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Guide to U.S. Security Assistance to Indonesia and East Timor
(revised April 2008) |
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CTFP : Regional Defense Counterterrorism
Fellowship Program/Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Program
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DCS : Direct Commercial Sales
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DEA Training
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EDA : Excess Defense Articles
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ESF : Economic Support Fund
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FMF : Foreign Military Financing
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FMS : Foreign Military Sales
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Global Peace
Operations Initiative
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ICITAP : The International Criminal
Investigative Training and Assistance Program
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Introduction
Restrictions on U.S. security assistance to Indonesia have played a crucial
role in promoting democratic reform and human rights in Indonesia and
self-determination for East Timor. In March 2008, ETAN,
along with dozens of other
organizations, wrote Secretary of Defense Robert Gates that “we are
disturbed that assistance to the TNI is rapidly expanding, absent any
significant TNI reform and despite the ongoing failure to hold the TNI
accountable for its past and current human rights violations. Any pretense to
condition engagement on accountability and human rights has totally
disappeared.” In its
final report, East Timor's
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation called on countries to make
military assistance to Indonesia "totally conditional on progress towards
full democratisation, the subordination of the military to the rule of law and
civilian government, and strict adherence with international human rights..."
Congress first voted to restrict Indonesia from receiving International
Military Education and Training (IMET), which brings foreign military officers
to the U.S. for training, in response to the November 12, 1991 Santa Cruz
massacre of more than 270 civilians in East Timor by Indonesian troops wielding
U.S.-supplied M-16 rifles. Military relations were increasingly restricted until
all military ties with Indonesia were severed in September 1999 as the
Indonesian military and its militia proxies razed East Timor after it voted for
independence. Soon after, Congress banned foreign military financing and all
IMET until a range of conditions were met, including a requirement that the
Indonesian government was prosecuting members of the armed forces accused of
rights violations or aiding militia groups and punishing those guilty of such
acts. Later Congress restricted the export of lethal defense articles for
Indonesia. Since taking office, the Bush administration sought to lift all
legislated restrictions on assistance to Indonesia. They succeeded in FY 2006,
when all remaining restrictions were removed. In late 2007, the administration
informed Congress that it planned to train members of Kopassus, the notorious
Indonesian Special Forces unit with a long record of human rights violations.
Brimob, the brutal para-military mobile police brigade, will be trained as well.
Re-engagement has not ended
the widespread impunity of Indonesia’s security forces for crimes against
humanity and other serious violations committed against the peoples of East
Timor and Indonesia, their continued resistance to civilian control and
oversight, their lack of budget transparency or their persistent emphasis on
internal security. The Indonesian military continues to resist attempts to
dismantle its "territorial command" system, which allows the military to exert
influence over civil administration and politics, commerce, and justice down to
the village level. The required end to its business empire has turned into a
farce and the military remains involved in many illegal enterprises. “[M]ilitary
involvement in both legal and illegal business activities” is linked to alleged
human rights violations, according to leading human rights activists in Jakarta.
In West Papua, where outside access is restricted, human rights violations
include the targeting of civilians during military and police operations and the
imprisoning peaceful activists for their political views.
Upon independence in May 2002, East Timor became eligible for security
assistance from the United States.
La'o Hamutuk, an
East Timorese NGO, wrote that the country’s recent political and security
crisis “raise[s] questions about the military training done by the USA,
Australia, South Korea, Portugal, Malaysia and other countries, as well as the
international advisers in every state institution, including in the military (F-FDTL)
and police.”
Below are descriptions of the main U.S. programs providing aid to the
military and police of both countries.
Military Equipment
FMF: Foreign
Military Financing
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides
grants and loans to foreign governments for the purchase of
military supplies and services. While regulated by the State
Department, the Defense Department oversees its daily
functioning. FMF to Indonesia was suspended following the
Indonesian military’s campaign of terror against the East
Timorese in 1999, but was reinstated for Fiscal Year (FY) 2006.
