Subject: UN Press Briefing summary
From: "John M. Miller" <fbp@igc.apc.org>9 February 1999 Press Briefing
PRESS BRIEFING ON EAST TIMOR 19990209
At the conclusion of two days of intensive talks on East Timor, the Secretary-General's
Personal Representative, Jamsheed Marker, the Foreign Minister of Portugal, Jaime Gama,
and the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Ali Alatas, briefed the press Monday evening at
Headquarters.
Mr. Marker told correspondents that the talks began yesterday when the
Secretary-General saw both Mr. Alatas, and Mr. Gama, before he went to Amman, Jordan. They
had very positive discussions -- quick, but substantive -- that set the tone, the pace and
the track for subsequent meetings held yesterday and today.
Mr. Marker said he was most grateful to both Foreign Ministers for the spirit of
accommodation, understanding and high statesmanship they had displayed throughout the
negotiations. Those were not cliches, but sincere comments. The problems had been
difficult and complicated, but the desire to find a solution was paramount in the
deliberations.
What had happened, he continued, was that the Ministers were presented with a text on
the whole issue of wide-ranging autonomy for East Timor, which would be an appendix to an
agreement. It contained a number of very complicated issues. The senior officials had
developed the text as far as possible, but there were certain political elements that had
to be placed before the Ministers. That had now happened, and the Ministers were able to
remove most of the major outstanding issues. On the few important issues that remained,
there was an understanding that consultations with the two Governments were required.
The draft agreement was also currently under consideration, he explained. It set out
the views of both sides and the desire to reach an agreement, particularly on the
proposals for autonomy. The proposals for autonomy were nearly a "clean" text.
They would now be considered by the respective governments and Mr. Marker would wait to
hear from the Ministers. He did not expect to wait very long, as the Ministers had agreed
that their senior officials would meet for the next session of talks on 9 March, and the
Ministers themselves would meet on 10 March. By the end of 10 March, he expected the
United Nations would have a direction in which to pursue its activities on East Timor.
Mr. Marker added that he was not in a position to provide the text to correspondents,
but he hoped he would be able to do that later in the process.
With regard to another element in the process, Mr. Marker said, he had been holding
discussions with East Timorese leaders and keeping them informed as much as possible, as
had been done in the past. He had met today with some of those leaders. Eventually the
documents on the autonomy proposal would have to be circulated amongst them. He proposed
to do that as soon as they were cleared and ready for discussion -- and he hoped that
would not take very long. He described his current state as one of "very profound
optimism".
The Foreign Minister of Portugal, Mr. Gama, said that matters had been discussed in a
substantive way. Until now, attention had been concentrated on a draft model for
democratic autonomy. The next move would be discussion of an agreement that would deal
with how the model would be presented to the East Timorese, in a democratic manner, to get
their views of the proposal.
Then, Mr. Gama continued, according to an Indonesian statement, if the East Timorese
refused the model of democratic autonomy, there would be another step. That would entail
returning the issue to the United Nations and reopening the decolonization processes.
Portugal very strongly praised the work of the United Nations on East Timor, especially
that of the Secretary- General and Mr. Marker. Portugal also held its own consultations
with the East Timorese, although the work of the United Nations in the area was very
important, he said.
Some assessment of final points of the draft were being undertaken, he continued, and
discussion on the agreement was commencing. It was very important to find a solution based
on democratic principles. It also had to be based on international law, which included
peaceful relations between Portugal and Indonesia.
The Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Mr. Alatas, told correspondents that the meeting had
been productive. Substantive progress had been made. Some points still needed further
discussion and thought, but the Ministers had covered most of the text put together by
their senior officials. The Indonesian delegation believed that the talks were on the
right track, and moving towards finalizing the substantive content of a model for
wide-ranging autonomy and a special status for East Timor.
The draft text the parties would now be looking at would be the main agreement, he
added. It would be the final act, explaining the two positions and the gist of the model
described in the annex.
As he had explained before, Indonesia continued to believe that its proposed solution
-- establishing a special status with wide-ranging autonomy for East Timor -- remained the
best solution. It was the most realistic, viable and peaceful solution and a good
compromise. Therefore, Indonesia believed that, first and foremost, the parties should try
to reach agreement on a good text on that proposal, which they were now in the process of
obtaining.
Then, the text should be presented to the East Timorese people inside and outside
Indonesia, he said, in order to determine their reaction. Indonesia had asked for the help
of the United Nations to devise the best way
East Timor Press Briefing - 3 - 9 February 1999
to determine whether or not the draft autonomy package would be acceptable to the East
Timorese people, or would be rejected. Only then could they move towards the next phase.
If the East Timorese people accepted the plan as a compromise, Indonesia would
implement it, he said, and steps would be taken in the United Nations in accordance with
the agreement.
If the proposal was rejected by the majority of East Timorese, Indonesia had now put
forward a second option, he continued. Under that option, the matter would be brought to
the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly. Elections in Indonesia for that Assembly
were due on 7 June, and it would, therefore, meet by the end of August. It would be
proposed to the Assembly that it consider, in the light of the rejection, whether it might
be better or wiser to part ways with East Timor. That would involve rescinding an earlier
Assembly resolution, which accepted integration of East Timor into Indonesia in 1978, and
replacing it with a new resolution to part ways in a dignified, peaceful and orderly
manner. After that, East Timor would legally revert back to its status before integration;
that of a non-self governing territory, within the context of the United Nations, with
Portugal as its administering Power.
