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May 2001
Current Status
Recommendations
Forum of NGOs for Humanitarian issues in West Timor statement on refugee
registration
Additional Links
East Timorese Refugees and the Need for Justice
More than one-tenth of the population of East Timor - 80,000 to 100,000
people - has been virtual hostages in squalid refugee camps in West Timor
(Indonesia) for nearly two years. Repatriation has slowed to a trickle,
due to the failure of the international community to act, combined with
intransigence by the Indonesian military and government. Although East
Timor is now free of Indonesian troops, the refugees across the border
live under daily militia-imposed terror.
The situation of the East Timorese refugees is critical. Jesuit Refugee
Service, the only international organization with a regular presence in
the West Timor camps, observes drastically worsening conditions, including
critical food shortages and spreading epidemics. The Centre for Internally
Displaced People's Services, an Indonesian humanitarian agency in West
Timor, reports as many as five deaths per day among refugee children.
Violence against refugee and West Timorese women, including sexual slavery
to militia leaders, has also been documented. Allegations of bias, poor
communications, and insufficient security measures surround the Indonesian
government's plans for a massive one-day refugee registration on June 6,
2001. In addition, refugees who do not return to East Timor by June 20th
will be unable to vote in elections determining the structure of East
Timor's independent government.
The East Timor Action Network (ETAN) is gravely concerned for
the human and political rights of the East Timorese refugees. ETAN has
written this briefing paper to complement the United States tour we are
organizing for the West Timor-based General Secretary of the Centre for
Internally Displaced People's Services (CIS), Winston Neil Rondo.
Background
On August 30, 1999, the East Timorese people voted overwhelmingly for
independence from Indonesia in a United Nations (U.N.)-supervised
referendum, ending 24 years of brutal, illegal Indonesian military
occupation. Immediately following the ballot, the military (TNI) and its
militias conducted a scorched earth campaign, forcing 300,000 East
Timorese to flee into the mountains and moving more than 260,000 people
across the border into West Timor, often at gunpoint. In addition to
displacing 70% of East Timor's population, the TNI and its militias
destroyed three-fourths of the buildings and most of the country's
infrastructure. Currently, East Timor is under a transitional U.N.
administration, with full independence scheduled for early 2002.
Overwhelming evidence proves the TNI formed, funded, armed, and directed
the militias from early 1999 in an attempt to derail the referendum.
Militia violence - including the April 1999 massacres of at least 50 in
the Liquica church and at least 12 in the Dili home of independence leader
Manuel Carrascalao - allowed TNI to terrorize the country but claim
innocence. This policy existed before and continued following the
agreement signed by the U.N. and the governments of Indonesia and Portugal
on May 5, 1999, which entrusted security in East Timor during the
referendum process to Indonesia. In response to the post-ballot
destruction, an international force was deployed in East Timor, prompting
most militias and all Indonesian troops to withdraw into West Timor.
On September 6, 2000, militias murdered three international workers with
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in a refugee camp
near Atambua, West Timor; it remains the worst attack ever on the UNHCR.
Following the killings, all international aid workers were evacuated from
West Timor. There remains almost no international presence in the refugee
camps. The U.N. Security Council called for "immediate and effective
action" to end the refugee crisis, but a Security Council delegation
to West and East Timor two months later witnessed continued intimidation
and misinformation by the militias and found the refugees' condition to be
"truly depressing." Since then, little has been done to enable
refugees to decide freely whether to return to East Timor or to settle in
Indonesia, and the situation continues to deteriorate. Hunger and poor
health conditions are widespread problems in the refugee camps, and
tensions are increasing between the refugees and some West Timorese
communities.
One of the main obstacles to resolving the refugee crisis is the continued
presence of armed militia in many West Timor camps. CIS and other
observers have noted military recruitment and training of militias, and
militia intimidation of refugees wishing to return to East Timor. The
international community and Indonesian authorities have been unwilling or
unable to disarm the militias and arrest those guilty of serious crimes,
including murder and rape, in East and West Timor. Although the Indonesian
government has repeatedly promised to disarm the militias, their
ineffective attempts are largely seen as a token gesture to pacify the
international community. The militias continue to foment an atmosphere of
fear among the refugees, holding them hostage to the political and
personal demands of militia leaders. The Indonesian military and militia
members in West Timor also present a serious threat to the integrity and
security of East Timor. The United States, U.N. and other international
authorities must act now to support justice and democracy in Indonesia, to
secure the refugees' human rights, and to ensure peace in East Timor.