In November 2005,
Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice waived a congressionally-mandated
restriction on FMF within 48 hours of the restriction’s
becoming law. While in FY2005 Indonesia received no FMF, FY2006
finished with $990,000 in assistance through the program; it
received $6,175,000 in FY2007. FMF for FY2008 allocation is
estimated at $15,572,000 (more than doubling 2007s allocation),
but Congress withheld $2,700,000 until
the Secretary
of State reports “on steps taken by Government of Indonesia”
regarding actions and progress concerning human rights
accountability, military reform and access to the West Papua
region. The FMF request for FY2009 is $15,700,000. East Timor
has also begun receiving FMF to help build and instruct the
Timor-Leste Defense Force: $2,420,000
in 2004; $1,023,000 in
2005, $990,000 in 2006, and $475,000 for FY2007. The
administration requested no for FMF for FY2008 or FY2009.
FMS: Foreign Military Sales
There are two major channels through which foreign
governments purchase U.S. military supplies: Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) and
Foreign Military Sales (FMS). DCS are transactions between a foreign government
and a corporation. FMS transactions are government to government. (Purchases
through either can be funded through FMF, which provides grants and, to a lesser
extent loans, for the purchase of military equipment). This is different from
DCS and Foreign Military Financing (which provides grants or loans for the
purchase of weapons and other material, through either FMS or DCS). FMS to
Indonesia were
particularly high in 1976 (during the early stages of Indonesia's illegal
occupation of East Timor) and 1986 (during the Reagan administration).
Sales were halted due to Indonesia’s atrocious human rights
violations in the 1990s. However, in May 2005, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice
announced that “non-lethal” FMS sales would resume. The
following November she
waived all remaining congressional human rights conditions on “national
security” grounds, resulting in $15,000,000 in
FMS agreements in FY2006. In 2007 there were $22,343,000 in FMS agreements
with Indonesia. For 2008 the FMS agreements projection is $38,000,000. There are currently no legislated restrictions on
military purchases by the Indonesian military.
Independent East Timor first received FMS in FY2003 in the
amount of one million dollars. This amount increased in FY2004 to $1,990,000 and
to $2,051,000 in FY2005. In FY2006, FMS agreements totaled $613,000. As is
typical, actual deliveries in those years were less: $958,000 in FY2003 and
$24,000 in each of the following two years. FMS agreements in FY2006 totaled
$19,000, rising to $527,000 in 2007.
DCS: Direct Commercial Sales
The State Department oversees the DCS
program, which is regulated by the
Arms Export Control Act. This act provides the legal
framework (along with the Foreign Assistance Act) for corporate
sales of weapons and military-related services to foreign
nations by obtaining an export license. Indonesia has
purchased hundreds of millions of dollars in weapons through DCS
since the 1970s. Notably, in fiscal year 1978, when conditions
in East Timor were among the worst, due to Indonesia’s invasion
and occupation, Indonesia received authorization for $112
million in commercial sales from the United States -- a 2,000
percent increase from the previous year's authorization of $5.8
million. Following the bloody aftermath of East Timor’s
referendum in 1999,
DCS were temporarily halted by presidential order. In
January 2005,
commercial sales of non-lethal weapons and supplies resumed,
and for the same fiscal year,
a reported $51,626,913 in licenses were authorized for
Indonesia. In
March
2006 the ban on lethal weapons sales to Indonesia was lifted.
In FY2006, approximately $115,000,000 in DCS licenses were
authorized. Since there are currently no legislated restrictions
on military aid to Indonesia, DCS will continue to be a major
source of military supplies, depending on Indonesia’s budget
priorities, the level of FMF, and congressional oversight.
