arwaah bin Lisan</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>Djafaruddin bin Hadi</td>
<td>08-04-1969</td>
<td>27138</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Rahman bin Adam</td>
<td>04-02-1971</td>
<td>27106</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>Zanuddin bin Ragid</td>
<td>20-06-1969</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Djamalul Hakim bin Ismail</td>
<td>13-03-1972</td>
<td>27454</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Sjukri bin Mohd Beijab</td>
<td>12-10-1969</td>
<td>27453</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Suhurm bin Abdul Latif</td>
<td>21-03-1974</td>
<td>27452</td>
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<td>Mahjuddin bin Usmam</td>
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<td>Abdul Raheman bin Maddah</td>
<td>07-05-1972</td>
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<td>Sjaham Bejik bin Mohd Sro</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>Mohd Ali bin Ibrahim</td>
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<td>Salauuddin bin Abdul Hamid</td>
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<td>Seyed las Alquranji bin Seyed Usmam Abdullah</td>
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<td>Izamai bin Ahmad</td>
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<td>Anwar bin Mahamed</td>
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<td>Zailani bin Dhalas</td>
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<td>Irda bin Alesjah</td>
<td>10-10-1975</td>
<td>29493</td>
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<td>Zakaria bin Tahi</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>Ridwan bin Hatifi</td>
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41. Zain al-din bin M. Nur, 16-08-1976, 29491
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8. Muhammad Tahir bin Husen
9. Yadi bin M. Yunus
10. M. Nasru bin Kaseen
11. Mukhtar bin Husen
12. Musaafir bin Abu Bakar
13. M. Ismail bin Yusaf
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15. Muhammad bin Burhan
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17. Djamaluddin bin Amper Tu
18. M. Ali bin Syama'un
19. Idris bin Ismail
20. M. Daud bin Kubir
21. Najib bin Haji Abu Hadi
22. Iskander bin Nurin
23. Haasimuddin bin Ali
24. Abu Bakar bin Amin
25. Zekaria bin Harun
26. Abdul Malik bin Yasin
27. Muhammed bin Njib bin:
28. M. Ismail bin Gani Usman
29. Nurin bin Ali Basyah
30. Ismail bin M. Amin
31. Hamid Azhari bin Ismail
32. Shamsuddin bin Jamil
33. Abu Bakar bin Maklum
34. Zainuddin bin Makul
35. Zulkifli bin Zainal
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37. Darmawan bin Amin
38. Murza bin Ismail
39. Adi Syah bin Kanyah
40. Abdul Djali bin Ali Basyah
41. M Djami bin Affan
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44. Nordin bin M. Saleh
45. Sulaiman bin Hanun
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DEPOH-DEPOH IMIGRESEN MALAYSIA
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Ttd: Akasy

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Block 86SA #10-14
Woodlands Drive 50
Singapore 730895

Tel & Fax: 7420174
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From The Independent, UK 27th April 1998
Malaysia fury over "poisoned" refugees

By Richard Lloyd Parry

MALAYSIA'S determination to deport illegal workers is putting thousands of people at risk of illness, injury and political persecution, according to the human rights organisation Amnest International.

The group was responding to newspaper reports that thousands of Indonesian migrants have been deliberately poisoned in detention camps across Malaysia prior to a mass deportation organised at the end of last month, and that policemen shot dead detainees who resisted them.

Accounts picked up by human rights groups in the days leading up to the riots said inmates vomited blood after they were given drugged water, apparently in an unsuccessful attempt to pacify them in preparation for a mass deportation.

"Amnesty is concerned at the apparent corroborations of earlier reports of poisonings," said Tim Perrett, who recently returned from a visit to Malaysia on behalf of Amnesty. "We reiterate our call for a full public enquiry into the events of last month, and access to the camps for international organisations.

"There were rumours of food poisoning, but tension was high at the time, and it could have been some kind of mass hysteria," Mr Perrett said. "Our concern is with the course of events earlier in the month and the degree of force which was used to bring about the deportations."

The official reckoning is that eight Indonesian detainees and one Malaysian policeman died during riots which broke out at several camps early on the evening of 23 March.

The authorities in Kuala Lumpur are refusing to allow international organisations into the camps, including the United Nations High Commission on Refugees, in spite of claims that some of the refugees face political persecution on their return to Indonesia. Malaysia is insisting none of those who were deported had grounds for seeking political asylum, a claim based on events after their return to Indonesia. Fourteen of them were detained for being members of a banned organisation seeking independence for the province of Aceh.

Twenty-two Indonesians are in sanctuary in UN and embassy premises in Kuala Lumpur where they are demanding political asylum.

The Malaysian government angrily rejects suggestions that excessive force was used in the camps. Here Fernando, a researcher who published a report on maltreatment and medical neglect in the camps, is currently being prosecuted for "publishing false news", a crime punishable by imprisonment.
for his clarity as he was known for fear of reprisal.

He says: "in book after book people were writing blood. I knew the gauchos were poisoning us. From 8am to 4pm the next day all the indians were dying. Then the police shot in the air and fired tear gas at us. Everyone was excited. 500 police from the Mayo, the Federal Reserve and the army came in the camp and we were surrounded. They had helmets, guns and whips. The men refused and the note took control. At dawn they went to Block E, where the Asanases people were."

The Asanasses, of A氏 "Arabs" named after the Arabs, are independent not a republic in 1981. They were the most to flee from being sent back across the State's borders.

David said: "The police beat the Asanasses. Their leader was shot dead in the head. The body was buried and one police officer with a block of wood. The man was shot in the stomach and they killed a third man. To help the injured, the injured were killed. The police took the eyes of the Asanasses away so they were never seen again. A second eyewitness at the site said: "I saw the bodies of the women and the dead. And after the first time the police were back in the area."

Two days after it, the Asanasses, 400 Asanasses, and 4000 other indians were killed in the camp. The Asanasses saw everything. I said: "As we were shot by the police, they took the eyes of the dead. The police beat up another, who they suspected was a 'spy'."

Reports of mass shootings and deaths from Hunger Avenue, the greater Kari Lama region, evidence that the Mayo Uruco poisoning was not a one-off, but part of a widespread strategy. At the camp the police, 16 miles south of the capital, Asanases were also complained the cold was poisoned, leaving them weak and sick. The authorities said I ask that fights break and the police had been killed.

The official news of all the incidents said the violence was started by the police and police used force in self-defense.

Last week Prime Minister Mohamed Mohamadpur told reporters that he rejected the term used by human rights groups and labeled the right of political "armed criminals". He said he was referring to "organized immigration, armed war and armed criminals".

But the report says suggests a different story. A press photograph snapped at San Juan shows that at least two of four bodies were bound and shot. John Stearns's report will be shown on BBC's "Correspondents" at 7.30pm on Saturday.

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Testimony by Pius Lustrilanan
Secretary-General of ALDERA

At a Hearing of the Committee on International Relations
Subcommittee on International Organizations and Human Rights
United States House of Representatives
May 7, 1998

Mr. Chairman and honorable members of the House,

It is a great honor to be able to testify in front of this august body and I want to thank you all for this opportunity. My name is Pius Lustrilanan, and I am an active member of the pro-democracy movement in Indonesia.

I regard myself as fortunate to be able to testify in front of you: I was kidnapped, held for two months and released. Other victims who were held together with me have disappeared without trace. In my language we differentiate between 'hilang' and 'dihilangkan'. The first term means "to disappear" and the second term "dihilangkan" is the active form, the translation of which is to make disappear.

I am fortunate that I no longer belong to the category of those who were made to disappear. When, on 4 February, 1998, I was taken to the place of detention, which was also a torture center, one of the kidnappers told me: "There are no laws here and no human rights. You simply have to answer all our questions. And remember, some people come out of this place alive and some as corpses. If you want to stay alive, you better behave."

My release is the result of domestic and international pressure and also the wide exposure in the domestic and international press. I want to use this opportunity to thank all the human rights organizations, NOOs and individuals all around the world that have campaigned for me and the other disappeared. My gratitude goes also to those governments that have made representations to the Indonesian government. My sincere gratitude goes also to those friends who are still held in detention.

Mr. Chairman,

Giving testimony like this is not without risk. It took me more than a week of consideration before I decided to go public. In fact, I'm the first Indonesian victim of disappearances to have done so. We all received death threats, not only to ourselves but even worse to our next of kin and the other detainees. Our abductors warned us that if we told our stories it would have nasty consequences. I drew the conclusion that giving a full account of my two-month disappearance was worth the risk. It also serves as
protection for myself and my family. Exposing myself might also accelerate the release of the other detainees.

I was kidnapped on 4 February while waiting for public transport in front of the General Hospital in Jakarta. Suddenly, somebody with a pistol told me to get into a car. Another three persons were sitting in the car. They immediately handcuffed and blindfolded me. We drove in the direction of Bogor and after approximately a one-hour drive, we arrived at the place where I was held for two months.

The prison compound was quite modern. In the section where I was held there were six cells - two rows of three cells - complete with a detector camera. In the two months I was held, I never saw my kidnappers. Either I was blindfolded or they were hooded. But by being able to see the eyes of the various people who delivered my food, I was able to distinguish at least a dozen different people.

The first three days were the worst. They gave me electric shocks, kicked and hit me all over my body. I was put in a tub of water and my head was pushed down over and over again. At that time I thought I would never survive. I was in the hands of professionals, they did everything as part of a routine.

The main thrust of the interrogation was about my activities as coordinator of SIAGA, a loose coalition to support Megawati and Amien Rais, the two main opposition figures. What was the strategy of SIAGA, who else participated in the preparation factions and so on. It became obvious to me that the kidnappers were safeguarding President Suharto's re-election in March. All stumbling blocks - people like me - had to be removed. The ones that were mutually detained with me in the same block had the same background. This period is one of the worst periods in the history of the Suharto regime. Hundreds of arrests took place, at least a dozen others were kidnapped like me, and an extra 35,000 troops were stationed in the capital Jakarta. Holding a peaceful protest in the streets of Jakarta became a virtual impossibility.

I do not possess definite proof about the identification of my kidnappers. I do not believe that they were part of any organized crime gang or any of the pro-government political groupings. Everything was far too professional. Sometimes I was able to communicate with the other detainees to compare our experiences. All evidence suggest that we were in the hands of the armed forces. Every afternoon around 3 o'clock I heard the sound of a trumpet, for roll-call. The clearest evidence was on the day of my release on the morning of 3 April. One of the officers revealed that he was an AKABRI (Armed Forces Academy) graduate. Actually, he was the one who gave me a final dose of electric shocks before my release. As a token of remembrance, he said.

The top officials of ABRI, the Indonesian armed forces, have categorically denied their involvement in kidnappings. Commander-in-Chief and concurrently Minister of Defense General Wiranto and local territorial commanders have said this in public. Police officers do not wear hoods during interrogation. From deducting the facts there is a high probability of the involvement of a special unit within ABRI. I want to remind this
In these last few days the government has announced that they will set up two fact-finding teams. One of the teams has to find out whether members of the security forces are involved in the kidnappings. I welcome this announcement, another proof of positive results due to pressure. But I have to say at the same time that we have had experiences with government fact-finding teams. After the Santa Cruz massacre in Dili, East Timor in November 1991, similar fact-finding teams were established, also due to strong international pressure. The results were more than disappointing. No independent inquiry has been made up to this very day, and only a few low-ranking officers - who were sacrificed like lambs - received minor sentences.

Mr. Chairman and honorable members of the House,

I also want to use this opportunity to raise the matter of impunity. President Subarto is by far the longest-serving ruler in Asia. In the more than three decades of his rule, fundamental freedoms have suffered greatly. The human rights situation in Indonesia is fundamentally flawed. Over the years, the U.S. State Department, in its annual Human Rights Report, has recorded some of these violations. Often, the perpetrators of those violations are publicly known. In most cases, they are members of the security forces. The tragedy in Priok more than a decade ago, the killings in Lampung and Aceh and the tragic events on 27 July 1996 have occurred without the perpetrators being held accountable. The international community together with the growing democratic forces in Indonesia have to find ways to prevent senseless killings like this and to make sure that perpetrators will appear in court to give an account for their acts.