The UNHCR and most other international agencies blame poor security
conditions for their failure to resume necessary work in West Timor.
Disturbingly, the UNHCR plans to disengage from the entire process,
regardless of the reality on the ground for the tens of thousands of East
Timorese refugees, due to reduced funding and political pressure to
declare the crisis resolved.
Indonesian efforts at refugee registration and repatriation in March 2001
met with failure, as TNI troops enabled militia leaders to terrify
potential returnees. The Indonesian government plans another attempt at
registration on June 6, 2001, but observers are concerned the prominent
role of the Indonesian military and militias in this process will again
prevent refugees from choosing freely between repatriation and
resettlement in Indonesia. The militias operate with impunity and with the
encouragement of TNI, and the refugee crisis will not end without strong
pressure on Indonesia and the U.N. from its member countries -- especially
the United States.
The failure of Indonesia and the international community to achieve
justice for East Timor exacerbates the refugee crisis. In its January 2000
report, the U.N. International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor called
for an international tribunal on crimes against humanity. The U.N. report
states:
The intimidation, terror, destruction of property, displacement and
evacuation of people [in 1999] would not have been possible without the
active involvement of the Indonesian army, and the knowledge and approval
of the top military command… The Commission is of the view that
ultimately the Indonesian army was responsible for the intimidation,
terror, killings and other acts of violence experienced by the people of
East Timor before and after the popular consultation. Further, the
evidence collected to date indicates that particular individuals were
directly involved in violations of human rights.
These findings were emphasized in a recent U.N.-commissioned report,
which called "the continued forced detention of those East Timorese
in refugee camps in West Timor who wish to return to their homeland"
… "one of the most serious crimes against humanity" committed
in East Timor in 1999.
However, no Indonesian military officers or militia leaders have been held
accountable for the forced removal of people from East Timor, or for the
murders, assaults, rapes and other serious crimes committed in West and
East Timor. In fact, many high-ranking Indonesian officers involved in
these crimes remain in positions of power, and some have even been
promoted. Recent actions by the Indonesian government and security forces,
described below, leave an international tribunal as the best remaining
hope for justice.
Current Status
As of May 2001, 80,000 to 100,000 East Timorese refugees remain in West
Timor camps. Some choose to stay for financial or other well-informed
reasons. However, the U.N., international humanitarian agencies, the East
Timorese leadership and other observers agree that a significant fraction
would choose to return to East Timor if they could do so in an atmosphere
free of fear and intimidation. In fact, in April the Governor of West
Timor asserted that the majority of refugees want to return immediately to
East Timor to participate in upcoming elections there.
Indonesia's plans to conduct a massive one-day refugee registration on
June 6, 2001, make this issue especially urgent. The planned registration
will require refugees to choose between returning to East Timor and
remaining in Indonesia. Concerns regarding the registration voiced by the
West Timor Forum on Humanitarian Issues, a coalition of nongovernmental
organizations working with the refugees, include the prominent role of the
Indonesian military and militias in the process, the continuing presence
of weapons in the camps, and confusing registration materials.
The humanitarian situation in the camps continues to deteriorate. Poor
conditions have escalated tensions between refugees and West Timorese, and
among the refugees themselves. Recent clashes between refugees around
Kupang forced Jesuit Refugee Service to temporarily suspend programs in
the region. Stress has also increased incidents of violence against women
in the camps.
In a May 2001 report to the Security Council, Secretary-General Kofi Annan
stated, "The pro-Indonesian militias based in West Timor have
continued to advocate armed struggle to bring East Timor into Indonesia
and have not laid down their arms." A TNI spokesman recently admitted
attempts to disarm militias had failed, explaining the militias use their
weapons to strengthen their "bargaining position," and they were
therefore loath to give them up. This statement leads one to question how
committed the TNI is to disarming their cohorts. Father Mark Raper, former
head of Jesuit Refugee Service, recently linked the need for justice and a
resolution to the West Timor refugee crisis, stating, "There is no
process of accountability for the perpetrators of the violence, and in
those camps are many militias. Without the help of the international
community, these camps will not be liberated from the control of the
militias."