EDA: Excess Defense Articles
The U.S.
military can transfer
Excess Defense
Articles (EDA) through section 516 of the Foreign Assistance
Act. EDA consist of various surplus military supplies ranging
from aircraft to uniforms. These articles can be given or sold
at reduced prices to foreign countries. EDA transactions are
coordinated by various parts of the military: security
assistance organizations, the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency, and individual armed forces. Between 1998 and 2005
Indonesia received no EDA, and no publicly known EDA transfers
occurred in 2006. However, in 2005 “non-lethal” EDA were again
allowed as a part of the
Bush
administration’s resumption of military relations with Indonesia.
The State Department describes EDA “as
potentially fill[ing] Indonesian
equipment shortfalls.
In FY2005 East Timor became eligible for EDA, but as of yet
there have been no known transfers.
Section 1206
Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act was
initially created for the
Pentagon to fund training and equipment for the militaries and police of Iraq
and Afghanistan without State Department involvement. The program has been
expanded to allow the Pentagon to spend several hundred million dollars each
year, with State Department agreement, to support militaries in a wide range of
countries including Indonesia. A
March 2007
General Accountability Office (GAO) report found that in FY2006, only five
of 14 proposals under the program were coordinated with the relevant embassies
before being reviewed in Washington. And in another five countries, the Pentagon
did not inform the embassies of its plans to provide military assistance until
it had already notified Congress of the projects.
Indonesia received $18.4 million in Section 1206 funding in 2006 and $28.7
million in 2007.
At the end of May 2007,
a coalition
wrote the Senate to oppose the “Building Global Partnerships Act of 2007,”
which grows out of Section 1206. The Act would grant permanent authority to the
Department of Defense to spend up to $750 million annually to help foreign
governments build up their military forces, police and other internal security
forces, with limited congressional oversight. The groups said the Act
"represents a continuation of the dangerous
trend to remove State Department control over U.S. military assistance programs."
Military Training
CTFP: Regional Defense Counterterrorism
Fellowship Program/Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Program
Funds for the Regional Defense
Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) were first
appropriated in early 2002, after the September 11 attacks on
the U.S., and made permanent in the
2004
National Defense Authorization Act (the annual law which
sets policy and spending limits for the Pentagon). The program
was
initially created to circumvent the IMET ban on Indonesia,
and it has increasingly become a major source of military
training worldwide. In 2004, the
CTFP was authorized to fund lethal training. In FY2006
2,845 security and military personnel received training
through the program. For FY2007, Congress appropriated a total
of $20 million for the program. The Defense Authorization Act
for FY2007 authorized an increase in funding of up to $25
million and officially changed its name to the Regional Defense
Combating Terrorism Program.
Because the CTFP is funded through the military budget (as opposed to the
foreign assistance budget), the program does not have to follow the more
stringent Congressionally-mandated human rights standards required of State
Department-administered international assistance programs. (A
July 2006 GAO report found
that some recipients of CTFP training in Morocco and Tunisia had not been vetted
for human rights violations, even though the State Department reported that both
nations had highly problematic human rights records). From FY2002 through
FY2004, Indonesia received
more CTFP funding than any other nation and twice that of the second highest
recipient (the Philippines). In FY2005, Indonesia received $878,661 in CTFP
funding, $715,844 in FY2006 and $525,000 was planned for FY2007.
IMET: International Military and Education
Training
The International Military Education and
Training (IMET) program was created in 1976 and serves as a
major channel through which the United States trains foreign
military personnel. IMET is overseen by the State Department and
implemented by the Defense Department. The Indonesian military
has been a major recipient of IMET funds. During the period
following the invasion of East Timor through 1991,
more than 2,600
Indonesian soldiers received IMET. In October 1992,
following the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre and statements by
Indonesian military authorities justifying their policy of
violent repression toward the East Timorese, Congress banned
IMET funding for fiscal years 1993-1996. However, beginning in
1995 some IMET funds were allotted through the Expanded-IMET
program, a subprogram (see section on
E-IMET).