We also have to use internationally available instruments like the structures of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. It is urgent for your government to press for the sending of special teams to Jakarta. I would like to mention here the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, which is going to visit East Timor anyhow in the coming months. Also the UN Working Group onDisappearances and the Special Rapporteur on Torture are important to investigate the present situation. In cooperation with local human rights organizations, I'm confident that we can improve the situation.
Mr. Chairman,

Despite the traumatic experiences of my two months in captivity, I feel very optimistic. The winds of change are blowing in Indonesia. Because of the limited time given, I have included as an appendix a more detailed account of my experience. I sincerely hope that our mutual efforts will prevent repetition of the things that happened to me.

Thank you.
PIUS LUSTERILANANG

Mr. Pius Lustrilanang, 30, has been a prominent leader of Indonesia’s student movement since 1988. He is involved in Indonesia’s pro-democracy movement and has worked as a human rights campaigner and an organizer among urban poor and peasants in West Java and the Jakarta metropolitan area.

Since 1994, Mr. Lustrilanang has served as the Secretary-General of the People’s Alliance For Democracy (ALDERA), an alternative political organization of youth and students based on university campuses and in the slum areas of Jakarta and other main cities of West Java.

In January 1998, Mr. Lustrilanang initiated the founding of SIAGA, a coalition of various pro-democracy organizations opposing the re-election of President Suharto. SIAGA also supported the candidacy of ousted Indonesian Democratic Party leader Ms. Megawati Soekarnoputri and Dr. Amien Rais, a political scientist and leader of the Muslim mass organization Muhammadiyah, as President and Vice-President, respectively.

On February 4, 1998, Mr. Lustrilanang was kidnapped in Jakarta by unknown men believed to be part of a secret military intelligence unit of the Indonesian armed forces. He was hooded and taken by car to a secret detention facility within an hour’s drive of Jakarta, where he was held in incommunicado detention along with at least five other individuals working on pro-democracy and human rights issues. Mr. Lustrilanang was interrogated there for two months, during which time his captors beat him and administered electric shocks as part of an attempt to discover details of his political activities.

Mr. Lustrilanang was released on April 2, 1998, as a result of intense domestic and international pressure by human rights organizations and the United States and other governments. After providing an account of his ordeal to Indonesia’s National Commission on Human Rights on April 27, Mr. Lustrilanang went to the Netherlands out of concerns for his physical safety.

Mr. Lustrilanang was born in Palembang, in the Indonesian province of South Sumatra, and studied political science at the Parahyangan University in Bandung, West Java.
APPENDIX – Testimony of Pius Lustrilanang

House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Human Rights

May 7, 1998

Based on interviews published in: 

STAR, April 29, 1998
Tempo Internasional, Edisi DFV01, May 2, 1998

1. The Kidnapping

Pius was kidnapped at 3:30 PM on February 4, 1998. He was waiting at a bus shelter after visiting his friend’s mother at Cipto Mangunkusumo hospital (Jalan Diponegoro, Jakarta) when a gray sedan, Toyota Corolla Twin Cam, stopped in front of him.

A man got out of the car, took me by the hand, forced me into the car. He was holding a gun – it looks like an FN type. There were 4 people inside the car. Once I was inside the car, I was forced to bend forward. I was blindfolded, my hands were pulled and handcuffed at the back, and my body was covered with a half sheet of newspaper, my head was covered with a leather jacket. One of them ordered the driver to go directly to Bogor.

About an hour later the car stopped somewhere. I can’t identify what kind of place it was because I was blindfolded. I was taken to a room. One of the kidnappers said, “There is no human rights, no law here, all you have to do is answering every question. And, remember, there some people came out of this place alive, some died. Do you want to stay alive, answer [our questions] properly.”

Another one asked me if I knew why I was taken to that place.

2. The Interrogation

In the beginning they searched my bag and asked questions about its content. They found my ATM card and asked for its PIN number. After that they asked me my whereabouts the night before and where I lived. While doing this questioning, another man was testing an electric device on my foot. I could hear “tack…tack…tack” which proved that the device was working. The interrogator asked about my activities including the last meeting with Ratna Sarumpaet. Then they asked me about a meeting between Megawati, Daniel Indrakusumo, and two others I couldn’t remember at Block M (shopping center at southern part of Jakarta) and whether I attended that meeting. Since I told them I didn’t attend the meeting and knew nothing about it, they began to send electric shock to my foot and hands. I couldn’t stand it so I told them I attended the meeting. They asked me what was being discussed at the meeting. But since I actually didn’t attend the meeting, I couldn’t answer the question. They began to send electric shock again.

After the initial process of interrogation I was brought to another room by three people. The distance between the first and the latter room was about 20-30 meters. I was still blindfolded and handcuffed. The first time I stepped into the second room, I heard very loud music. I thought I was in a discotheque, but later I found out it was music from a portable tape. Before entering the room – later I knew it was a cell – they took off the blindfold and handcuffs and stripped me naked. All of the men were wearing masks. In the room there was a wooden bed frame, one tub and toilet.
I was ordered to get into a tub. After that they stopped on my head and turned on the water tap until the tub was full of water. Once the water level was at my shoulder, they held my head under the water with their feet. I thought I was going to die inside this tub because the water kept flowing up to my nose. They did this several times – pushing my head down, and pulling it up when I couldn’t stand it anymore.

The soaking went on for several hours. After that they gave me shorts, a T-shirt, a used toothbrush, a bar of soap and two blankets. They left me in that cell. Later on they came back with food and water in a bottle. Around 9 or 10 PM they dragged me out of the cell again. The usual procedure was once the cell door was opened, I had to approach the door, put my hands at the back to be handcuffed and let them blindfold me. I was brought to the interrogation room. The blindfold was taken off and all I could see was a table facing a wall, while the interrogator: was all wearing stjae veils and huge raincoats. They showed me a PRD document which I assumed was the PRD quarterly journal Confrontation. They asked me if I knew anything about PRD's 5 stages of mobilization. They told me that, “Actually we are planning to pull you out of their plan [it means pulling Pius out of the pro-democracy movement and turning him into pro kidnappers]. And you have reached the fifth stage.” They released my handcuffs so that I could answer some of their questions in writing. There were 4 questions I had to answer:

1. my biography
2. my activities in SIAPA [Indonesian Solidarity for Amien Rais and Megawati]
3. the detail about the meeting with Megawati
4. information about NOOs activities in Bandung and Jakarta

I only answered the first question. I had the feeling that the one who questioned me at this stage was an officer. If they’re not satisfied with my answer, one of the guys would beat my head from behind. After the interrogation session I was brought back to my cell. They continued to beat me or bump my head to the wall on the way to my cell.

I wasn’t ordered to do anything on the second day. The interrogation continued on the third day I was kidnapped. They asked me to identify people's names and pictures and whether I know them. The names they asked were Megawati, Fomradi, Daniel and a number of other activists. They also asked if I know LB Mordani. While questioning me they threatened me with electric shock.

After the third day I was left alone in my cell; there was no more interrogation and torture until I was released on April 3. A radio was played very loudly all day and night except for three hours (2-5 am) the broadcast was off. Usually this was the time I could communicate with other detainees. At times the kidnappers would come and asked me repeatedly, “Do you know where you are now?” or “Guess, where is this place, Jakarta, Bogor, Cianjur or Sukabumi?” Usually I didn’t respond to these questions. There were several times when they would ask me, “Do you know who picked you up?” At first I ignored the question and they all laughed. But one time I responded, “The one who picked me up is either BIA or Kopassus.” Strangely enough they were quiet when I gave that answer.

3. The Description of the Detention House and its Surrounding
As far as I can remember I heard the loud sound of either a jet or Hercules plane which was flying low every morning up to 10 am and in the afternoon. I imagined that the place was near an airport or air base, maybe Halim Air force base, or between Jakarta and Bogor. I'm not sure.

One time somebody opened the door to the cell block. I got a brief chance to notice that there were two other buildings outside the cell block. It didn't look like a residential house, but more like an office. The atmosphere was very similar to a Kodern office. The building was painted cream white and the tile was brown.

Every afternoon around 3 PM there was always a sound of trumpet. It sounded like a regular call for soldiers to attend the ceremony at the end of their day. I think the detention place is within a compound of different offices.

The size of the cell was 2 x 2.5 meters. It was painted cream white, with bars on the front side and on one side and the rest was a concrete wall. Inside the cell there was a wooden cot (the size was 1.60 x .80 m) and a bath tub - the width was about an adult shoulder length and the height was about 1 m. This tub was used to torture me.

There was no window and the lamp was the only light available. Once the electricity went out and the room was totally dark. There were six cells in two parallel rows altogether. One row was facing the back wall of the second row. The cells were air conditioned - one for each row. In front of every cell there was a camera.

When I was in my cell I heard the voices of four people. I could not see their faces but I recognized their voices. I could chat with them one time when the electricity was out for about 2-3 hours. In the beginning there were four of us: Desmon, Yani Avri (Ryan) and Sony, both from PDI Magawati, and me. Sony and Ryan told me that they have been detained for nine months. We were moved to other cells once more detainees came in, such as Haryanto Tsalam (Hartas) from PDI and Herman, Faisal Rana and R. Waluyo Jati from PRD.

(Pius drew a diagram of the calls and the people inside)

On February 4

Row I: Pius empty empty Ryan
Row II: Desmon empty empty Sony

On March 8

Row I: Empty Empty Ryan Desmon
Row II: Hartas Sony Sony Pius

On March 12

Row I: Herman empty empty Desmon
Row II: Hartas empty empty Pius

On March 13
Thanks to Mustang Radio [an FM station] I could keep track of the days and the hours during my detention.

4. Indication of Military Involvement

I don’t believe that this kidnapping was done by ordinary criminals or by the Mafia [as was suggested by military officials], because in Indonesia the military is the only force which has a monopoly over guns. I saw one FN 46 held by the guy who kidnapped me, and then a small revolver, and a rifle laid on the table. Sony also told me that he saw an M-16 one time on the table. Besides if the kidnapping was done by a Mafia, why did they have a ceremony every afternoon? Criminals don’t have ceremonies. As far as I know, only the military has this habit.

It’s difficult to recognize their physical features because they cov:ed every inch of their body and I could only see their eyes. But I tried to identify their voices. Those who delivered food to my place changed at least every two days. From their voices I think there were at least 15 people who served me food while I was in detention for 2 months.

The food was always freshwater fish, rice, and vegetables. It seemed like they had their own cook because whatever I ate was always fresh and warm. What I ate was the same with what the kidnappers ate.

The pattern of the kidnapping was the same among us the detainees. I came to this conclusion after chatting with some of the other victims, such as Desmon, Sony and Hartas. Sony’s story was the clearest one as to who possibly organized the kidnapping.

Sony was arrested by Kodim officials in mid 1997 when the campaign for election reached its height. He was arrested under the suspicion of involvement in the bomb explosion in Kotapac Gading [North Jakarta]. Sony used to be a ‘prames’ who sympathized with Megawati’s struggle prior and during July 27 Incident. He joined PDI-Megawati and loyalty supported Megawati.

Sony was detained at a North Jakarta Kodim for a night. He was released after he signed the official letter of his release. As he was leaving the Kodim office, a Toyota Land Cruiser stopped in front of him. Four stalwart men got off the jeep and tried to drag him to the car. Sony resisted the force and chung on the gate of the Kodim’s office. He was shouting for help and that made the officials inside Kodim’s office come out. Some of them were trying to rescue him, but one of the kidnappers then talked to those officials. The Kodim officials who initially tried to help him allowed the kidnappers to take Sony away.
Logically, since we were in the same detention camp, I assume that those who kidnapped me belonged to the same group with those who kidnapped Sony. Moreover, the fact that the Kodien officials changed their mind - from trying to help Sony to allowing him to be taken away - after talking with the kidnappers showed that the security apparatus was involved in this kidnapping business. But, I don’t have any more evidence to take this case to court.