A lot of "ifs" and "whens" remained before there would be a final
outcome, Mr. Alatas continued. Which route would be taken would be discovered later in the
year. That said, he was very pleased that progress was being made on the first step --
finalizing agreement on the proposal for wide- ranging autonomy and then placing it before
the East Timorese.
Asked whether Indonesia would allow the United Nations to conduct a referendum to
ascertain the views of East Timorese, Mr. Alatas said that the basic position of Indonesia
on that had been stated before. A referendum, or any decision using that form of
assessment of views, was not the way to proceed, because of inherent risks and dangers.
The result might be civil war. Rather, Indonesia had asked the United Nations to work with
it to find a way, short of a referendum, to consult the East Timorese.
Consultations had already occurred, he continued. Mr. Marker had consulted with East
Timorese in Portugal and Indonesia. That process might have to be expanded, making it
wider in its scope and perhaps improving on its methodology. To be frank, he concluded,
they did not yet know how best to achieve that, which was why it was one of the issues
still being discussed.
Asked if it was possible or permissible for the United Nations to determine the package
accepted or rejected without a popular vote, Mr. Marker explained that there were
discussions underway as to how it might be done. However, there was no question of
short-circuiting the democratic process. That could not be done. The trick was "to
kill the snake without breaking the stick". Right now, he was looking for the stick.
East Timor Press Briefing - 4 - 9 February 1999
Mr. Alatas added that, in the past, the United Nations had used various ways of
assessing the views of people. Forms of United Nations assessment of people's views
determined without referendums had been widely accepted.
Mr. Gama said that, at the end of the twentieth century, with democracy expanding, he
could not see the United Nations using any methods other than democratic methods to
determine the views of people. That meant a voting process was essential. Portugal's
acceptance of the result of what was now being negotiated would be proportional to the
legitimacy of the process the United Nations chose. That was, he stressed, Portugal's
position.
Asked whether Indonesia had agreed to allow a vote in East Timor and had subsequently
changed its position, as had been reported, Mr. Gama said that he had previously explained
what he hoped for from the umbrella agreement, which would cover the model for autonomy
and would elaborate United Nations actions in the matter. He would not comment further.
Mr. Alatas said that he had, this morning, explained in great detail the state of play
on the methodology for finding out the views of the East Timorese. Indonesia realized, as
did Portugal and the Secretary-General, that a methodology must be found that was
acceptable to all parties, and would also be deemed acceptable by the international
community. Indonesia was open minded about the methodology, short of accepting a
referendum. Referendums were complex and not easily organized. He continued to believe
that, for practical reasons linked to the situation and history of the East Timorese, such
a method was fraught with all kinds of risks.
In response to another question, Mr. Marker said consultations with the East Timorese
on the proposal must begin immediately, once there was agreement on the model to be
presented.
Asked about a United Nations presence during the process, Mr. Alatas said that when the
stage was reached where the United Nations was organizing the consultations in
implementation of what had been agreed, the United Nations would have to be in East Timor.
At that stage of the negotiations, the United Nations needed no permanent presence. It was
not necessary. United Nations representatives came to East Timor regularly. A United
Nations office there would prejudge the position on the subject under dispute.
Mr. Gama said a United Nations presence would be needed for a fair consultation and for
the possibility of an independent process.
Asked to respond to statements, attributed to the East Timorese leader, José Ramos
Horta, that the possibility of civil war could be eliminated immediately if the territory
was demilitarized and if the guns handed out in recent weeks were collected, Mr. Alatas
said he had spoken about the danger of conflict should a referendum be held. If Indonesia
were ever to agree to the holding of a referendum in East Timor, the Indonesian army would
not be there.
East Timor Press Briefing - 5 - 9 February 1999
They would have been withdrawn, as would the Indonesian local government. The United
Nations would have to be there, with United Nations troops. Only then could a referendum
take place.
Continuing, Mr. Alatas said that the accusation that the Indonesian army was arming
those East Timorese who favoured integration, so they could fight against independence,
that was misinformation and disinformation. Indonesia was accustomed to that kind of
disinformation after 23 years. What was happening in Indonesia, not just in East Timor,
was that there was a severe shortage of security personnel, especially police, who were
needed to quell disturbances occurring everywhere. Indonesia was facing a very serious
situation. The size of the police force was woefully inadequate and since new police could
not be recruited quickly and cheaply, it had been decided to organize "people's
guards", to guard the villages and certain urban areas. They were selectively armed;
that is, they had arms ready for them if necessary. In some cases, the arms referred to
were sticks. That was also happening in East Timor. The number of people involved in East
Timor was only a few hundred, not the 20,000 that he had read somewhere.
The last thing that Indonesia would want, if the East Timor problem was being settled,
was civil war again in East Timor, he continued. The brunt of the civil war would be borne
by Indonesia, as happened in 1975 when 45,000 East Timorese fled to the western part of
the island.
Asked what Indonesia's objection was to the idea of temporary autonomy for East Timor,
pending a referendum on independence at a specified later date, Mr. Alatas explained that
Indonesia had presented the offer of autonomy and special status, conforming to
international standards. If it was not wanted, and the East Timorese were free to not want
it, then why should Indonesia be asked to continue to bear the burden of East Timor's
financing and continue to bear the burden of all kinds of accusations if anything went
wrong? Indonesia's proposition was both clearer and fairer. Since the two alternatives had
been made available, there had been a crystallization of the views in the East Timorese
community, and they now understood which solution would be to their advantage.
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