All U.S. military assistance was temporarily cut off following
the campaign of terror implemented by the Indonesian military
against East Timor surrounding the 1999 independence referendum.
In FY2000, because of the “Leahy amendment” to the Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act, most military assistance for
Indonesia was conditioned on the return of the many tens of
thousands of East Timorese refugees, accountability for human
rights crimes and other requirements. In 2003 and 2004,
resumption of full IMET was conditioned on Indonesia’s
cooperation with the FBI investigation of the
murder of
two U.S. citizens and one Indonesian citizen in Timika, West
Papua in August 2002. However, in 2005, the
Bush administration resumed full
IMET funding for Indonesia despite the State Department’s
continued documentation of human rights violations by the
Indonesian military and the unfinished state of the Timika
investigation. In FY2002-2005, Indonesia received nearly $2
million in IMET funds. FY2006 IMET funding for Indonesia totaled
$938,000 and $1,398,000 in FY2007 (with a total of 69 students
receiving training through the program) The administration
estimates spending $927,000 in FY2008 (for a total of 46
students) and plans to increase IMET to $1,500,000 for FY2009
(with a corresponding increase in students to 74).
East Timor also receives IMET with the
stated purpose of supporting “U.S. objectives of East Timor's
self-sufficiency, disaster management and humanitarian assistance relief, as
well as of developing a professional, effective defense force.” In 2005, East
Timorese attended IMET training in courses such as “Electronic Principles” and
“American Language.” For FY2002-2005, East Timor received $648,000 in IMET for
216 students. IMET for FY2006 totaled $587,798 and $254,000 for FY2007 (with 27
students trained through the program). Estimated spending for FY2008 is $381,000
(with 40 students trained. The request for FY2009 is $300,000 to train 32
students
E-IMET: Expanded International Military Education and Training
Expanded International Military Education
and Training (E-IMET), a subprogram of the International
Military Education and Training program (IMET), is a State
Department program implemented through the Department of
Defense. All IMET funding to Indonesia was cut off following the
1991 Santa Cruz massacre, but the ban was amended in 1995 to
allow E-IMET forFY1996. E-IMET was created in 1991 to train
recipient militaries and later civilians in areas such as
management, civilian-military relations and peacekeeping. In
June 1997 Indonesia’s president
Suharto briefly refused to accept E-IMET, complaining about
U.S. criticism of human rights violations and restrictions on
other forms of military assistance. Regular participation in E-IMET
in the years prior to East Timor’s independence referendum did
nothing to restrain the Indonesian military’s campaign of
violence and destruction in 1999. After the 1999 violence, all
U.S. military support for Indonesia was cut off. However,
E-IMET for Indonesia resumed in 2002, even as regular IMET
remained banned.
Some of the IMET that East Timor receives takes place under
E-IMET.
JCET: Joint
Combined Exchange Training
The Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET)
program authorizes training of foreign military personnel
through the Special Operation Forces budget of the Defense
Department. The stated intent of the program is to train U.S.
Special Operations Forces, with any training of foreign military
personnel seen as a secondary benefit.
The Pentagon
trained Indonesian military personnel through JCET from 1992
through 1997, despite clear congressional intent to bar such
military training for Indonesia. During this period, the
Indonesian military, including its notorious special forces,
Kopassus, participated in 36 JCET trainings on topics such as
"Advanced Sniper Techniques" and “Psychological Operations.” In
1998 the Pentagon suspended JCET aid to Indonesia, but aid
through this
program was allowed to resume in FY2005.
Joint
Military Exercises and Other Activities
Indonesia participates in various joint
military exercises with the U.S. The United States Pacific
Command Theater Security Cooperation Program hosted 85 events in
2004, and in 2005 the
the U.S. embassy in Jakarta anticipated that Indonesian
military personnel would take part in 132 joint activities.
These activities have focused on "counterterrorism seminars
promoting cooperation on security as well as subject matter
expert exchanges."
