|
Winter 2007 Home
East Timor hits potholes on the road to
independence
Support Democracy! Become an Election Observer
Petroleum dependency
Support Resolution on “Comfort Women”
U.S. Re-engages the Indonesian Military: Rights, Democracy Suffer
Justice Remains Distant for East Timorese
Crimes Against Humanity From Ford to Saddam
Munir Update
Chega!’s Recommendations & the U.S.
Madison-Ainaro Sister City Alliance Maintains Solidarity Links
New Year Dawns with Threats to Human Rights in West Papua
Obituaries
Estafeta
back issues
ETAN Home Page
|
|
From Ford to Saddam
Crimes Against Humanity
By Joseph Nevins
As one might expect,
official Washington’s reactions to the deaths of Saddam Hussein and Gerald Ford
have been as different as night and day, with Democrats following the White
House lead in lockstep. President Bush called the former president a “great
man,” while Representative Nancy Pelosi voiced respect for Ford’s “fair and
reliable leadership.” By contrast, George Bush welcomed Hussein’s execution,
characterizing it as “an important milestone on Iraq’s course to becoming a
democracy,” and Senator Joseph Biden, the new chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, declared with satisfaction that “Iraq has . . . rid the
world of a tyrant.”
On the surface, it makes
sense to judge the two men in such divergent ways. An Iraqi court convicted
Hussein of a crime against humanity for ordering the deaths of 148 Shiite
villagers in Dujail. While the court was of the kangaroo variety, there’s no
doubt that the Dujail massacre was only one of many atrocities he oversaw while
ruling Iraq. Gerald Ford, to the contrary, was never even indicted for any such
crime.
But this distinction reflects a double standard for judging
similar conduct. If we examine Ford’s behavior through an internationalist lens
similar to that employed to judge Saddam Hussein and concerned with
crimes against humanity, we find that
Ford, too, was responsible for mass
murder—in East Timor.
Permission Granted
On Dec. 6, 1975, Ford and Henry Kissinger, his secretary of
state, were in Jakarta, Indonesia to meet the country’s dictator, General
Suharto. Ford was fully cognizant of Indonesia’s plans to launch an imminent
invasion of the former Portuguese
Timor. According to declassified
documents published by the Washington-based National Security Archive, Ford
assured Suharto that with regard
to East Timor, “[We] will not press
you on the issue. We understand . . . the intentions you have.”
Suharto needed
Washington’s go-ahead due to a 1958 agreement that prohibited Indonesia from
using U.S.-origin weaponry, which made up 90 percent of Jakarta’s arsenal at the
time, except for “legitimate national self-defense.” For this reason
Kissinger suggested that the invasion be framed as self-defense, thus
circumventing any legal obstacles.
Kissinger then expressed understanding for Indonesia’s “need to
move quickly” and advised “that it would be better if it were done
after we [he and Ford] returned [to the
United States].” About 14 hours
after their departure, Indonesian forces invaded neighboring East Timor.
While Indonesian troops massacred civilians
during the first hours of the Dec. 7
invasion, Ford spoke at the University of
Hawaii. There, he declared—apparently with
a straight face—his commitment to a
“Pacific doctrine of peace with all
and hostility toward none,” and spoke of an Asia “where people are free from the
threat of foreign aggression.”
Ford and his White House
successors helped make sure that his lofty vision was not realized in
occupation-ravaged East Timor. According to the now-independent country’s truth
commission report, released late last year, Indonesia’s war and illegal
occupation resulted in many tens of thousands of East Timorese deaths,
widespread rape and sexual enslavement of women and girls, and, in the waning
days of Jakarta’s presence, systematic destruction of the territory’s buildings
and infrastructure. Today, East Timor is one of the world’s poorest countries.
It is, according to a 2006 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report, a
country “chained by poverty.”
Over the almost 24 years of Indonesian rule, Democratic and
Republican administrations alike provided invaluable diplomatic cover and
billions of dollars’ worth of weapons, military equipment and training, and
economic aid to Jakarta. The truth commission report characterizes U.S.
assistance as “fundamental” to the invasion and occupation, and calls upon
Washington to apologize and pay reparations to East Timor. Washington’s
considerable share of the blame for East Timor’s plight does not rest solely at
Ford’s feet. But it was Gerald Ford that opened the door to this dreadful
chapter in history.
There is little doubt that Ford’s authorization was key to
Indonesia’s invasion. Intelligence and diplomatic documents reveal that Jakarta
was so worried about how the U.S. would react to its aggression that Suharto had
vetoed earlier plans to invade. Had the United States (along with its allies,
especially Australia and Britain) said “no” to Jakarta’s invasion prior to its
launching, the Suharto regime would have been in a
very difficult bind and most likely have
reversed course. And, given the
profound anti-communism of the regime, it could hardly have turned to the likes
of the Soviet Union as an alternative.
As William Colby, the head
of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1975, said in the 1990s, if the United
States had vetoed Indonesia’s
plan to invade, “[w]e certainly would
have had a little diplomatic strain
there,” but nothing beyond that, the implication being that Jakarta would have
backed down. Colby suggested that Jakarta had no other options apart from
securing Washington’s compliance, asking rhetorically, “where would have
[Suharto] gone” had the Indonesian ruler
not been happy with the U.S.
position?
One week after the meeting in Jakarta, Ford sent Suharto a
package of golf balls as “a personal gift.” In the months that followed, his UN
ambassador, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, prevented the United Nations from taking
effective steps to compel Jakarta to end its illegal aggression. Later in 1976,
Ford’s administration shipped a squadron of counterinsurgency OV-10 “Bronco”
ground-attack planes to Indonesia.
In the 1990s, journalist Allan Nairn asked Gerald Ford if he had
authorized the invasion. Ford replied, “Frankly, I don’t recall,” explaining
that there were many topics on the December 6, 1975 meeting agenda, and East
Timor was one of the lesser items. While Ford had the luxury of forgetting, the
East Timorese are condemned to remember.
They will live with the physical, social,
and psychological effects of the
horrific war and occupation for
decades. According to a 2006 UNDP report, 90 out of 1,000 East Timorese children
die before their first birthday,
half the population is illiterate,
64 percent suffers from food insecurity, half lack access to access to safe
drinking water, and 40 percent live below
the official poverty level of 55 cents a
day. Meanwhile, a study
conducted by the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims
determined that about one-third of East Timor’s population suffers from
posttraumatic stress disorder.
This is a legacy for which we should remember Gerald Ford, just
Hussein will justifiably be memorialized for his role in crimes against
humanity.
Joseph Nevins, a co-founder of ETAN, teaches at Vassar College.
He is the author of A Not-so-distant Horror: Mass Violence in East Timor,
which is available from ETAN. A version of this article appeared in
Counterpunch.
|