Another piece of evidence which made me convinced that the military was behind the kidnapping occurred just before I was released. I was released on April 3, 1998. Around 11:30 am after an interrogation one of the men at the detention place confessed to me that he graduated from the AKABRI [ABRI Academy]. He was 36 years old. He said that when he was about to graduate from the AKABRI his senior beat him up as a remembrance and as a sign of affection. He remembered that incident all the time. Then he told me that he also wanted to give me something as a remembrance. I was given an electric shock once more before I was released. I was still blindfolded at that time so I couldn’t see his face. After this last torture they brought me a new shirt, trousers and shoes. They also bought me a plane ticket to Palembang. At 3 PM they took me to the airport. I was still blindfolded until I arrived in Cengkareng.

According to me this kidnapping operation was done not by any ordinary members of ABRI, but by specially trained officials who were experts in terrorizing people. A day before I was released they intimidated me not to reveal anything I experienced for the past two months, or else they would hunt me down wherever I might go and execute me. One of them said that, “Our opinion about you is good so you might be released soon. But the decision depends on the meeting of my bosses. Hopefully the decision will be positive. But if the decision is negative, I would do it without hesitation at all.” Later on they said, “First, you have to be grateful to God because God was influencing our discussions about releasing you. Just so you know that the decision to execute people here is done in a very selective way. Second, you have to thank your mother because I believe your mother is continuously praying for you.”

5. Closing statement

I reveal all my experience with a risk of death. It’s not a small risk but I chose this way anyway because I want all this to end. Haryanto Taslam and Daemon have already been released. They were in the same place as I was. As potential witnesses they have to be protected and encouraged to speak the truth like what I have done. I also want them to talk with and strengthen each other. I heard from Waluyo Jati that the military was after Bimo Petrus Amagoras because he was the courier for Andi Arief. It’s clear that the military was looking for Andi Arief. When they could not find him, they threatened his friends, “Before we got Andi Arief you all will not see the sun.”

The government is clearly responsible for this incident. And don’t forget since Indonesia follows a presidential form of government, where the president is the supreme commander of the ABRI, the highest responsibility lies with the president.
I come to speak to you here today with some trepidation. Indonesia is not a free country where one can express criticisms of the government without worry about the possible consequences upon one's safety. I have no guarantees of protection. I am not a prominent leader of a mass organization, nor a member of the elite who has high connections. I am an Indonesian from a middle class background who is scared about telling you my honest opinions.

I take this risk because I feel compelled to. I am one of the youths of my country who will have to bear, for many years into the future, the burden of what mistakes and crimes the government is committing today. I take this risk also in the hope that the U.S. government, so long a staunch and powerful supporter of Suharto's militarism, will reform itself and do something to ensure that Indonesia does have a government that respects and guarantees basic civil liberties, such as the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, and the freedom of association.

Military
To understand the Suharto government you have to understand the Indonesian military for we have been living under what is an institutionalized martial law regime for the past thirty years. It is no ordinary military. It has what is officially called a "dual function": external defense and internal policing. Imagine for a moment that the US military had overthrown the US government by staging a coup and orchestrating the slaughter of about 500,000 people. The military then set up headquarters in each state, each county, each city and each town. Imagine that it placed one third to one half of the US military's troops in these headquarters. Imagine that there were no laws governing their actions nor any legislative oversight. Imagine further that the civilian administration was constantly monitored and controlled by the military and that many of the civilian administrators were themselves military officers. If you can imagine this scenario then you have a pretty good idea of how the Indonesian military operates. It is ubiquitous, all-pervasive, and beyond the law.

When the US military speaks about training Indonesian military officers to respect human rights, we can only laugh. The structure of the Indonesian military places it as an all-powerful institution and the laws of our country allow it complete freedom to do what it wills. A few courses in good behavior are not going to alter what it is a very oppressive system of military rule. Besides, we are not even certain that the US military is sincere in claiming that it is providing such training. Given the number of Indonesian officers trained
in the US, we as Indonesians are left to wonder whether, in fact, they learned their torture techniques here. After all, we have heard about what the US military used to teach at the School of the Americas.

The US Congress should feel no qualms about cutting off JCET training if it is thinking about our benefit. Once the JCET training became public knowledge, the Pentagon claimed that it was meant only for the benefit of US soldiers who were given the opportunity to see how another military operates. So, by the Pentagon’s own admission, the training was not designed to help the Indonesian military acquire less brutal habits.

Let us explain how the government instills in us a culture of fear and robs us of our basic civil rights. In response to the student protests sweeping the country, the government has decided to intimidate the students by resorting to the tactic of disappearances. According to the leading legal aid organization in Indonesia (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia), there are fifty persons that have disappeared over the past three months. One student activist who disappeared is Andi Arief. Military personnel kidnapped him from his home, in full view of his family, on March 28. The top generals of our country not only denied that the military had kidnapped him, they joked to the press that he had simply disappeared of his accord. For three weeks, his family, his friends, and his fellow students, worried themselves to the point of exhaustion. Knowing how the military operates, they were concerned for his very survival. On April 22, he turned up in the Jakarta central police station. The police had no arrest warrant and no explanation for how he got there. Andi Arief told his lawyers that he had been kidnapped by the special forces, Kopassus, held for three weeks of interrogation, and then dumped at the police station.

One must note that the military did not break the law by kidnapping these fifty activists because none of the laws of our country apply to the military. Thus, Andi Arief’s parents can not sue Kopassus for arresting their son without a warrant and holding him in detention without a habeas corpus. This is precisely what makes ordinary citizens so terrified of the military: it is unpredictable and unaccountable.

It has been said that one can judge a government by its prisons. Well then, let us look at Indonesian prisons. There we will find people whose only crime was to criticize the government. Sri Bintang Pamungkas, the leader of an independent political party, criticized the government. He is now in Cipinang prison in Jakarta on charges of subversion. Accompanying him in that prison are 12 members of the activism Party (PRD). They committed thought crimes. In the language of the prosecutors, they “deviated from the state ideology.”

There are presently at least twenty-five political prisoners in Indonesia’s prisons, some are in their teens, some in their seventies. Just in the past three months, 250 people have been arrested on political crimes — such heinous crimes as holding peaceful meetings and holding national elections. We have a government that has a pathological fear of any public assembly that it does not control and any public leader who does not grovel before our president. Every single independent political party and trade union has been
systematically destroyed by the government. In regions of the country where there has been serious organized resistance to the government — East Timor, Irian Jaya, Aceh — it has not been satisfied with arrests. It has resorted to massacres.

You can guess what type of society we have. We are a people who are terrified of expressing our own opinions and terrified of getting involved in politics of any kind. Politics for us is a spectator sport — and a cruel sport it is. We are daily bombarded by the statements of officials who are barely literate, barely articulate, and barely educated. When faced with public criticism, they speak of ‘crushing’, ‘smashing,’ and ‘hacking.’ They treat the youths of our country, those in their teens and twenties who are sincerely and peacefully attempting to change this society, as though they were foreign agents bent on subversion. We are not citizens of a state; we are subjects of a modern, militarized sultanate.

It is obvious today that Suharto's reign is coming to a miserable, ignoble end. A necessary condition for democracy in Indonesia is the ending of Suharto's presidency. But it is not a sufficient condition. The military, with its dual function, is prepared to continue Suhartoism without Suharto. What I mean is that the sources of the systematic human rights abuses we see today are not going to vanish with the demise of the Suharto presidency. For genuine democracy to exist in Indonesia, our laws will have to be changed to embody basic principles of human rights and the military will have to be confined to the barracks and put under civilian oversight.

Economics
For the past thirty three years we have been told this system of martial law was necessary for our material benefit. The religion of the government, its legitimating ideology, has been economic development, what is called in Indonesian, pembangunan. But what have we to show for thirty years of development? Two hundred families have fat Swiss bank accounts while millions of people have had their land expropriated. A few timber contractors and palm oil companies have accumulated fortunes while chopping and burning down most of the rain forest. Thirty years of development has meant the victimization of many Indonesians. And we have not heard all their laments precisely because there has been no freedom to criticize what the state calls its 'development program.'

Thirty plus years of development under martial law has meant the accumulation of an enormous debt. For thirty years, the United States, Japan and Europe provided billions of dollars annually as foreign aid to the Suharto regime. The US government has, since Suharto took power in 1965 by ordering the massacre of thousands of people, consistently maintained that his regime provided stability and security. Every single US president since Nixon, including the present incumbent, has, to their shame, celebrated the Suharto regime for its economic accomplishments and political stability. In effect, the US government has said that the Indonesian people were best kept under the thumb of a sultanate and that democracy was opposed to our best interests. US academics and retired Foreign Service personnel, such as those at the US-Indonesia Society here in Washington, have been saying that Indonesians would just have to sacrifice their political freedoms for economic
growth. The economic crisis of the past nine months has put paid to these cynical propositions.

Now, after suffering so that development could proceed, what is the prospect of the Indonesian people under the IMF bailout? In short, we are now expected to suffer even more to pay off a debt that we did not incur. Thanks to the Suharto regime’s deal with the IMF, all Indonesians have been put into debt bondage. Our labor and resources are supposed to be devoted to paying off the debt for the next generation. Meanwhile, those 200 families who contracted the debt have enough money in their own personal accounts to pay it off many times over. Is it possible to deny that this current economic austerity plan by the IMF is a gross injustice? The Indonesian people never approved of accepting all those loans. We weren’t even allowed to know what the government’s economic policy was for all those years. Not even our farcical showcase parliament was given authority over economic policy, nor is it given any authority now. But the IMF is now telling us that we have to share the debt burden equally. While it is apparently acceptable to the IMF that political power is monopolized, it absolutely insists that the debt be democratically distributed. Those governments that have loaned money to the Suharto regime and its crony capitalists for the past thirty years are now supporting the IMF’s agreement. Thus, they appear to us like heroin pushers who, after keeping an addict hooked for years and driving him ever deeper in debt, throw him back on his family when he is near collapse, telling them that they have to foot the bill for his rehabilitation and for all his past debts.

Please do not believe that you are doing us any favors by authorizing money for the IMF loans to Indonesia. We need democracy in order to settle our economic problems but that is not a word you will find in the agreement between Suharto and the IMF. The IMF, with the blessing of the Clinton administration, is actually hoping to engineer an economic recovery under the same political conditions of institutionalized martial law. This is, I assure you, an impossible dream. The protests against the Suharto regime have by now reached the point of no return. The Indonesian people, now that they have had the opportunity to express their long suppressed grievances against this regime, are not going to be satisfied until it falls. Democracy is a rare commodity these days but it is no less vital to us than rice.

It is paradoxical that the IMF is willing to dictate terms to Suharto when it comes to managing the economy but not when it comes to fundamental economic rights, such as the right of workers to organize. The IMF refuses to insist that, as a condition for receiving the loans, the government recognize workers rights. It calls that meddling in the internal affairs of Indonesia — when it already controls the government’s economic policy. If the IMF’s agreement mediated in such a way as to allow the Indonesian people to have a greater voice over economic policy then perhaps the US Congress should support it. But, as it stands, the agreement is a worthless piece of paper signed by a collapsing dictator.

The IMF money is not going to benefit us. As you know, much of the money will be simply transferred to foreign banks that made risky loans to the Indonesian government and Indonesian enterprises. The money will enter Indonesia for a moment and then get
sent back out as debt payments. These payments are supposed to restore "investor confidence" but one has to wonder what kind of investors these are who believe in being rewarded for making bad decisions. It is astonishing that the foreign banks that made risky loans to a corrupt and unstable economic system want to be repaid in full. It is even more astonishing that they want the Indonesian people to pay for their bad decisions.

Look at the tragic conditions Indonesia is now in after thirty years of US-supported stability and development. Indonesia has an abundance of fertile land yet we are now begging other countries to give us supplies of our staple food: rice. The Food and Agricultural Organization estimates that Indonesia needs to be given 2 million tons of rice for the estimated 7.3 million Indonesians who will require "food assistance" within the next year. There is a famine in eastern Indonesia now. We, living in other parts of the country, hardly hear anything about it and what we do hear are government whitewashes. We have been told by the Suharto regime and the US government to exchange our political freedoms for economic prosperity. We have wound up with neither.