Indonesian military personnel have also participated in the
Cooperation Afloat and Readiness Training program (CARAT), a series of
bi-lateral military exercise in Southeast Asia. The 1998 CARAT was cancelled
after the Congressional uproar over JCET. Indonesia's Lt. Col. Willem first
helped coordinate the Indonesian naval forces in the August 1999 CARAT and
then traveled to Dili
where he served as a senior official in KOREM military headquarters from which
Dili’s notorious militia operated. In the 2005 CARAT exercise, Indonesian
personnel learned "skills directly applicable to the combat of seaborne
terrorism threats and transnational crimes at sea."
According
to the U.S. Navy in 2006 over 2,000 personnel from the United States and
Indonesia participated in CARAT training in scenarios "including visit, board,
search and seizure…demonstrations, amphibious operations, diving and salvage,
and small craft force protection tactics." Major General Syaiful Rizal, the
commander of Kopassus, who have a notoriously poor human rights record –
participated in the 2006
Pacific Area Special Operations conference.
In April 2007, Indonesian Major General Noer Muis
participated in Garuda Shield 2007, in Bogor, West Java. Garuda Shield was the
first joint brigade-size since 1997.
Muis was tried and
convicted in 2003 for crimes against humanity by Indonesia’s Ad Hoc Human
Rights Court for his role in brutal attacks on East Timor’s Dili Diocese, East
Timorese Bishop Belo's house and the Suai Church massacre in September 1999. His
conviction and sentence of five years were
overturned on
appeal in that widely discredited process. On February 24, 2003, Muis was
indicted
with other senior officers by the UN-backed serious crimes process in East
Timor.
Indonesia has also observed the Cobra Gold program since
2000 and
participated for the first time in 2006. Cobra Gold takes place annually,
primarily with Thailand and participated in the Khaan Quest peacekeeping
exercise hosted by Mongolia in 2006 and 2007.
In late March 2007, the marines in both countries signed an
agreement on joint military training. More than 700 Indonesian and US marine
troops participated in the first Naval Engagement Activity (NEA), an in-port
exercise that covers amphibious raids, riverine operations, laws of armed
conflict, rules of engagement, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and
piracy.In March 2008, the U.S. Marines
31st Marine Expeditionary
Unit participated in a bilateral field training exercise in Indonesia, The
exercise included live fire sniper and other training “to help the Indonesian
Marines understand how to successfully battle an insurgency.”
Global Peace Operations Initiative
The Global Peace Operations Initiative is a multilateral
five-year program to train and equip a total of 75,000 military troops for
peacekeeping missions by 2010. The program was initiated for Africa in 2004 and
extended to the Asia Pacific region starting 2005. Indonesia was eligible for
direct training starting with four Indonesian personnel trained in 2006. The
number of Indonesian trainees expanded to more than 160 in 2006 and 2007. In
2006, the Initiative also funded the transportation and logistics requirements
of Indonesian troops who deployed to Lebanon.
Regional
Centers for Security Studies
The Department of Defense runs five
Regional Centers for Security Studies. The major goal of the
Regional Centers is to build relations between officials from
the U.S. and those from other nations. Indonesian students
regularly attend courses and seminars at the Asia-Pacific Center
for Security Studies (APCSS) in Hawaii.
APSCC began
in 1995 and directs its courses primarily toward military
executives, bringing them together with policymakers and others
to discuss regional issues and security strategies. Courses
include “Comprehensive Security Responses to Terrorism”, which
seeks to “counter ideological support for and combat terrorism
cooperatively for the long term.” Other courses have focused on
topics such as emergencies and regional stability.
