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EAST TIMOR REPATRIATION AND SECURITY ACT OF 2000 (as
passed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 27, 2000)
S. 2621 (List of Sponsors) First introduced May 24, 2000: By Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. L. CHAFEE, Mr. HARKIN, Mr. KOHL, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. WYDEN, and Mr. KENNEDY): 106th CONGRESS S. 2621 To continue the current prohibition of military cooperation with the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia until the President determines and certifies to the Congress that certain conditions are being met. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. L. CHAFEE, Mr. HARKIN, Mr. KOHL, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. WYDEN, and Mr. KENNEDY) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations A BILL To continue the current prohibition of military cooperation with the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia until the President determines and certifies to the Congress that certain conditions are being met. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the `East Timor Repatriation and Security Act of 2000'. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. (see below for Findings in original version of the bill) The Congress finds the following: (1) Widespread violence and destruction were carried out in East Timor both before the August 30, 1999 United Nations referendum and thereafter. (2) In the latest of numerous attacks on aid workers in West Timor, 3 workers of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, including an American citizen, Carlos Caceres, were murdered on September 6, 2000 in Atambua, West Timor by a militia mob while Indonesian armed forces and police stood by. (3) Indonesian armed forces have failed to ensure the security of foreign aid workers and have allowed militias to terrorize refugee camps in West Timor. (4) Indonesian armed forces have trained and organized the militias. (5) An estimated 125,000 East Timorese remain in refugee camps in West Timor. (6) After the September 6, 2000 attack, all UNHCR staff and other international aid workers were evacuated from West Timor, leaving remaining East Timorese refugees at the mercy of the militias (7) Militia groups have returned to West Timor with the collusion of Indonesian armed forces. (8) Militia attacks have claimed the lives of two United Nations peacekeepers, from Nepal and New Zealand, during border operations. (9) Jafar Siddiq Hamzah, a leading human rights lawyer from Aceh, Indonesia, and a permanent resident of New York, was found murdered on September 3, 2000. SEC. 3. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS. It is the sense of the Congress that the United States Government should utilize all diplomatic and economic means to press for-- (1) the safe repatriation to East Timor of all East Timorese in West Timor and elsewhere who wish to return to East Timor; (2) an end to border incidents and infiltration of militias and an end to any other violent actions by militias and the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia against the people or territory of East Timor; (3) processes and prosecutions leading to justice for the victims of the violence in East Timor; (4) rapid reconstruction of East Timor, including maximum consultation with and inclusion of local personnel; and (5) a significant increase in employment for East Timorese in all internationally-sponsored reconstruction and United Nations efforts relating to East Timor. SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON MILITARY COOPERATION WITH AND ASSISTANCE TO THE ARMED FORCES OF INDONESIA. (a) PROHIBITION- Notwithstanding any other provision of law (other than section 589 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2000), United States military cooperation with, and military assistance for, the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia suspended by the President pursuant to the directive of the President issued on September 9, 1999, may not be resumed until the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Indonesia and the Indonesian Armed Forces are-- (1) taking effective measures to bring to justice members of the armed forces and militia groups against whom there is credible evidence of human rights violations; (2) taking effective measures to bring to justice members of the armed forces against who there is credible evidence of aiding or abetting militia groups; (3) allowing displaced persons and refugees to return home to East Timor, including providing safe passage for refugees returning from West Timor; (4) not impeding the activities of the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor; (5) demonstrating a commitment to preventing incursions into East Timor by members of militia groups in West Timor; and (6) demonstrating a commitment to accountability by cooperating with investigations and prosecutions of members of the Indonesian Armed Forces and militia groups responsible for human rights violations in Indonesia and East Timor. (b) DEFINITIONS- In this section: (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES- The term `appropriate congressional committees' means the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. (2) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY- The term `crimes against humanity' includes crimes of genocide, torture, forced disappearance, extrajudicial killing, and rape, if committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population. SEC. 5. RECOGNITION OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ASSISTING THE INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN EAST TIMOR. The Congress recognizes and salutes those members of the United States Armed Forces who have assisted the international peacekeeping operation in East Timor. STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS (Senate - May 24, 2000) By Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. L. CHAFEE, Mr. HARKIN, Mr. KOHL, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. WYDEN, and Mr. KENNEDY): S. 2621. A bill to continue the current prohibition of military cooperation with the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia until the President deter-mines and certifies to the Congress that certain conditions are being met; to the Committee on Foreign Relations. EAST TIMOR REPATRIATION AND SECURITY ACT OF 2000 Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to keep a promise that I made on this floor a few months ago. In January, I came to the floor to talk about the tragic events that occurred last fall in East Timor . I spoke about the need to encourage the new Indonesian government in its commitment to reform and its resolve to reject the climate of impunity. I withdrew an amendment that would have codified the administration's suspension on military and security assistance for Indonesia East Timor, although I believed then and strongly believe today that Indonesia has not yet met the basic conditions that should be prerequisites for any restoration of military ties with Indonesia. At that time , Mr. President, I pledged to continue to monitor events in Indonesia and in East Timor closely. And I pledged to come to this floor if what I saw troubled me. Let me tell you what I see today. First, I am sorry to say, Mr. President, there have been no trials yet. No one has been brought to justice for the atrocities committed in East Timor last year. I recognize that the Indonesian government has taken some courageous steps in investigating the atrocities that took place in East Timor , and I commend the Indonesian government for its efforts to date. The Indonesian government and the U.N. have succeeded in signing an agreement to exchange witnesses and evidence that could lead to the prosecution of those responsible for the violence in East Timor. A number of dedicated individuals within the new government continue to work courageously for reform, justice, and accountability. But I note, that observers have been disturbed by the number of civilian and military police officers that the government has appointed to the team charged with investigating human rights abuses in East Timor . And the simple fact remains--no one has yet been held accountable in a court of law for the acts committed by the military and militias in East Timor last year. A second concern is there has been no change in the situation in West Timor. Today, half a year after the referendum, some 100,000 people are still living in the refugee camps of West Timor , afraid of what will happen to them should they attempt to return home. Some will likely choose to stay in Indonesia, but all reports from the area indicate that many want to return home but do not because of continued intimidation from militia groups. Within the refugee camps, since January there have been about a dozen incidents in which international agencies attempting to deliver aid to the refugees were attacked. According to recent reports, one militia group is so well-organized that it prints a newsletter of fabricated horror stories aimed at dissuading refugees from returning to East Timor. This week the plight of these refugees--at this point the most vulnerable of the original masses--was made even more difficult as they contend with the heavy rains and floods that have already killed at least 148 people. Over a hundred are still missing. When the flood waters recede, these people should have every opportunity to put their lives back together, free from threats and from fear. I look at these facts and I consider that the administration has chosen to take a first step toward lifting its suspension on all forms of military assistance and contacts by inviting the Indonesians to participate in a joint exercise, and I am indeed troubled. Today I am introducing a bill, the East Timor Repatriation and Security Act of 2000. The bill codifies the suspension of military and security assistance to Indonesia until certain conditions are met--the same conditions that have been articulated in the past; the same conditions contained in last year's foreign operations appropriations bill. The bill would permit military and security assistance to resume only when the President determines and submits a report to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Indonesia and the Indonesian Armed Forces are: Taking effective measures to bring to justice members of the armed forces and militia groups against whom there is credible evidence of human rights violations; Taking effective measures to bring to justice members of the armed forces against whom there is credible evidence of aiding or abetting militia groups; Allowing displaced persons and refugees to return home to East Timor , including providing safe passage for refugees returning from West Timor ; Not impeding the activities of the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor ; Demonstrating a commitment to preventing incursions into