The Indonesian government and security forces have placed serious
obstructions to justice for East Timor. In April, Indonesian President
Abdurrahman Wahid signed a decree establishing an ad hoc Human Rights
Court for East Timor that limits the court's jurisdiction to crimes
committed after the August 1999 referendum. This measure effectively
assures impunity for high-ranking military strongly implicated in planning
and directing gross human rights abuses. The U.N., Amnesty International,
and others have expressed concern at restrictions placed by the
presidential decree, which will exclude two of 1999's worst massacres --
the April attacks in Liquica and Dili -- from the court's purview. In
addition, the Indonesian Attorney General's office has not investigated
any cases of violence against women, which was a major component of 1999's
violence.
Extremely lenient sentences recently handed down by Indonesian courts in
two high-profile cases of militia further demonstrate the need for an
international tribunal for East Timor. Eurico Guterres, head of the
murderous Aitarak militia, was given only six months in jail, minus time
served under house arrest, for inciting violence in West Timor.
(Subsequently, Guterres has led an "anti-communist" organization
burning books and terrorizing people throughout Indonesia.) In May, six
militia members were given sentences of 10 to 20 months for the brutal
murders of the three UNHCR workers last September. The defendants have
admitted their guilt. The sentence was decried as "a wholly
unacceptable response to the ultimate sacrifice" by U.N.
Secretary-General Annan. The U.S. State Department questioned
"Indonesia's commitment to the principle of accountability and its
commitment to the international community to bring to justice the
perpetrators of this and other crimes in East and West Timor." The
head of Indonesia's National Commission on Human Rights has remarked,
"Without enough international pressure, there won't be enough
domestic political will for justice."
Recommendations
The East Timor Action Network, in consultation with the Centre for
Internally Displaced People's Services in West Timor, makes the following
recommendations for actions by the Indonesian and United States
governments and the U.N. to resolve East Timor's refugee crisis, and to
achieve justice for serious crimes committed in East and West Timor:
- The Indonesian government must act immediately to disarm and disband
militias in West Timor; to provide security for international
organizations to resume operations in the refugee camps; to ensure
adequate security and access to registration information for all
refugees before proceeding with refugee registration efforts; to
include international organizations and local nongovernmental
organizations in any refugee registration process; to provide aid for
West Timorese communities impacted by the refugee camps; to hold TNI
and militia responsible for gross human rights violations committed in
East and West Timor; and to cooperate with U.N. efforts to investigate
and prosecute crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in East
Timor.
- The U.N. should fully accept responsibility for the future of the
East Timorese refugees who were forced into West Timor as a
consequence of a U.N.-conducted referendum. The UNHCR and other U.N.
agencies should resume their support for the refugees, and continue to
provide humanitarian assistance until all refugees have had the
opportunity to freely decide whether to return to East Timor or settle
in Indonesia. The U.N., in conjunction with UNHCR, the International
Organization for Migration and others, should provide transportation,
resettlement, and other services to enable those who chose
repatriation to go home.
- The U.S. and U.N. must pressure the Indonesian government and its
security forces to verifiably disarm and disband the militias in West
Timor. TNI must end its continued support of the militias, and the
militias must be physically separated from civilians in the refugee
camps. International and Indonesian agencies must provide counseling
and rehabilitation services to militia members to enable them to
re-enter society.
- The U.S. and U.N. must ensure that any refugee registration process
is conducted under international oversight and with significant
international participation, including that of the UNHCR, so that
refugees may safely and freely choose between repatriation to East
Timor and resettlement in Indonesia. The Indonesian government's task
force for refugee repatriation, SATGAS-PMP, must stop working with
militia, as it is currently doing.
- The U.S. and U.N. must work with the Indonesian government, its
security forces, organizations in West Timor, and other involved
parties to ensure that refugees wishing to return to East Timor to
participate in the August 2001 Constituent Assembly elections are able
to do so.
- The U.S. and U.N. must support humanitarian efforts to provide aid
to West Timorese communities who have also suffered during the refugee
crisis, through loss of land; property destruction; increased
militarization and violence, including violence against West Timorese
women; and decreased availability of essential resources.