Recommendations

As US Congreseemen, you must realize that the only force that the military appears to feel accountable to is the US government. You greatly determine whether the Indonesian government receives economic aid from the IMF and political legitimacy in international forums such as the United Nations. I can assure you that the Suharto regime, feeling entirely unaccountable to the Indonesian people, does feel beholden to the US government. It panics on seeing any sign of displeasure with it here in Washington.

I urge you to listen to more people than just Indonesian government officials and retired State Department officials. Since the government has not allowed for any opposition political leaders or parties to exist, it may seem difficult to know to whom one should listen. I suggest that you listen to those who have had the determination to sacrifice for their beliefs and the bravery to risk military violence to assert what they believe to be the truth. You should listen to people such as Sri Bintang who has demanded the international community refrain from loaning money and giving military aid to Indonesia until a democratic regime can be established. You should especially listen to the youth, such as Pius Lustralanang, and the jailed leaders of the People's Democratic Party (PRD) who have no interests other than those of the nation.”

In conclusion, I would recommend that:

1) The US military not assist the Indonesian military. The US government should restrict itself to civilian relations with Indonesia.

2) The US Congress should not authorize money for the IMF to be loaned to the Suharto regime.
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PREAMBLE

We, Indonesian and non-Indonesian participants representing more than 100 organisations in the 11th conference of the International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development taking place in Germany from May 4-6, 1998, believe that Indonesia is facing a major turning point in its history. The illusion of an economic miracle is gone: more and more Indonesians are finding they can no longer afford basic goods, transport, and health care. Significant gains in poverty alleviation have been eroded. At the same time, the political system seems to be lurching toward breakdown as well. The government appears to be moving toward confrontation with a student movement that is gathering strength and whose demands for political reform have struck a responsive chord across the country. The image of the New Order government abroad has undergone a dramatic shift from one presenting over rapid economic development to one responsible for the Latin American-like disappearances and torture of pro-democracy activists, in the midst of the worst crisis in thirty years.

The economic and ecological crisis is inseparable from the political crisis in Indonesia today. No one believes that economic stability can be restored without fundamental political change that involves respect for fundamental rights, close checks on executive power, full accountability of public officials, an end to corruption and depredation, and the ability of ordinary Indonesians to participate fully in political life. It is no coincidence that Thailand and Korea, with more democratic systems, have been able to move more quickly toward economic recovery, while in Indonesia, the crisis has only deepened.

We believe that we as NGOs, working together with the international community, have a vital role to play in helping Indonesians through the transition and working toward a new, democratic system based on human rights, respect for the rule of law, full political participation, recognition of the existence of indigenous peoples (masyarakat adat), gender equality, and social justice. We seek the cooperation of donor governments and international financial institutions to bring that new system about.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank A.Mukmin Siregar, Minister - Counsellor of the Indonesian embassy in Bonn, for addressing the opening session of our meeting.

POLITICAL REFORM AND HUMAN RIGHTS

All participants agreed that political reform and respect for human rights must be at the top of Indonesia's development agenda. Without such reform, not only are all other development objectives likely to fail, but political stability that constitutes an essential condition for economic development may be undermined. Social and economic frustrations have already erupted in anti-Chinese violence and food riots earlier this year, and further unrest is certain, to the point that there is widespread concern that some form of martial law may be declared, further restricting basic rights. We call on the Indonesian military to refrain from the use of violence in reacting to social unrest. Political reform is not just a long-term desire, it is a short-term necessity for the well-being of all Indonesian citizens. The most crucial elements of reform, in our view, are outlined below.
1. Protection of the three basic freedoms of expression, association, and assembly is key. Protection of these rights has been a demand of INFORM - and its predecessor, INDI - since the second INDI conference in April 1985, but now it has taken on a new urgency. Many observers looking at the ongoing political transition in Indonesia see no viable political alternatives on the horizon. They fail to understand that for the last thirty years, no political development has taken place. Not only are truly independent political parties banned, in violation of freedom of association, but anyone who strives to bring people together for a meeting to work toward democratic goals can face intimidation, harassment, or these days, disappearance. To work toward democracy in Indonesia it is not enough for international donors to fund NGOs in the name of "strengthening civil society." That assistance is welcome and much appreciated, but we need international help in lifting the restrictions that inhibit political development, so that we can work openly, freely, and without fear of repression, to build the political institutions necessary to construct a real democracy.

2. Repeal of the five political laws of 1985 is essential to achieve this end. Those laws froze the political system as it is now, prevent full political participation, restrict the number of political parties at three, and impose a kind of ideological uniformity on all mass organizations. They have destroyed public trust in the government and discouraged some participation in political life. INFORM has recommended the repeal of these laws since 1991. We believe the move toward a more open political system should involve not only the immediate repeal of the 1985 laws, but also the lifting of the de facto or de jure ban on efforts to form independent political parties such as the Indonesian United Democratic Party (PUID). We also call for the repeal of the anti-subversion law, Law No.3/1963, and the anti-terrorist movements of 1965 (Article 154 of the Criminal Code), all of which have been used to restrict political freedom, and we urge that no such laws or offenses be included in the new draft Criminal Code. We also call for the repeal of MPR Decree No.5/1990 giving the president extraordinary powers.

The disappearance of Indonesian activists that have taken place since February underscores the draconian restrictions on political activity in Indonesia and the fact that the current government has lost its legitimacy. Every one of the more than a dozen activists abducted at this point this year and held incommunicado in an unknown location, some of them also tortured, has been active in a political organization; these abductions are clearly designed to deter others from activism. The international community, up to and including the head of the International Monetary Fund, has expressed concern over the disappearances; it would be even more helpful if donor governments would use the COI meeting to collectively call for protection of basic freedoms and the lifting of controls on the political system. We also urge those attending the COI meeting to call for a full, impartial, and independent inquiry into the disappearances cases, to release those currently disappeared, and to bring those responsible to justice. The inquiry must be left to the Indonesian armed forces.

We call for full freedom of expression including academic freedom and the right of students and academics to take an active role in the country's political life, on and off campus. The right to freedom of expression also includes the right to hold peaceful demonstrations in support of political ideas.

Finally, we call on the Indonesian government to cease all forms of arbitrary arrest and detention.

3. We welcome Indonesia's stated intention to ratify major international treaties on human rights and urge that particular priority be given to the speedy ratification and implementation of the Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment, first signed in 1985, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

4. A new law on the presidency is needed, limiting the President to two terms. Indonesia now has one of the longest-serving rulers in the world. A system of direct popular election of political leaders and a restriction on terms that enables a change of government takes place on a regular and systematic basis will better enable Indonesia to overcome the crisis of confidence at home and abroad that is contributing to the current economic crisis.
5. We strongly support moves toward the full separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. In 1991, the 7th INGI conference called for Indonesians "to have the freedom to question or challenge executive decisions and practices without harassment or intimidation both directly or before an independent judiciary and/or through parliament. In order to achieve this, INGI recommends to elect directly local representatives [...], to reduce the proportion of appointed members in parliament at all levels, and to reduce the proportion of military officials in civilian positions." As a rethinking of the electoral system takes place, we urge that any new system be designed to redistribute power, giving more voice and power to the regions, and reflecting more the diversity of Indonesia.

6. Following the recommendation of the 1993 INGI conference in Japan, we call for a significant reduction in the role of the military in government and a redefinition of, the dual role of the military in both security and political affairs. We call on the military to respect human rights and strongly condemn the disproportionate use of lethal force, including the use of live bullets, against students in the current demonstrations.

7. We recommend that all those with aspirations to leadership in a new political system give particular attention to social justice and protection of human rights and develop platforms that take the needs and rights of women, workers (including migrant workers), indigenous people, peasants, and other marginalized groups into account.

8. We call for the release of all political prisoners and detainees.

9. We consider it especially critical to separate the exercise of political functions from private economic interest. The conflation of political office and personal interest is a principal cause of the present economic crisis, increases social injustice and represents a major political obstacle to Indonesia’s economic recovery.

ECONOMIC REFORM AND CORRUPTION

The current economic crisis is causing severe hardship throughout Indonesia and across all social strata. Open unemployment and underemployment have almost doubled since the crisis began. The devaluation of the rupiah and contraction of credit have devastated businesses, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises. Many factory workers have been laid off without severance pay, the minimum wage has been capped for those still employed, and migrant workers have been subjected to mistreatment and forcible repatriation from neighboring countries. Women are differentially affected by the crisis in many ways: female workers are often the first to be laid off, and their reproductive health is compromised by depleted stocks of contraceptives. Children are hurt by the shortage of powdered milk, and rising costs of school supplies.

Linking Economic and Political Reform

The economic crisis, and Indonesia’s inability to respond as effectively as other Asian nations, are both rooted in the delinking of economic development from political development over the last three decades. International financial institutions have attempted to separate economic from political reform agendas, but given the interwoven of economic and political power in Indonesia, such an approach is indefensible and is indeed in part responsible for the current crisis. INFID believes that lasting economic reform can only take place in conjunction with fundamental political reform.
Accordingly, INFD calls on international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and CGI member countries to condition further economic assistance to Indonesia on fundamental political reform. Any further assistance agreements must be fully debated in the Indonesian parliament and structured in such a way as to enable civil society to exercise control over the use of the funds. The agreements should also be structured to avoid the use of public funds to pay private debts, either directly or indirectly. Reform measures should include provision of a social safety net, and maintain public expenditures necessary to protect environmental and social services.

INFD further calls on those institutions — and the national governments that sit on their boards — to improve their own transparency and accountability in order to increase the legitimacy of their exercise of this conditionality. INFD reminds these institutions that to the extent they are perceived to be supporting and colluding with a corrupt and repressive regime, their political credibility and ability to marshal support from the international community to assist other countries will be undermined.

Corruption

The fragility of the Indonesian economy is a result of large scale and widespread corruption. Political interference in the allocation of credit and other economic opportunities — also known as “crony capitalists” — has distorted investment patterns to the detriment of small enterprises, which are the engines of employment creation. The linkage between corruption, collusion, and nepotism in economic policy-making and Indonesia’s uncompetitive manufacturing sector is symbolised by the preferential financing given to the national car project. At the same time, ordinary Indonesians are subjected on a daily basis to a myriad of petty “taxes” in their efforts to obtain services from a corrupt bureaucracy.

Accordingly, INFD calls on the Government of Indonesia to implement fully economic reforms related to:

- the elimination of internal trade barriers that harm small producers;
- the introduction of transparency in privatization processes;
- the institution of competitive bidding practices;
- the dismantling of clove, timber, rattan, and other monopolies, and
- the elimination of favoritism in credit allocation through increased autonomy of the Central Bank.

In addition, INFD calls on the GOI and international donors to include in reform programs deregulation efforts of special significance to vulnerable groups. In particular, the “deregulation for the poor” should target unnecessary licenses, unnecessary fees for licenses, and other opportunities for officials to engage in petty corruption.

The sustainable eradication of corruption from Indonesia will require a manifestation of political will on the part of the country’s leadership as well as an unwillingness to tolerate corrupt practices on the part of Indonesian civil society. Accordingly, INFD calls on Indonesian leaders to take a stand against corruption, and institutionalize this commitment through the establishment of a high-level, independent anti-corruption commission. Those suspected of corruption should be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. INFD further calls on non-governmental organizations to refuse to participate in corrupt practices, improve the transparency of their own operations, and popularize intolerance of corruption throughout Indonesian society.
The international community has an important role to play in fighting corruption in Indonesia. For example, the German government has repeatedly been criticized for allowing a tax deduction for bribes paid abroad. INFID challenges the German government to clearly distance itself from this policy in compliance with the recently concluded OECD treaty on corruption, the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.