Funding for the Regional Centers comes overwhelmingly from
the Defense Department, but smaller amounts come from other sources that vary by
Regional Center and program. In 2004, 24
students from Indonesia trained through Regional Centers, while 16 trained
there in FY2005. For FY2008 the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (which has
administered the Centers since FY2006) is pushing a “Transformation,” shifting
the Centers’ from an “academic” orientation toward one of “outreach,” and
realigning older programs with the Global War on Terror agenda. This “outreach”
oriented position seeks to “promote a real physical presence” in each region in
which a Center is directed. In 2006 the
Defense Department spent $68,097,000 on the centers and will spend an
estimated $79,625,000 in FY2008.
Section 1004 Counter Drug
Assistance
Section 1004 of the National Defense
Authorization Act allocates funds for anti-narcotics efforts,
including training, non-lethal arms transfers, construction and
other forms of aid. The program has been noted for its use as a
major source of military support in Latin America, but it is
also used to fund military and security forces in other regions.
Section 1004 is funded through the Defense Department.
Accordingly, it lacks the restrictions of State funded programs
like IMET. Congress did not require Section 1004 funds to be
accounted for until 2001, and did not require this reporting in
FY2003-FY2005. The FY2006 Defense Authorization Act again
reinstated the reporting requirement, but the report that has
been made available only includes information on funds allotted
for construction efforts. The
June 2006
report listed $1.06 million spent on two projects in
Indonesia.
Some argue that Section 1004 has been used to evade restrictions on military
aid for governments with troubling human rights records. In 1999 Human Rights
Watch reported that some of the Mexican recipients of Section 1004 training
funds had engaged in
acts of torture.
While in 2005 there were no Section 1004 funds allotted to Indonesia for
training, in 2006 it was estimated that 120 students would be trained through
its budget. In 2005 $1,016,000 Section 1004 funds were provided to Indonesia to
help construct training centers, including $354,000 for the construction for the
Marine Police Training Center in Jakarta. In October 2007 the program was
renewed through 2011.
Police Training & Equipment
ESF: Economic Support Fund
According to the State Department, the
Economic Support Fund (ESF) program provides grants to nations
for purposes of stability, development, and security. ESF grants
are provided in the context of larger U.S. foreign policy
objectives and only a portion is earmarked for security forces,
usually the police. Between 2001 and 2004, the
U.S. provided $23.2 million in ESF to support police forces
in Indonesia. In FY2005
Indonesia received $68,480,000 in total ESF, and $69,300,000
for each of the following two years. For FY2008 the estimated
allotment is $64,474,000.
East Timor also receives ESF, but according to the State
Department, ESF funds have not yet been used for police training. However,
USAID provides “support to government and parliament
bodies responsible for monitoring and oversight, and insuring civilian knowledge
of police and military responsibilities and applicable laws.”
Between 1999 and 2004, East Timor received $165 million of
ESF, including $23,036,000 in 2004. The stated purpose of this aid has been to “support
development of East Timor's civil society and democratic and economic
institutions…”
USAID’s goal for East Timor between 2005-2009 is to help the country grow as
“a model for the developing world, a mature democracy with a thriving
free-enterprise economy.” In 2005 East Timor received a total of $21,824,000 in
ESF and $18,810,000 in each of the following
two years. Funding for FY2008 is $16,862,000.
ICITAP: International Criminal
Investigative Training and Assistance Program
The International Criminal Investigative
Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP) is administered by the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to train foreign police forces and
judiciaries. Its main stated purposes are “the development of
police forces in the context of international peacekeeping
operations” and “the enhancement of capabilities of existing
police forces in emerging democracies.” Indonesia first received
ICITAP funding in 1999. This assistance increased following the
official separation of the Indonesian police (INP) from the
military in July 2000. In April 2007 the DOJ stated that “On
average the Indonesia ICITAP program receives $8 million per
year.” The DOJ describes the primary objective of
ICITAP in Indonesia as assisting “the INP transition from a
military to a civilian agency that is committed to democratic
policing practices and international standards for the
protection of human rights.” However, doubt has been cast on the
centrality of “the protection of human rights” in ICITAP
trainings. A
July 2005 GAO report “found no evidence that an estimated
4,000 Indonesian law enforcement officials who received training
under Justice's ICITAP were vetted for possible human rights
violations prior to October of 2004.”