- The U.S. must actively work towards the formation of an
international tribunal for crimes against humanity and war crimes
committed in East Timor. The U.S. and U.N. must support an expanded
mandate for the tribunal that includes crimes of universal
jurisdiction against East Timorese people committed during and since
Indonesia's 1975 invasion.
- The U.S. and U.N. must ensure that those who perpetrated rape,
sexual slavery, forced sterilization, and other widespread forms of
violence against women committed in East Timor since 1975 and in West
Timor since 1999 are held accountable.
- The U.S. and U.N. must provide increased technical support and other
resources to judicial efforts in East Timor and Indonesia, to support
nation-building and reconciliation in East Timor, and to further
democratic reform and the rule of law
Back to Tour Media Release
Schedule of Tour events
Biography of Winston Neil Rondo
Note: this statement has been publicized
widely through local media and has been presented directly to the Deputy
Governor of NTT as the responsible party for refugee affairs within the
NTT regional administration. It has led to the postponement of the
registration from 1 May to 6 June because of unequal socialization,
security problems in the camp and the rejection by UNTAS (militia group)
of this statement and of the registration process designed by the
government.
Forum of NGOs for Humanitarian issues in West Timor
The Forum of NGOs for Humanitarian Issues in West Timor is a forum
comprising several NGOs in West Timor working with refugees in West Timor,
with great concern for humanitarian issues and upholding human rights in
West Timor.
We have observed the situation related to the decision to register
refugees from East Timor currently in West Timor on 1 May 2001. We stand
on the principles of respect for free choice and the need to secure a
sense of safety for the refugees in this process of registration. We are
thus presenting the following:
1. We support the plans to register refugees in West Timor on the
following conditions:
a. the process of registration must take place under truly free and
safe conditions' this includes absence of weapons or threats of violence
and the absence of all forms of prejudice or vested interests.
b. a clear, widespread, open and equitable process of socializing the
registration procedures covering each area, in face-to-face meetings,
distribution of pamphlets/leaflets or press releases in all local mass
media, all of which should provide concrete information about the
following:
-the goal of the registration -time of registration -format of
registration -mechanisms of registration -actors/officials involved in the
registration -guarantees for security during and after the registration.
This is to ensure that male and female refugees and male and female
local residents have the same access to all information, to ensure that
the rights of all men and women are protected, and to ensure that all are
properly prepared to participate in a peaceful manner.
c. No weapons may be hidden inside or outside the camps.
d. The security of local residents around the camps must be taken into
account.
e. To ensure a smooth registration process, all refugees must have
equal access to the registration process, and in order to ensure the
safety of the refugees, we ask that the registration format must take into
account the following:
-the mother tongue of the person registered -repatriation and
resettlement options should be deleted; -the format should add an item
asking the place of origin of husband/wife.
f. There must be monitors to oversee the entire refugee registration
process, covering the socialization period to and including the
post-registration period.
We feel that the safety of the refugees is not fully secured and for
that reason it is very likely that the registration will give rise to
serious conflict in West Timor. For that reason, the above requirements
must be attended to.
2. We urge the Refugee Registration Committee and the Task Force for
the Resolution of East Timorese Refugee Question to co-operate with those
NGOs that have observed the problems of refugees for a long time but have
not been asked to participate in discussions and decision making.
3. We demand that the Refugee Registration Committee, the Task Force
for the Resolution of the East Timorese Refugee Question and the
government of Indonesia ensure that women refugees do not suffer
marginalization, are not subjected to discrimination, and are not sexually
exploited during the registration process and during efforts to repatriate
or relocate them. We also demand that refugee women and local women be
involved in significant numbers in the decision making process (thus, in
meaningful numbers), in relation to the question of refugees in NTT (East
Nusatenggara).
This demand is made by the Forum of NGOs for Humanitarian Issues in
West Timor:
1. The Women's Health Network for East Indonesia (JKPIT)
2. Lap Timoris
3. Lakmas Cendana Wangi
4. The Volunteer Team for Humanitarian Issues, Flores (TRUK-F)
5. CIS GAMKI-GMKI NTT
6. Rumah Perempuan Kupang (Kupang Women's House)
7. Forum for Disaster Preparedness and Response (FKPB)
8. West Timor Humanitarian Team (TKTB)
Kupang, 2 April 2001
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