In the context of working out Indonesia’s debt, international investors should not be allowed to make the public liable for the risks that they have undertaken by doing business with a corrupt regime. Private financiers should accept their fair share of the losses resulting from the economic crisis, and those losses should not be imposed on tax payers in Indonesia or internationally.

In the context of current emergency assistance to Indonesia, INFID calls on the international community and the Indonesian government to:

- disclose and publicize the content and commitments of all assistance agreements and make the process for concluding those agreements transparent;
- acknowledge and address corruption in the granting and use of donor funds; and
- invest in the establishment of independent monitoring and accountability mechanisms, with direct support for civil society organizations from those donors able to provide such support.

Civil society organizations should monitor government compliance with agreed reforms and donor compliance with agreed conditionalities, and publicize breaches. All organizations should pay special attention to potential new opportunities for corruption created by the economic crisis and the international responses, particularly those related to new inflows of humanitarian assistance and exploitation of labor and of natural resources.

LAND AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

At its 10th Conference, INFID stated that the current development model in Indonesia holds little hope for large numbers of Indonesians because of the unequal distribution of benefits and the repressive methods often used to implement land and development policies. Regarding the interests of Indonesia’s indigenous peoples, INFID expressed its concern that indigenous institutions and systems were not acknowledged and that indigenous peoples were losing their land to industrial and infrastructure development, to forestry, plantation and mining and to commercial real estate. The loss of land threatens the very livelihoods and cultures of indigenous peoples.

INFID believes that the way that the Indonesian government tries to cope with the current crisis will result in an intensification and acceleration of these processes and will have significant long-term impact on the indigenous peoples of Indonesia. In addition to the general hardships experienced by all sections of Indonesian society, indigenous peoples will be burdened with the consequences of accelerated development as Indonesia seeks to generate extra revenue to trade its way out of the crisis through increased exploitation of natural resources, expansion of plantations, mining, and increase in agricultural exports. Business is expected to rush to take advantage of cheap labor, land and abundance of resources. Land for plantations, for example, is to be expanded from 7.4 million hectares to 30 million hectares. Of the 7.4 million hectares, 4 million are palm-oil plantations, 75 percent of which are foreign invested. So far 650 companies have applied for licenses to take advantage of this opportunity. The end result of this accelerated development will be the
displacement of indigenous peoples from their land, the destruction of habitats, indigenous religion and culture, increased land disputes, and alienation.

In view of these concerns, INFID calls on the Indonesian government to halt the expansion of plantations and on the World Bank and IMF to suspend plans for liberalizing investment in the plantation sector. It calls for review and revision of the Agrarian Law in accordance with pluralistic legal principles that characterize various indigenous peoples.

The government should fully respect and protect the right of indigenous peoples to ownership of customary land. It should also amend land-related laws so that this right cannot be easily violated in the name of the ‘national interest.’

The government—specifically the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and the Ministry of Forestry and Plantations—should open dialogue with indigenous peoples and NGOs to review the issue of the concentration of land and forest control, land-grabbing, and the relation between unequal land distribution and poverty. It should also revise the Agrarian and Forestry Laws.

As it has in the past, INFID again urges the government of Indonesia to ratify ILO Convention 169; to support the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples in its present form, and to cease all military involvement in land disputes and forced cultivation of crops as such intervention tends to create violence.

The private sector also must do its share. INFID calls on business companies, and overseas companies in particular, to adopt and implement stricter Codes of Conduct which contain clear commitments to respect indigenous rights, and to uphold best practices on human rights, social policy, environmental standards and accountability. It also calls for these codes to be enforced through independent outside monitoring.

LAND ADMINISTRATION PROJECT

Concerning the Land Administration Project (LAP) which is run by the National Land Agency/Badan Pertanahan Nasional or BPN) with support from the World Bank and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), INFID rejects the application of the project to the indigenous peoples’ land because it will be in conflict with indigenous peoples’ social, cultural, and spiritual relationship to the land and their rights to collective ownership of the land.

In particular, INFID rejects any so-called ‘communal land registration’ procedures that may be recommended in LAP’s “customary land study” because the study has not taken into account customary land tenure systems of indigenous peoples and thus far has not engaged in genuine consultation with the indigenous peoples concerned.

INFID urges the World Bank and AusAID to consult with indigenous peoples and NGOs regarding their concerns about the LAP.
ENVIRONMENT

The current economic and political crisis in Indonesia poses a tremendous threat to the environment. As Indonesia's economy is based on the exploitation of natural resources, economic distress is resulting in the exacerbation of already strong pressures on the environment.

In particular, Indonesia's forest and land-use policies have led to a high rate of deforestation and the recent forest fire disasters, resulting in a change of the local climate, prolonged dry seasons, and food and water shortages. INFID calls on the Government of Indonesia and the international community to focus their response to the fires on preventive measures, including improvement and the enforcement of existing environmental and forest protection laws, and to establish an early warning system to ensure food security. INFID emphasizes the need to address the underlying causes of forest fires, especially large-scale plantation development, and calls for fundamental change in current forest management policies and practices. INFID also calls on the Government of Indonesia and the responsible plantation companies to adhere strictly to the internationally agreed principle that those who destroy the environment should bear the costs, and thus to provide compensation to communities and individuals affected by the fires, both in Indonesia and in neighboring countries.

Large-scale development projects in forested areas have failed to deliver the promised benefits in terms of income and employment for local communities and revenue for the state. Instead, they have resulted in environmental devastation, loss of traditional livelihoods, and the enrichment of a few. Accordingly, INFID calls on the Government of Indonesia to halt the process of developing various projects10, including the one million hectare rice project in Kalimantan and the Mamberamo hydropower project in Irwan Jaya.

The failure of large-scale development projects to deliver promised benefits is particularly evident in the industrial timber and tree crops sectors. The example of Latin America in the 1980s demonstrated that government reliance on export-oriented plantations for debt service can lead to bottlenecks in food production for domestic consumers. Indonesia's plans to rapidly expand large-scale plantations, particularly in light of their connection to recent fires, directly contradict commitments to the principles of sustainable development made by the Indonesian government at the 1992 UNCED conference in Rio.

INFID calls on the Government of Indonesia, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund to cancel the planned expansion and liberalization of investment in the plantation sector, to abolish policies and loans which have a negative impact on forests and indigenous communities, and to support sustainable alternatives such as community-based natural resource management. INFID regards any development assistance to large-scale plantations as counterproductive, and calls on private banks to abstain from financial assistance to the plantation sector because of the high ecological, social and economic costs.

The Indonesian forest products and tree crops sectors are heavily dominated by monopolies which are economically inefficient and socially unjust. INFID calls on the Government of Indonesia to implement agreed commitments to abolish these monopolies. However, the abolition of monopolies must be accompanied by the establishment of an alternative regulatory framework that is transparent and accountable, and by support for small-scale community-based tree crops development.

The commodification of environmental resources without regard for their social and ecological functions has proven unsustainable. In the future, all policies, programs, and projects related to natural resources management must incorporate the principles of social and environmental sustainability. INFID therefore calls for the recognition, promotion, and support of community-based natural resource management systems.
May 7, 1998

STATEMENT OF THE 11TH INFID CONFERENCE ON EAST TIMOR

INFID deplores the continuing violation of human rights in East Timor, including extrajudicial killings, disappearances, arbitrary detentions and the violation of the rights of women including sexual violence;

INFID regretts that the Indonesian government has failed to implement most undertakings made at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights;

INFID notes that according to international law, East Timor is a non-self-governing territory whose status is not resolved. One important step toward resolution would be the exercise of the right to self-determination through a mechanism that is just and peaceful and that can be accepted by the international community.

In addition, recognising the long standing effort by East Timorese people and by Indonesian and non-Indonesian NGOs to promote and protect the human rights, and in the interests of seeking a just and peaceful solution of the problem of the people of East Timor,

Witnessing the emergence of more and more voices in the democratisation movement in Indonesia for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in East Timor,

And supporting the efforts of the UN secretary general for achieving a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution to the question of East Timor,

INFID calls on the government of Indonesia:

- to approach negotiations in a spirit of renewed commitment, and to facilitate wider and deeper East Timorese participation in any further initiatives;
- to implement all the resolutions and chairman’s statements adopted at the UN Commission on Human Rights;
- to take unconditional measures to improve the human rights situation in East Timor;
- to immediately and unconditionally release those East Timorese detained or convicted for political reasons;
- to ensure that all East Timorese in custody are treated humanely and in accordance with international standards, and that trials are similarly conducted according to international norms;
- to stop oppressing and intimidating East Timorese and Indonesians working to protect and promote the human rights of the people of East Timor;
- to invite the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to East Timor as soon as it can be arranged and to enable the working group to present its report at the 55th session of the UNCHR;
- to demilitarise the territory, reducing both Indonesian regular troop numbers and immediately disbanding existing paramilitary organisations such as Gardapakai and Halilintar;
• to respect the right of East Timorese people to determine their future and manage their own lives economically, socially and culturally, and to ensure that no development project involving land acquisition or major Indonesian or foreign investment takes place without the full participation of the affected people in the decision-making process.
• to refrain from implementing government sponsored transmigration programmes
• to respect the freedom of expression, association and assembly and refrain from intervening in events organised outside Indonesia that involve peaceful expression of support and solidarity for the people of East Timor,
• to respect the rights of the Indonesian to be and remained fully informed on what is happening in East Timor

INFID calls on the international community,

• to stop providing arm and military assistance to Indonesia;

• to make every effort to persuade the Indonesian government to enter into negotiations with the other parties directly involved.
MIGRANT WORKERS

MIFID expressed deep concern about the mistreatment of Indonesian migrant workers. Migrant workers - especially women - are subject to underpayment, arbitrary detention, discrimination, sexual abuse, abusive labour conditions, and in most countries domestic workers have no protection or recognition under the law.

The economic crisis in Indonesia and the region has sharply worsened the plight of migrant workers. Large numbers of Indonesians have worked abroad for many years, sometimes in long-term employment. Following the economic crisis, they were the first to lose their jobs. The return of so many workers to Indonesia sharply worsened domestic unemployment - and made their own and their families' position extremely precarious. Confronted by unemployment and impoverishment, many have little choice but to try to go abroad again to find work, even though most governments in the region have introduced increasingly restrictive draconian policies to restrict the arrival of Indonesian and other non-local labour.

The movement of migrant workers and illegal emigrants from Indonesia is organized by numerous labour recruiters across the country. The evidence suggests that some of these companies work in collusion with corrupt security officials or unscrupulous employers to entrap labourers into working conditions that are insecure, into jobs that do not exist, or into positions where they may be arrested for illegal entry into Malaysia and other countries. These people are extremely vulnerable, driven as they are to seek work abroad by the level of unemployment at home.

We urge the Indonesian Government to take action to stop abuses by recruiting agents, and we urge all organizations that recruit Indonesian workers, or protect and monitor the movement of migrant workers, to give particular attention to their rights at this very difficult period.

We are particularly concerned by the abuses against Indonesian nationals that took place during recent forced repatriations from Malaysia in late March. These abuses included:

- Excessive use of force by Malaysian police against Indonesians resisting deportation;
- Failure of the Malaysian authorities to provide adequate medical care to those injured in riots in the Seremban, Manchester, Kuala Lumpur and June camps, to the point that two migrant workers died of their wounds.
- Failure to allow the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to interview asylum-workers from Aceh.
- Deportation of some Indonesians who had already been acknowledged as refugees by the UNHCR.
- Seizure of personal belongings, including money of migrants, before deportation.
- Sexual harassment of Indonesian women workers.

The conditions in which groups of workers are employed, arrested and re-employed in rotation, in parts of Malaysia, are entirely unacceptable.

We urge the Malaysian Government to allow the UNHCR regular access to immigration detention camps in Malaysia to evaluate any claims for refugee status, and to conduct an independent investigation into the violence on March 26th. We hope such an investigation would include representatives of both Malaysian and Indonesian NGOs, as well as international agencies. We urge the security forces of Malaysia, who are involved in arrest, detention and deportation, to respect the Code of Law Enforcement Officials.