Indeed, the report found that trainees “included 32
Indonesian police from a notorious special-forces police unit [BRIMOB] that was
prohibited from receiving U.S. training funds under State [Department] policy
because of the unit’s prior human rights abuses.”
East Timor also receives aid through ICITAP. ICITAP’s work in East Timor has
primarily focused on three stated areas: “basic supervision and management
skills training”, “developing policies and procedures” and “the establishment of
a field training officer program.”
INL/INCLE: International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
The International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement program (INCLE) is administered through the Bureau
for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL),
the top agency dealing with drug policy within the State
Department. The stated purpose of the program is narcotics
control, though more recently INCLE has worked for a “broader
and more integrated law enforcement effort to combat the full
range of criminal, drug, and terrorist threats”, according to
the FY2006 budget justification. Following the official
separation of the Indonesian police and military in July 2000,
the U.S. began training Indonesian police. In FY2005 there was
no INCLE support to Indonesia; in FY2006 there was $4,950,000 in
aid and $4,700,000 in FY2007.
The estimate for FY2008 is $6,150,000, and the request for
FY2009 is $9,450,000.
East Timor receives support through INCLE for police
training. While no INCLE funding was received in FY2005, East Timor received a
total of $1,485,000 worth of aid in FY2006. There were no funds allotted through
INCLE during FY2007. The estimated expenditure for FY2008 is for $20,000, and
the request for FY2009 is $1,010,000.
NADR: Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related
Programs
The Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) budget is controlled by
the Department of State.
NADR consists
of multiple programs covering three major categories:
nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, and regional stability and
humanitarian assistance. NADR funding for Indonesia is primarily
for Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA), with more than $30 million
allotted since FY2002. The Detachment 88 Indonesian police
unit—a special police unit largely created under U.S. government
auspices and trained using ATA funds—has
been accused of serious human rights violations. To a much
lesser extent, funding for Indonesia for Export Control and
Border Security Assistance (EXBS), the Counterterrorism
Financing budget (which targets the funding of terrorism), and
the Terrorist Interdiction Program (which allows countries to “collect,
compare and analyze traveler data”) come through NADR.
During FY2007 there was a total of $8,881,000 in NADR funding.
For FY2008 there will be an estimated $5,861,000. The NADR
request for FY2009 totals $6,750,000.
NADR-ATA funds for FY2005 totaled $5,987,000, $6,237,000 in
FY2006 and there was $7,626,000 in NADR-ATA funds during FY2007. In 2008 there
will be an estimated $4,166,000 in NADR-ATA funding, and with an increase to
$5,800,000 requested for FY2009. A major priority for FY2009 NADR-ATA funding is
to support "enhanced training for a premier Indonesian anti-terrorism unit which
regularly performs major operations against terrorists in the region. “In FY2005
Indonesia received $275,000 in NADR-EXBS funding; $450,000 was spent for EXBS
funding for FY2006 and FY2007, with an estimated $490,000 spent during
FY2008.There is a requested increase to $600,000 for FY2009. In FY2005 Indonesia
received no CTF funding, but $201,000 was spent in FY2006. There was a total of
$805,000 in CTF funding for FY2007. An estimated $$461,000 will be spent in
FY2008. For FY2009 there is a requested decrease in CTF funding to $50,000.
NADR-TID funding for FY2008 is estimated at $744,000 and $300,000 has been
requested for FY2009.
DEA Training
Training by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
consist of basic and advanced drug enforcement seminars to improve the
capabilities of foreign law enforcement agencies to implement self-sufficient
counter narcotics programs. Indonesian police participated in one training
between 2000 and 2004, and again in 2006 and 2007.
see also:
Special thanks to Craig Hughes, Shiela Oviedo and
Bahasa Indonesia version
(as of November 2007)