East Timor by members of militia groups in West Timor ; and, Demonstrating a commitment to accountability by cooperating with investigations and prosecutions of members of the Indonesian Armed Forces and military groups responsible for human rights violations in Indonesia and East Timor . These certainly are not unreasonable conditions. They work in favor of the forces of reform within Indonesia. And by linking military and security assistance to these benchmarks, Congress will ensure that the U.S. relationship with Jakarta avoids the mistakes of the past, and that U.S. foreign policy comes closer to reflecting our core national values. To those who believe that all is well, to those who would prefer to forgive and forget, to those who think that the issue is yesterday's news, I would simply reiterate the simple facts. There have been no trials for the perpetrators of abuses in East Timor , and the situation in the refugee camps has remained unacceptable. Quite recently, Admiral Dennis Blair, commander in chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific, reaffirmed what Secretary of Defense Cohen articulated last year--the U.S. will not resume a military relationship with Indonesia until the military personnel responsible for the devastation in East Timor are brought to justice, and the U.S. will not resume a military relationship with Indonesia until the refugee crisis in West Timor has been resolved. Specifically, Admiral Blair called on the Indonesians to disband and cut off support to the militia members still terrorizing the refugees. It is critical that the U.S. insist on nothing less. In fact, we should insist on more--the militia members guilty of atrocities should be brought to justice. It is clear that these conditions have not yet been met. But the administration's new proposals for joint exercises with the Indonesians undermine Admiral Blair's words. The substance of the exercise currently being planned does not necessarily trouble me, but its significance does. The administration looks as if it suffers from a lack of resolve and from a wavering sense of commitment. Indonesia is an extraordinarily important country--strategically and economically. Its future course will undoubtedly affect the United States. For this very reason, we must stand firm, and insist upon rebuilding U.S.-Indonesian ties on the firm foundation of respect for the rule of law and for basic human rights. It is because I believe this so strongly--and I know that many of my colleagues share my views--that I have come back to the floor to raise this issue again. I am keeping my promise. I am watching the situation in East and West Timor very closely, and I still do not like what I see. FINDINGS in original version of the bill: (1) More than 100,000 East Timorese refugees remain in West Timor, where they fled or were forcibly driven by militia and members of the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia following the United Nations sponsored popular consultation of August 30, 1999, in which 78.5 percent of East Timor's population voted for independence from Indonesia. (2) Most of the East Timorese refugees in West Timor would like to return to East Timor but have been prevented from doing so by militia forces operating with the cooperation of Indonesian army elements. (3) Hundreds of the refugees in West Timor have died from preventable illnesses while many thousands continue to live in a state of danger, uncertainty and severe threats, including that of forced resettlement to other areas of Indonesia. (4) Elements of the Indonesian army have attempted to infiltrate armed militia members into East Timor, and reportedly have planned a militia invasion of East Timor. (5) Border attacks by militia groups remain a threat to peace and stability in the region and to international peacekeeping forces. (6) Much of East Timor's infrastructure was destroyed in the violence of 1999 and remains to be rebuilt. (7) An estimated 200,000 of East Timor's original estimated population of 700,000 perished from the effects of Indonesia's occupation of East Timor before the violence of 1999. (8) Many East Timorese were killed in violence perpetrated by Indonesian army elements and militia in 1999. (9) The prospects for justice for the victims of the violence in East Timor remain unclear. (10) An estimated 80 percent of East Timor's population remains unemployed and East Timor's Nobel Prize winning Catholic Bishop, Carlos Ximenes Belo, has made a plea on their behalf. (11) United States funds have been provided to help rebuild East Timor. (12) Communications and logistical units of the United States Armed Forces have formed part of the international peacekeeping forces that entered East Timor in 1999. (13) Following historic elections in October 1999, Indonesia's first democratically elected President, Abdurrahman Wahid, has pledged reform and accountability within the Indonesian government and military. (14) The Government of Indonesia, led by President Abdurrahman Wahid and Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri, has made good faith commitments to end Indonesian military support for militias and to establish a fair and transparent mechanism to bring to justice the perpetrators of gross human rights violations in East Timor and elsewhere, but efforts of the elected leadership of Indonesia have been resisted, and in some cases actively disobeyed, by elements in the military and in the bureaucracy.
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