Finally, we urge all countries to ratify the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families.
May 8, 1998

Dear Senator:

Re: International Monetary Fund supplemental funding

The attached letter from national environmental organizations has been sent to the Members of the House. We urge the House to oppose the increased funding requested by the Administration for the IMF unless disbursement of funds is conditioned upon implementation of key accountability provisions to ensure that IMF operations do not undercut or override environment, labor and human rights laws and standards at home and abroad.

We hope that Senators will work with conference committee members to ensure that any bill that includes IMF funding also accomplishes the objectives described in this letter.

Sincerely,

Brent Blackwelder
President
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH-US

Barbara Bramble
Director, International Affairs
NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION

On behalf of:

ACCOUNTING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT -- ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS NETWORK -- NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL
SIERRA CLUB -- WESTERN ANCIENT FOREST CAMPAIGN
Dear Representative:

Re: International Monetary Fund supplemental funding

In anticipation of consideration by the House of funding requested for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by the Administration, our organizations would like to share with you our deep concerns about the social and environmental impacts of the Fund's actions. We fear that increased funding for the IMF, combined with several harmful conditions that expand its jurisdiction, in particular over liberalization of capital and investment flows—the same liberalization that is being sought under the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)—would, if adopted, cause the IMF to bring about even greater environmental and social damage than it has up to now.

We therefore urge you to oppose increased funding for the IMF and an expansion of the IMF's jurisdiction over international capital flows unless it incorporates the key accountability provisions and safeguards described below.

The policies that the IMF requires of borrowing countries often compound or provoke environmental and social problems, to which the Fund is blind and for which it is not held accountable. For example, the current IMF conditions required of Indonesia include expansion of exports in the palm oil sector, in spite of the fact that many of the forest fires are set by palm oil plantation owners. IMF-imposed austerity measures at the same time aggravate the poverty that is the other major factor driving the forest fires. The result: irretrievable loss of native forests and critical ecosystems including water supplies, as well as large health, social and economic costs for the people in Indonesia and the region—in short, a costly bill which the Fund is neither being asked to foot or told to avoid.

It would be irresponsible to increase funding for the IMF and expand its mandate to further promote unfeathered trade and capital flows, without first requiring an assessment of the full impacts and costs of its operations.
On behalf of our over four million members and supporters, we therefore urge the House to:

(1) **Withhold the Administration's $18 billion request for the IMF until the legislation described below is implemented.**

The IMF has largely ignored previous Congressional "voice and vote" requirements. Only when Congress withheld disbursement of funds, in 1994, did the IMF accede to a Congressional request to release a specific set of documents, the "Recent Economic Developments." Congress should therefore not disburse any funds until the required reforms are implemented by the IMF, and their implementation verified by the US Treasury and the General Accounting Office.

(2) **Enact legislation to ensure:**

--- **that the IMF operates with respect for international and domestic laws on protection of the environment, labor and human rights.**

Alarmingly, the Senate-approved IMF language requires the IMF to force open trade and investment in borrowing countries and potentially override international and national laws regarding labor rights, human rights and protection of the environment, in effect requiring the IMF to apply a form of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) with teeth. Instead, borrowing countries should be required, as a minimal safeguard, to be in compliance with international labor, human rights and environmental agreements.

--- **that the IMF operates with full transparency vis-a-vis the US and all its members.**

Currently, Senate-approved language only asks the IMF to provide access to IMF documents by the US government. Transparency should be a condition for the disbursement of funds, otherwise it is unlikely to be implemented by the IMF. Documents that should be made public include Article IV Consultations, Letters of Intent, Policy Framework Papers, Staff Reports, evaluation documents and development and interim committee reports.

Moreover, the IMF should establish this comprehensive disclosure policy for all member countries, not just the US, to ensure public participation and IMF transparency regarding structural adjustment programs and other far-reaching IMF programs in the borrowing countries themselves.

--- **that the IMF operate with full accountability vis-a-vis the US and all its members.**

The IMF currently operates without independent evaluation of its operations, and without any mechanism to allow the public to hold the IMF accountable for its actions. The IMF should therefore be requested to establish an independent evaluation unit to assess IMF performance and effectiveness, including impacts of its policies and programs on the poor, on employment, and the environment. The IMF should also establish an appeals or inspection panel empowered to receive and investigate complaints.
that the IMF, audited by the US Treasury and General Accounting Office, undertake social and environmental impact assessments and account for the full cost of alternative policies.

The Senate-approved language makes no explicit requirement for full cost assessments of IMF operations, whether by the IMF or by a US agency. Yet the economic costs of IMF operations can be substantial, as recent Congressional hearings have made clear. Social and environmental impacts can further augment such costs. Prudent fiscal management requires that these be identified and prevented, by undertaking assessments of alternative policies before these are applied.

Environmental impact assessments are a requirement for major government actions, in the US as well as in many countries due to domestic and international law. The IMF as an agent of these governments should be bound by the laws and requirements that bind its government principals.

that the IMF and the US Treasury set minimum international financial and national income accounting guidelines, to require better accounting and disclosure for environmental impacts and costs of operations and policies.

Currently, it is difficult if not impossible for investors to assess and compare financial statements and environmental performance of corporations and banks across different nations, and thus to make informed decisions about the sustainability of their investments. Moreover, it is difficult to assess and compare the genuine economic performance of countries because variables such as GDP do not fully measure economic progress. In particular these measures say nothing about environmental and other costs of growth, which are often substantial.

The IMF should be required to improve accounting and disclosure guidelines, and request such improvements of borrowing countries, so that the sustainability of a sector or country can be better assessed by all investors. This is of particular importance in the present context of expanding international capital flows. Congress has already asked the IMF in 1989 and 1992 to seek revisions in national income accounting systems to track depletion and degradation of natural resources, and therefore better represent a country's economic condition, yet the IMF has ignored these legislative instructions.

By taking these steps, the House will ensure strict implementation of the mission of the IMF, which is to provide lending "under adequate safeguards" to correct short-term balance of payments problems (IMF Articles of Agreement I), and will prevent IMF actions from undercutting the efforts of the United States to support basic accountability, labor, and environmental standards at home and abroad.
Sincerely,

Brent Blackwelder
President
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH-US

Carl Pope
Executive Director
SIERRA CLUB

Christine Real de Azua
Project Director
ACCOUNTING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT

Bruce Rich
Senior Attorney and Director
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Owen Lamners
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INTERNATIONAL RIVERS NETWORK

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Statement to the House Committee on International Relations
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights
Human Rights in Indonesia
May 7, 1998

Indonesia is facing not just an economic crisis but also a growing human rights crisis. In a statement released today in Bonn, Germany, the International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID), composed of more than 100 Indonesian and non-Indonesian NGOs, issued a call for "urgent reform of the Indonesian political system," declaring that "Indonesia is facing a major turning point in its history." It said that without a loosening of political controls, economic recovery was at risk. It pointed out that "protection of the three basic freedoms of expression, association and assembly is key...For the last thirty years, no political development has taken place. Not only are truly independent political parties banned, but anyone who tries to bring people together for a meeting to work toward democratic goals can face intimidation, harassment, or these days, disappearance."

The most tangible symptom, but by no means the only symptom, of the crisis is the series of tense confrontations taking place daily between students and police and military troops on campuses across the country. Before Indonesia's parliament re-appointed President Soeharto to a seventh five-year term in early March, significant protest activity was taking place on about a dozen campuses. Today, the protests are taking place on over 80 campuses, with students from hundreds of institutions joining the protests. On many days, major protests take place on ten or more campuses simultaneously. Students are calling for Soeharto to step down, imposition of more aggressive price controls on basic commodities, and an end to corruption, nepotism and economic collusion. Many of the student groups are also demanding more representative institutions, respect for citizen autonomy, and guarantees for basic rights.

The student protest movement has become a nationwide political force in Indonesia because other political outlets are closed. Even as calls for reform mounted in the run-up to the March parliamentary session, however, the government was stepping-up its use of repressive laws and intimidation of political opponents. By mid-February, efforts to bring together prominent opposition figures in a united front to challenge the leadership fell apart. When the parliament met in early March, electing Soeharto to another 5-year term without a dissenting vote and rejecting all
proposals for reform, the center of political activity shifted to the student movement.

To date, the government has used repression, threats and promises of reform in an effort to contain the protests. It has tried to contain the movement by force, banning public marches by students nationwide and stationing hundreds of riot police and troops at campuses across the country. The security presence at campus gates has become a magnet for the protesters' anger and, increasingly, a flashpoint for violence. Far from containing the movement, the government's response appears if anything to have pushed toward increased violence, as witnessed by the sharp increase in both the number of violent confrontations and the level of violence since late April. Some students are now using Molotov bombs as well as stones, and security forces increasingly responding to the protests with rubber bullets, and apparently, at times, live ammunition. There have been at least thirty major clashes between students and security forces since mid-March, and dozens of less serious skirmishes. According to Indonesian news reports, over 800 students and at least 100 security personnel have been injured in the clashes, and at least 100 of these injuries have been treated at hospitals, many with serious facial and head wounds.

The government has also tried to deter the protests through fear. It has threatened to expel students who engage in political activity on campus, has issued ominous warnings that the protests have been infiltrated by communists, and has repeatedly stated that military forces will take "repressive" action against protesters who leave campus grounds. There is also evidence that the forced abduction and subsequent "disappearance" of over a dozen of prominent opposition organizers since early February was the work of military or para-military forces, though some of them have surfaced in recent days. Student leaders have responded by ignoring the warnings, and by suggesting that the abductions are proof either of the government's lack of respect for law or its loss of control of its own personnel.

Earlier this month, the government began to work through the legislature to implement some of the reforms sought by student protesters and opposition leaders, including removal of some of the barriers to political competition that currently constrain Indonesia's two recognized opposition parties. Because President Soeharto has just been re-elected, however, election law reform, even if enacted, will not take effect until elections scheduled for 2002. The government has also indicated that it will consider reform of Indonesia's vaguely worded anti-subversion law, one of several powerful tools the government has used to silence peaceful political dissent. The government has not made a broader commitment to implementing protections for citizens' basic freedoms. It has not suggested that it will replace a spate of other laws, regulations and decrees that severely constrain freedom of expression, association and assembly, and has not offered to release political prisoners currently being held under such laws.

Human Rights Watch/Asia believes that at least some of the recent violence might have been avoided through principled implementation of respect for basic freedoms. Immediate implementation of protections for citizens' basic civil and political rights must be an essential part of efforts to diffuse the crisis without an eruption of even more significant violence. Human Rights Watch fully endorses the call for such protections made today by the International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID). The statement calls on the international community for "help in lifting the restrictions that inhibit political development, so that we can work openly, freely, and
without fear of repression, to build the political institutions necessary to construct a real democracy."

