| Subject: Jane's: FALINTIL: guerrilla army
to professional force
Jane's Intelligence Review July 1, 2000 ASIA; Vol. 12; No. 7 FALINTIL:
guerrilla army to professional force
Tom Fawthrop
Political expediency persuaded the UN mission in East Timor to revoke
its original requirement to disarm FALINTIL, the army of the
pro-independence rebel group Fretilin, but what of its future status?
SINCE THE beginning of the year, FALINTIL - the army of the
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) - has put
increasing political pressure on the UN Transitional Authority in East
Timor (UNTAET). Their demands range from the granting of official status,
to involvement in the on-going peacekeeping operation and the eventual
formation of a professional army of the independent republic.
UNTAET and UN peacekeeping headquarters in New York are undecided as to
how to deal with FALINTIL's demands, as well as the prime issue of the
future security needs of an independent state of East Timor. The UN
mandate for East Timor does not mention FALINTIL, and authorises
peacekeepers to 'disarm all irregular forces'. Although primarily directed
at the Indonesian Army-backed militias that inflicted such chaos on the
territory last September, this directive also includes FALINTIL.
Whether FALINTIL constitutes a legally recognised army that resisted
the 1975 Indonesian invasion (the Portuguese view), a disciplined
guerrilla movement or some kind of 'irregular force', is at the heart of
UN confusion.
Many of the surviving FALINTIL guerrilla commanders were officers in
the colonial army of the Portuguese garrison in East Timor. After the 1974
revolution in Portugal (when its colonies in Africa and East Timor gained
independence) and the 1975 election in East Timor, the pro-independence
movement, FRETILIN, formed a government. Most of the Timorese soldiers
from the Portuguese garrison became the backbone of the FRETILIN army.
Regarding the FRETILIN government as 'dangerously leftist', the regime
of Indonesian President Suharto invaded in December 1975. This was
condemned by the UN General Assembly with a series of resolutions that
upheld East Timor as a Portuguese administrative territory engaged in the
unfinished process of decolonisation.
Although FALINTIL claimed that it was the legally-constituted army
formed in 1975, and has as such rejected labels such as 'rebels' or
'insurgents', it was forced to withdraw to the jungles and mountains of
East Timor by the overwhelming force of Indonesian aggression.
Cut off in the remote jungles and mountains of East Timor, FALINTIL had
no materiel support from abroad. Apart from their old Portuguese
equipment, all guns, ammunition and uniforms came from ambushing
Indonesian forces. Their 24-year survival helped to keep the question of
independence on the international agenda.
After the 5 May 1999 agreement signed between Indonesia, Portugal and
the UN to peacefully settle the East Timor conflict through a referendum,
FALINTIL adopted a unilateral ceasefire and complied with the UN plan for
the cantonment of all military forces. This was to prove one-sided as the
Indonesian Army and the militias refused to comply with the UN's plan.
While under house arrest in Jakarta, commander-in-chief of FALINTIL
Xanana Gusmao ordered his forces to exercise self-restraint in the face of
provocation from other Indonesian-backed militias after the results of the
referendum were announced on 4 September 1999. Gusmao calculated that any
move by FALINTIL forces to abandon their four cantonment zones would be
used by the Indonesian Army as a pretext to pour more troops into East
Timor and once again engage in all-out war, thereby nullifying the
referendum verdict. Despite FRETILIN's restraint, INTERFET still attempted
to disarm Gusmao's forces.
Following negotiations between the INTERFET commander, Australian
General Peter Cosgrove and FALINTIL commanders, INTERFET retreated from
further attempts to disarm the guerrilla army on the understanding that
FALINTIL would continue to adhere to maintaining their weapons in the
cantonment zone.
FALINTIL believes that the cantonment policy, in effect since July
1999, cannot continue indefinitely. FALINTIL's deputy-chief of staff
Commander Lere Anan Timor complained that they are being excluded from the
transition process; Ana Gomez, the Portuguese ambassador in Jakarta warned
that: "It is very dangerous to leave FALINTIL out there in limbo and
very unjust. The UN should find a way to include FALINTIL in their
peacekeeping operations."
Pressures were building in March for the follow-on peacekeeping force,
the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET), to seriously address
FALINTIL's demands and to consider possibilities for taking them out of
cantonment and into the peacekeeping framework. Brainstorming sessions
were convened in Dili, bringing together UN peacekeeping officers, UN
political advisors, military observers and civilian police.
According to the UN's chief administrator in Dili, Sergio Vieira de
Mello, speaking in March: "We were counting on the discipline of
FALINTIL and I pay tribute to their patience." He added that UNTAET
faces a dilemma because the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1,272,
which provided the mandate for governing East Timor, "makes no
mention of FALINTIL and does not cover setting up a new army".
De Mello acknowledged FALINTIL's positive role as a stabilising force
in society and conceded that " FALINTIL could have a very useful and
possibly essential role in providing intelligence". He argued,
however, that it would be impossible to convince the UNSC to permit them
to carry their arms outside of the cantonment area.
By the end of April, UNTAET reported that firm recommendations had been
sent to UN headquarters to "recognise FALINTIL's role in the past,
the discipline with which they carried out their duties last year and also
recognise that a part of FALINTIL will make up the backbone of the
security forces in East Timor".
In a landmark decision, the UN agreed in May that FALINTIL should work
alongside UN peacekeepers as liaison officers. Four senior FALINTIL
officers will be integrated into the three UN military sectors, and the
headquarters command centre in Dili. There are now 10 FALINTIL officers in
the UN peacekeeping force, three attached to each military sector and one
to Dili HQ. They advise the UN on security matters, especially the
militias and provide community liaison.
For the first time, UN peacekeeping spokesman in Dili, Colonel Brynjar
Nymo acknowledged: "We cannot be seen to leave East Timor in a total
security vacuum. They need to be able to start and develop their future
security force, and FALINTIL could be the core of this group."
It is assumed that the four East Timorese liaison officers will assist
the UN mission with intelligence reports, and help to identify militia
infiltrators and saboteurs sent from West Timor to disrupt East Timor's
development process.
FALINTIL offered 800 fighters for peacekeeping duties. Although this
proposal has not been accepted, various options are still under
consideration. A senior UN military observer commented that: "
FALINTIL can only carry arms outside a cantonment area if they are given
some de facto regular status."
FALINTIL's new status as liaison officers, and their future role as the
core of a new defence force is far from clear. De Mello the UN chief in
Dili, has sought further clarification from the UN in New York about their
official status, which could have a critical bearing on the further
integration of FALINTIL members at the operational level. UN military
observers feel that FALINTIL fighters must accept major reorientation
before they become part of a professional army within a democracy.
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