The most pressing need in Indonesia today is implementation of a principled distinction between citizens’ exercise of basic rights, which must be protected, and acts of violence, which should be punished to the full extent of the law, in accordance with internationally recognized standards of criminal justice, no matter who is the perpetrator of that violence. Human rights law requires that the government respect students’ right to freedom of assembly, including their right to hold public protest marches. The U.S. government, and other key donors, should continue to speak out on behalf of those rights.
Letter from 55 NGOs from 19 Countries to IMF Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, and World Bank President, James D. Wolfensohn

Africa Water Network (Kenya), Bank Monitoring Unit (K:oya), Berne Declaration (Switzerland), Center for International Environmental Law (US), Conservation Chair Andrew Mason (US), Center of Concern (US), Down to Earth-the International Campaign for Ecological Justice in Indonesia (England), Edmonton Friends of the North Environmental Society (Canada), Elk Valley Branch of the East Kootenay Environmental Society (Canada), Environmental Investigation Agency Ltd (UK), Friends of the Earth (France), Friends of the Earth (US), Forest Peoples Programme UK (England), Forest Stewardship Council (Ireland), Ferv/WRM (United Kingdom), Fukuoka NGO Forum on the ADB (Japan), Friends of the Earth the Netherlands (Netherlands), Friends of the Oldman River (Canada), Friends of Siberian Forests (Russia), Friends of the Earth International (France), Federal Land Action Group New York (US), Green Korea United (South Korea), Galway One World Centre (Ireland), Irish Woodworkers for Africa (Ireland), INFID The Hague (Netherlands), INFID Indonesian (Indonesia), INHURED International (Nepal), International Rivers Network (US), Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society (Japan), Japan NGO Network on Indonesia (Japan), Komitee Indonesia (Netherlands), MFI-Program Both ENDS (Netherlands), Leavenworth Audubon Adopt-a-Forest (US), National Wildlife Federation (US), Netherlands Committee for IUCN (Netherlands), Pesticide Action Network North America Regional Center (US), People’s Forum 2001 (Japan), Pacific Asia Resource Center (PARC) (Japan), Rainforest Foundation International (US), Researcher Bank Monitoring Unit c/o Africa Water Network (Kenya), Red de Informacion Rural Universidad Metropolitana (Mexico), Rainforest Information Center (Australia), Rainforest Relief (US), R.F.K Memorial Center for Human Rights (US), Sierra Club (US), Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (Sweden), South and Meso American Indian Rights Center (SAIC) (US), THE BORNEO PROJECT of Earth Islaki Institute (US), Tutu Student Nature Protection Group (Estonia), The Arctic to Amazonia Alliance (US), The Slovak Union Association (Slovakia), Watch Indonesian Haus der Demokratie (Germany), World Rainforest Movement International (United Kingdom), Worldview Temple (US), Wetlands Preserve New York (US), Yayasan SAMA (Indonesia)

Mr. Michel Camdessus
Managing Director
International Monetary Fund
700 19th Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20431

Mr. James D. Wolfensohn
President
The World Bank Group
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Camdessus and Mr. Wolfensohn,

We are writing on behalf of fifty-five environmental, development, and human rights organizations, with over six million members and supporters in nineteen countries, concerning ongoing IMF and World Bank lending to Indonesia. Given the rapid pace at which events are unfolding and the enormous levels of public funding involved, we have a number of urgent concerns regarding the environmental, social and economic viability of IMF and Bank loans associated with the Indonesian crisis.

April 16, 1998

Mr. Michel Camdessus

Managing Director
International Monetary Fund
700 19th Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20431

Mr. James D. Wolfensohn

President
The World Bank Group
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Camdessus and Mr. Wolfensohn,
We believe that much in the current approach of the Fund and Bank, especially loan conditions and policies concerning the dismantling of monopolies and cartels and the elimination of government subsidies for large projects, has promise for promoting long overdue economic reforms that will also entail very important positive environmental and social benefits. We are very concerned, however, that the environmental and social situation may deteriorate even further if there is lack of political will, consistency, and monitoring to ensure that IMF/Bank funds will not be disbursed if these reforms are not fully implemented. In addition, there are some elements of the Fund/Bank package that are likely to have serious adverse environmental and social impacts, namely the explicit encouragement under current conditions of expansion of investment in palm oil. Finally, we are concerned about the need for greater transparency in Fund and Bank operations in Indonesia and elsewhere, both as a condition for public lending to borrowing governments, and for the Bretton Woods institutions themselves.

We would like to briefly summarize these concerns, and the recommendations that ensue from them. Attached is a more detailed memorandum and annexes that analyze and document more fully the issues.

1. The January, 1998 IMF agreement with Indonesia explicitly calls for removing "all formal and informal barriers to investment in palm oil plantation." Under current conditions, we believe there are extremely serious environmental, social, and economic risks associated with an IMF push for expansion of the oil palm sector. A significant part of last year's Indonesian forest fires were associated with plantation expansion, including palm oil, and there are growing reports of new fires, and reports of recent attempts at forced plantation establishment on the forested lands of indigenous peoples in Indonesian Borneo in the wake of the IMF letter of intent.

2. We believe that a critical aspect of the credibility and potentially positive environmental and social effects of IMF/WB economic liberalization conditions is linked to terminating government subsidies for two planned mega-projects. The first is a one million hectare rice project in Kalimantan peat swamp forests, and the second a planned one million hectare plantation project in Irian Jaya. Both projects have disastrous implications for tropical forest resources, the sustainability of indigenous local economies, and risk expanded mass forest fires that will damage not just national, but regional economic well-being.

3. We are concerned over the lack of success of the IMF in ensuring the implementation of its requirements concerning the disbanding of government sponsored monopolies and cartels. A number of these monopolies have been the cause of massive environmental and social destruction, as well as engendering huge economic inefficiencies. On April 4, 1998, the Directors of a leading Indonesian economic think tank, Econit, publicly stated that "the IMF package would very unlikely directly address the main cause of the crisis, namely 'free, unbridled crony capitalism.'" There is an urgent need to ensure consistent, credible, and thorough implementation and monitoring.
4. We are concerned that standard Bank environmental and social directives do not apply to Structural Adjustment Loans. Recent reports indicate that the World Bank is preparing two rapidly disbursing $1 billion Structural Adjustment Loans for Indonesia to be made prior to July, 1998. Initial reports indicate portions of these loans may support privatization of oil palm plantations, and that at least $600 - 700 million may go for balance of payment support purposes. Under current governance conditions in Indonesia, and in the absence of implementation of Bank environmental and social policies, these loans would appear to have little to do with the World Bank's mandate of poverty alleviation and environmentally sustainable development. We are particularly concerned by the lack of publicly available information from the Bank on the proposed loans, which would violate standard Bank public information and disclosure policies, except that Bank staff have indicated that these policies do not apply to Structural Adjustment Loans. We are also concerned about initially reported plans for rapid one-tranche disbursement, which would eliminate effective mechanisms for monitoring of loan implementation and forestall remedies for non-implementation, such as halting disbursements.

5. The Fund and Bank should insist on more rigorous standards of financial transparency and accountability for borrowers--and for themselves--than in the past. They should refuse to disburse public funds to governments that do not take actions to meet such standards, including civil service reform and the dismantling of nepotistic government monopolies. These conditions currently characterize the situation in Indonesia. There is growing worldwide concern that the Fund in particular has not undertaken long overdue reforms to ensure greater transparency and accountability concerning its own operations, a lacuna which undermines the credibility and efficacy of the advice it proffers to its borrowers.

Therefore, we offer the following recommendations:

1. In the absence of meaningful, enforceable environmental and social conditionality tied explicitly into IMF and Bank loan disbursement schedules, we call for a halt to any direct or indirect encouragement by the Bretton Woods Institutions for the expansion or privatization of the Indonesian palm oil sector. Loan conditionality should include the prerequisites of an open, transparent, and participatory system of land use planning, one which recognizes the adat land and forest tenure of indigenous forest communities.

2. We call for IMF and World Bank Indonesian loan conditions to include the cessation of all direct and indirect subsidies -- including those to the private sector, through the "Reforestation Fund", and through the Ministry of Transmigration -- to the immensely damaging one million hectare projects in Central Kalimantan and Irian Jaya. These projects substantially risk the further irreparable depletion of Indonesia's resource base, the destruction of local indigenous economies, and as more fires rage out
of control in the mega-project areas, will have a negative impact on regional ASEAN economies as well.

3. We call for the disbanding of the plywood, rattan, paper, and other monopolies and cartels as a litmus test for determining whether further disbursements of IMF, World Bank, ADB and other public multilateral and bilateral funds (which are not designated for direct poverty relief) should be made in Indonesia. "Direct poverty relief" means food and medical supplies and job creation. In the interests of protecting the needs of the poor, we urge the IMF and the Bank not to push Indonesia rapidly to withdraw subsidies for basic food commodities and unleaded fuel.

4. We call for existing World Bank environmental and social policies and procedures (i.e. Operational Directives, Operational Policies and Bank Procedures) to be applied directly to Structural Adjustment Loans, including those planned for Indonesia. We call for a halt to plans for the rapid disbursement of large Bank loans to the Indonesian Government, which are not subject to Bank environmental and social policies (transparency, public information, effects on indigenous peoples, resettlement, etc.), unless the loans are purely for direct poverty alleviation (i.e. food supplies, medical supplies, job creation). The disbanding of the monopolies and cartels must be a prerequisite for the disbursement of any other funds, including balance of payments and structural adjustment loans.

5. We call for the Bank and the Fund to ensure that loans to Indonesia during the current crisis are accompanied by rigorous, monitorable, enforceable measures to promote civil service reform, greater financial accountability and transparency, and respect for good governance and human rights. The World Bank should follow its own public information policy in the proposed billion dollar adjustment loans and all other loans in the current crisis. We urge the IMF and the World Bank to promote the establishment of an Independent Anti-Corruption Commission, to prevent the "leakage" of funds, and work towards the creation of a clean and accountable government bureaucracy.

Finally, the IMF should undertake long overdue reforms to ensure transparency and public access to information concerning its activities. The IMF should make publicly available the Policy Framework Papers and Letters of Intent at the time of the signing of loan agreements. Article IV Consultations, evaluation and audit documents, Interim Committee and Development Committee documents and Staff Country reports should also be made publicly available following Board discussion of such documents. In the case of Indonesia, the Fund should respond to repeated requests by Indonesian and other civil society organizations and NGO's for direct meetings in Indonesia and abroad. The Fund should also undertake major reforms to promote a more participatory, open process and involve elements of civil society in the formulation of its policies and recommendations for borrowing nations.
Thank you very much for your attention. We look forward to hearing your responses to our concerns.

Sincerely,

Stephanie Fried, Ph.D.
Staff Scientist
International Program
Environmental Defense Fund

On behalf of:

John Seed, John Revington,
Director
Rainforest Information Center
Australia

David J. Parker, Treasurer
Edmonton Friends of the North
Environmental Society
Canada

Erica Konrad
Elk Valley Branch of the East
Kootenay Environmental Society
Canada

Cliff Wallis, President,
Friends of the Oldman River
Canada

Peep Mardiste, Project
Manager
Tanu Student Nature
Protection Group
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James Barnes, Counselor
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Watch Indonesia!
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Asmara Nababan, Secretary
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Dr. Kenji Ago, Chairman
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Roman Havlcek, Coordinator
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Lee Taehwa, International Coordinator
Green Korea United
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Goran Eklof, Head of
North/South Department
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Peter Bosshard, Secretary
Berne Declaration
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Frances Carr, Campaigner.
Down to Earth - the International Campaign for Ecological Justice in Indonesia.
United Kingdom

Steve Trent, Campaigns Director
Environmental Investigation Agency
United Kingdom

Saskia Ottinga
FERN/ World Rainforest Movement
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Marcus Colchester,
Forest Peoples Programme
United Kingdom

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World Rain Forest Movement
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Erik van Lennep, Executive Director
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Jim Puckett, Director
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United States

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Attachments:

Memorandum: Environmental and Social Concerns Relating to IMF and World Bank Lending in the Indonesia Crisis

Appendix 1: Plantations and Forest Fires. Includes: CIFOR Reports, Senator Max Baucus ASEAN report, photographs of plantations burning.

Appendix 2: Environmental, Social, Economic Impact of Megaproject in Central Kalimantan.


Appendix 4: Good Governance, Transparency, and Democracy. Includes: Statement on IMF by Indonesian environmental, development, and legal organizations.

Cc: Executive Directors of the World Bank Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund Jean-Michel Severino, Vice President, East Asia & Pacific Regional Office, World Bank Ismail Serageldin, Vice President for Special Projects, World Bank Dennis De Tray, Indonesia Director, World Bank Stanley Fischer, First Deputy Managing Director, IMF Hubert Neiss, Asia and Pacific Department, IMF Mr. Kadhim Al-Eyd, Indonesia Senior Resident Representative, IMF United States Departments of State, Treasury, Council on Environmental Quality Members of Congressional Appropriations Committees Members of House International Relations Committee Members of Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Bisnis Keluarga Empat Menko: Feisal Tanjung, Haryono Suyono, Ginanjar, dan Hartarto

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Oleh George J. Aditjondro /by George J. Aditjondro

[This document is only available in Indonesian. Highlights include reports that:

- In January Menko Polkam Feisal Tanjung transferred $50 million via Bank Niaga to a Singapore financial institution (Asian Currency Unit);
- Haryono Suyono (Menko Kesra), oversees Depts. of Health, Birth Control - after he assumed office, the birth control injection trade was transferred to a company, PT Triasa, owned by his child ("anak" in Indonesian means son/daughter, can't identity gender); He arranged for the transfer of a condom factory in Banjaransari formerly managed by Perum Kimia Farma (parastatal?) which was funded by the World Bank to a business owned by Suharto's son, Bambang. Haryono Suyono is also the treasurer of a "social foundation", YDKM, headed by Suharto.
- Ginanjar Kartasasmita: a key player in the Medco conglomerate which consists of 62 firms and has oil operations in Burma, Turkmenistan and Khazakstan with an annual turnover of Rp 650 billion. Former Minister of Transmigration Siswono, Tutut's husband, Hitler Singawinata are shareholders. Pages and pages of information on business dealings of his family.
- Hartarto - his two sons are reported to have extensive business dealings with companies associated with Suharto sons; together with Tunky Ariwibowo he is reported to receive substantial kick-backs from fertilizer factories and other factories, including PT Krakatau Steel.]

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Bisnis Keluarga Empat Menko: Feisal Tanjung, Haryono Suyono, Ginanjar, dan Hartarto


Kendati demikian, khalayak ramai barangkali belum banyak mengenal wajah lain dari ketiga Menteri Koordinator yang baru diangkat oleh Suharto, yakni Feisal Tanjung (Menko Polkam), Haryono Suyono (Menko Kesra), Ginanjar Kartasasmita (Menko Ekuin/ Ketua Bappenas), dan Hartarto (Menko Pengawasan Pembangunan dan Penertiban Aparatur Negara). Seberapa "bersih" mereka dari kepentingan bisnis raksasa, khususnya bisnis keluarga mereka sendiri?
Kanindotex yang tadinya juga milik Robby Tjahjadi – diambil alih oleh Bamamp Trihatmodjo bersama tiga partner barunya (Bambang R. Sugorno, Yohannes B. Kotjo, dan Wasnu Suhardono), Mayalaxdian dan Kanindotex dilebur menjadi PT Apac Centertext Corporation (ACC). Saat itu, nama Anne Kartasasmita menghilang dari daftar komisaris perusahaan itu.


Modal awal perusahaan-nya, Diaco Alamita Suana (DAB), yang bergerak dalam pengeboran minyak, petrokimia, dan reyakan lainnya, konon hasil tabungan saat ia menjadi promotor pertunjukan Rhoma Irama tahun 1988. Di luar perusahaan-nya sendiri, ia juga eksekutif pemasaran PT Sentrafood Indonusa, yang termasuk kelompok Medco (konsi antara Arifin Panigoro, Eddy Kowara Adiwinita, dan Siswono Judosodo).

Akhimya, Agum Gumiwang Kartasasmita, putera Ginanjar sendiri, juga berniat terjun ke dunia bisnis, dengan mengambil alih kelompok Golden Key warisan Eddy Tanzil yang telah lari (atau dibikat lari?) ke luar negeri. Dia itu boss PT Agusmas Gumiwang. Pernyataan dalam rencana pengambilalihan ini, yang diumumkan awal Maret 1997, adalah Fadel Muhammad dari kelompok Bukaka, yang batal menguasai 85% saham Golden Key baru, Ramlies Manampang, 25%, dan Agus Gumiwang "cumai" 10%. Tiga sekawan itu berjanji pada Bapindo akan melunasi hutang Golden Key sebesar Rp 1,4 trilyun, kemudian akan segera menanam Rp 25 miliar untuk mengoptimalkan operasi tiga anak perusahaan Golden Key, PT Glassfrindo Indah, PT Materindo SMW, dan PT Sukma Beta Sampurna.


Keluarga Baramuli sendiri juga tak lepas dari kepentingan dagang dengan keluarga Suharto. Emir Baramuli, putera Arnold, adalah partner bisnis Ari Haryo Wibowo, cucu Suharto, dalam bisnis cukai minuman keras yang masih bertahan di Timor Leste serta monopoli impor obat-obatan tradisional Cina
Feisal Tanjung:


Haryono Suyono:

Dengan "naik pangkat" dari Ketua BKKBN menjadi Menko Kears, yang a.i. membangun Menteri Kesehatan, Ketua BKKBN, dan Menteri Sosial, kemungkinan berbisnis bagi keluarga Haryono Suyono semakin meluas.

Misyainya, yang sempat saya lacak lewat sumber-sumber di jaringan e-mail, pembuat obat kontrasepsi suntik yang semula diperoleh oleh Rukmini Abidin (PT Tunggal) sekarang dialihkan ke PT Triasa, milik anak Haryono Suyono. Kenaikan pangkat dari Ketua BKKBN menjadi Menko Kesra, tentunya tak terlepas dari "upeti" yang telah dibayar Haryono Suyono pada bosannya, Suharto. Pabrik kondom Banjaran semula dikelola oleh Perum Kinia Farma, kemudian oleh Haryono Suyono dialihkan kepada Bambang Tri (Bimantara grup).
Itu terjadi tanpa serah terima yang jelas mengenai pengembalian utang dan pembagian keuntungan. Padahal model diulang dari Bank Dunia, yang berarti dibayar oleh rakyat dari uang pajak mereka.

Haryono Suyono sekarang makin akrab hubungannya dengan Bambang Trihatmodjo. Soalnya, di Yayasan Dana Kesejahteraan Mandiri (YDKM), satu di antara belasan "yayasan sosial" yang dikelola Suharto sendiri, Haryono Suyono menjadi wakil bendahara, mendampingi putra bossnya yang jadi bendahara yayasan itu.

Ginanjar Kartasasmita:

Nama Ginanjar Kartasasmita tercantum sebagai salah satu "orang kunci" (key person) kelompok Medco. Konglomerat yang beranggotakan 62 perusahaan, yang antara lain bergerak dalam pertambangan minyak di Burma, Turkmestan dan Kazakhstan dengan taksiran omset (estimated turnover) sebesar Rp 650 milyar tahun 1996, dipimpin oleh Ir. Anfin Panigoro. Pengusaha berumur 53 tahun ini belakangan diperangkap oleh tentara karena kedekatannya dengan tokoh Muhammadiyah, Dr Amlen Rais, dan karena ikut menandatangani petisi alumni ITB yang menolak pencalonan kembali Suharto sebagai Presiden.

Orang-orang kunci lain dalam belakang Anfin Panigoro adalah Ir. Siwono Yudohusodo (bekas Menteri Perumahan Rakyat dan Transmigrasi dalam dua kabinet sebelumnya), Indra Rukmana (suami Tutut ini menggantikan sang ayah, Edi Kowara Adwina) yang memang punya saham dalam perusahaan Medco, John Karamoy, Hitler Singawinata, dan Selawan Djody (partner Tommy Suharto dalam pabrik mobil mewah Lamborghini).

Keterangan ini tercantum dalam profil konglomerat itu yang saya peroleh lewat e-mail dari Jakarta. Untuk verifikasi, silakan tanyakan ke kantor pusat Medco Group di kedeng Graha Niaga Lantai 16, Jalan Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 58, Jakarta 10270, telepon no (021) 250 5459 dan 571 0630 (hunting), dan fax no (021) 250 5536 dan 571 0620.


proyek-proyek Non-Departemen bernilai di atas Rp 500 juta yang harus disalurkan melalui SekNeg.

Dengan dinilai menumbuhkan penguasa pribumi, Ginanjar yang reminiya waktu itu berstatus sebagai Asisten Menteri SekNeg Urusan Lembaga-Lembaga Pemerintah Non-Departemen, ikut berjasa membentuk penguasa-penguasa non-China seperti Aburizal Bakrie (keturunan Arab, jadi juga bukan pribumi), Iman Taufik, Jusuf Kalla, Fadel Muhammad (keturunan Arab juga), Arifin Panigoro, dan tentu saja, adiknya sendiri. Di kalangan pers asing, mereka dikenal sebagai "the Ginanjar boys".


Tidak jelas apakah ia sudah ke luar dari pegawai negeri. Yang jelas, direktori perusahaan yang terdaftar di bursa saham Jakarta mencantumkan nama Indra Kartasasmita sebagai direktur PT Pancawrata Sakti, perusahaan properti beraset total Rp 286 milyar, yang itu membangun kota satelit Tigaraksa seluas 3000 Ha di Tangerang, lengkap dengan golf resort dan perumahan mewah seluas 38 hektar.


Anna Kartasasmita, yang belum jelas bagi saya hubungannya perkerabatannya dengan Ginanjar, tadinya komisaris PT Mayatexindan Industry, perusahaan induk dari enam pabrik garment konglomerat Lippo (keluarga Riady) dan Kanindo (Robby Tjahjadi). Setelah perusahaan itu bersama pabrik

Nama Gunadharma tercatat sebagai komisaris PT Sorini Corporation (Sorbitol Inti Mumi Corporation), produsen tapioka yang aset totalnya Rp 360 milyar th 1996. Laporan perusahaan-perusahaan yang terdaftar di bursa saham Jakarta tahun 1994 menunjukkan bahwa saham Gunadharma di PT Sorini bernilai 7.67%. Namun itu bukan bisnisnya yang paling top.

Gunadharma juga adalah direktur PT Branta Mulia, pabrik kain dan mid milik Robby Sumampouw, bekas cukong Benny Murdani yang menjadi kaya raya karena praktik monopoli bisnis di Timor Leste, selama masa kekuasaan Benny Murdani. Robby memiliki 22.25% saham perusahaan itu, yang punya cabang di Muanghtai, Malaysia, dan Filipina, sementara Henry Pribadi, rekan Robby, memiliki 14,42 %, sementara Ibrahim Risyad, satu dari antara "empat serangkai" pendiri Salim Group, menjadi presiden direktur perusahaan itu dengan memiliki saham Branta Mulia sebesar 7,21%. Total aset Branta Mulia tahun 1996 lebih dari Rp 0,7 trilyun.

Selain itu, Gunadharma juga bekerjasama dengan kelompok Kedaung milik Agus Nursalam dan Probosutedjo, dalam penjualan truk impor merek Iveco.

Bersama-sama Alex Budiman dan Bambang Samijono, Gunadharma Hartarto membentuk konglomerat sendiri, yang diberi nama Langgeng Group. Di kelompok itu, Gunadharma, yang melanjutkan studi manajemen di Universitas Boston dan Chicago itu menjadi pemegang saham dan direktur. Ia termasuk 30 taipan muda Indonesia pilihan majalah Tiara.


Dalam hal itu, "jasa" Hartarto bagi Suharto sejajar dengan "jasa" Habibie sebagai pengusaha Pulau Batam. Cuma bedanya, Hartarto tidak melakukan sesama Menteri, dengan membuka peluang bagi kelompok Bangun Cipta Sarana milik keluarga Siswono Judohusodo untuk ikut berkiprah di Pulau Kaninun.

Lewat e-mail, seorang informan saya juga mengungkapkan dekatnya Hartarto dengan Ibrahim Risyad, yang sering bertamu ke rumah sang Menteri. Juga Gunadharma Hartarto punya ruang sendiri di kantor kelompok Gajah Tunggal pimpinan Syamsul Nursalim. Selain itu, Hartarto dan Tungky Arwibowo menenemanya banyak "kick-back" (upeti) dari pabrik-pabrik pupuk serta pabrik-pabrik lain di bawah koordinasi kedua, seperti PT Krakatau Steel.

Nah, dengan latar belakang demikian, apakah Feisal Tanjung, Ginanjar dan Hartarto tak perlu mengumumkan kekayaan, serta saham serta posisi kunci yang dipegang anak dan saudara dalam perusahaan keluarga mereka, karena bak kata Tutul, "segama kami melarang kami menonjolkan kekaysan kami?"

Puri Baru, 20 April 1998

Referensi: